Babies and Animals

Here is a common argument in favor of animal rights:

1. If babies have rights, then animals have rights.
2. Babies have rights.
Therefore,
3. Animals have rights.

In 1977, philosopher R. G. Frey argued that at least one of the premises of this argument must be false, and hence that the argument is unsound. (R. G. Frey, "Animal Rights," Analysis 37 [June 1977]: 186-9.) This doesn't show that animals don't have rights, for an unsound argument can have a true conclusion; but it does show—if Frey is right—that there must be some other basis for animal rights than the one provided by this argument.

What is Frey's argument? Frey claims that (i) there are only three grounds for ascribing rights to babies and (ii) none of them applies to animals. Thus, what makes premise 2 true makes premise 1 false. What are the three grounds?

1. Potentiality. Babies may not be rational, but they're potentially rational. If we ascribe rights to babies on the basis of their potential rationality, we thereby deny rights to animals, for animals are not even potentially rational.

2. Similarity. Babies may not be rational, but they're similar in many other respects to "other members of our species." If we ascribe rights to babies on the basis of their similarity to other human beings, we thereby deny rights to animals, for animals are not similar in many other respects to human beings.

3. Immortality. Babies may not be rational, but they have immortal souls. If we ascribe rights to babies on the basis of their immortality, we thereby deny rights to animals, for animals are not immortal.

One way to challenge Frey is to show that (i) there is a ground other than these three for ascribing rights to babies and (ii) it applies to animals. Can you think of such a ground?