11 May 2008
From Today's New York Times
To the Editor:
Re “On the Ground, Counting Deer” (New Jersey and the Region, May 4) and the efforts of Essex County officials to justify the deer hunt in South Mountain Reservation:
When I moved to New Jersey from New York City 13 years ago, I was enchanted to encounter deer in a forest two blocks from my house in South Orange (which abuts the reservation).
People who move out here from the city generally feel the same way. It tends to be the Jersey natives who drive too fast and refuse to build fences in their backyards who view wildlife as the enemy.
You report that Susan Predl, a senior biologist with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, uses “distance sampling” to count the deer that managed to survive the recent county-organized, taxpayer-financed slaughter.
You also note that “counting deer is an imprecise science” and that an aerial survey is expensive, “but some believe it yields the most accurate count.” Grid searches are the best, although that would require patience and commitment, which seem in short supply in Essex County.
The article’s observations regarding “rutted roads” and “long-neglected picnic groves and campgrounds” more accurately describe the pitiful condition of the reservation. The lack of maintenance and patrol is staggering under the stewardship of Joseph N. DiVincenzo Jr., the county executive. The fault does not lie with the deer.
Kelly Bishop
South Orange, N.J., May 5, 2008
(0) CommentsRe “On the Ground, Counting Deer” (New Jersey and the Region, May 4) and the efforts of Essex County officials to justify the deer hunt in South Mountain Reservation:
When I moved to New Jersey from New York City 13 years ago, I was enchanted to encounter deer in a forest two blocks from my house in South Orange (which abuts the reservation).
People who move out here from the city generally feel the same way. It tends to be the Jersey natives who drive too fast and refuse to build fences in their backyards who view wildlife as the enemy.
You report that Susan Predl, a senior biologist with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, uses “distance sampling” to count the deer that managed to survive the recent county-organized, taxpayer-financed slaughter.
You also note that “counting deer is an imprecise science” and that an aerial survey is expensive, “but some believe it yields the most accurate count.” Grid searches are the best, although that would require patience and commitment, which seem in short supply in Essex County.
The article’s observations regarding “rutted roads” and “long-neglected picnic groves and campgrounds” more accurately describe the pitiful condition of the reservation. The lack of maintenance and patrol is staggering under the stewardship of Joseph N. DiVincenzo Jr., the county executive. The fault does not lie with the deer.
Kelly Bishop
South Orange, N.J., May 5, 2008
09 May 2008
From the Mailbag
Keith,
Here is a photo of a little guy we found across the street. It was chewing on the remains of a little bird that had fallen out of its nest. It was right on the curb and I was concerned about it getting run over. My son and I put it in a box and took it to a ditch area behind our house. Usually possums this small are with their mothers. This little guy appeared weak and the wound on its head is very apparent. The heart in me wanted to take him in and get him up to strength. What to do? During this season, a lot of little birds will be falling from the trees. There is really nothing you can do for them. A young bird, yet to reach flight, is extremely vulnerable to pet cats and dogs. Feeding and caging them from your own pet, is impossible. Birds, possums, same problem.
I regret that I didn't leave that little fellow with some dog food or a can of tuna. However, my son and I did remove him from the dangers of man (cars). We took positive action. We did leave him in nature in a more secure location than when we found him. Nature has already been cruel.
We did our part. There is a philosophical lesson here somewhere.
Regards,
Christopher
(0) CommentsHere is a photo of a little guy we found across the street. It was chewing on the remains of a little bird that had fallen out of its nest. It was right on the curb and I was concerned about it getting run over. My son and I put it in a box and took it to a ditch area behind our house. Usually possums this small are with their mothers. This little guy appeared weak and the wound on its head is very apparent. The heart in me wanted to take him in and get him up to strength. What to do? During this season, a lot of little birds will be falling from the trees. There is really nothing you can do for them. A young bird, yet to reach flight, is extremely vulnerable to pet cats and dogs. Feeding and caging them from your own pet, is impossible. Birds, possums, same problem.
I regret that I didn't leave that little fellow with some dog food or a can of tuna. However, my son and I did remove him from the dangers of man (cars). We took positive action. We did leave him in nature in a more secure location than when we found him. Nature has already been cruel.
We did our part. There is a philosophical lesson here somewhere.
Regards,
Christopher
08 May 2008
From Today's New York Times
To the Editor:
Re “Another Horse-Racing Horror” (editorial, May 6):
Thank you for adding your voice to the many who are demanding that the welfare of racehorses should come before profits. But let us also give thought to the thousands of horses that are bred every year for racing and don’t make the cut or outlive their usefulness to the investors and owners.
Most wind up auctioned off for a few dollars each and sent to the foreign slaughterhouses to be made into pet food or dinner for someone overseas. Even the 1986 Kentucky Derby winner Ferdinand ended up in a Japanese slaughterhouse because he wasn’t proving his monetary value as a stud.
It’s not just the injured horses that suffer. It’s the thousands of faceless colts and fillies we never see that suffer from this so-called sport.
Jane Shakman
Ossining, N.Y., May 6, 2008
(0) CommentsRe “Another Horse-Racing Horror” (editorial, May 6):
Thank you for adding your voice to the many who are demanding that the welfare of racehorses should come before profits. But let us also give thought to the thousands of horses that are bred every year for racing and don’t make the cut or outlive their usefulness to the investors and owners.
Most wind up auctioned off for a few dollars each and sent to the foreign slaughterhouses to be made into pet food or dinner for someone overseas. Even the 1986 Kentucky Derby winner Ferdinand ended up in a Japanese slaughterhouse because he wasn’t proving his monetary value as a stud.
It’s not just the injured horses that suffer. It’s the thousands of faceless colts and fillies we never see that suffer from this so-called sport.
Jane Shakman
Ossining, N.Y., May 6, 2008
From the Mailbag
Keith,
Here is an online ethics and animals class I developed for the Humane Society of the United States. Perhaps its content would be useful for your readers.
Thanks
Nathan Nobis, Ph.D.
(0) CommentsHere is an online ethics and animals class I developed for the Humane Society of the United States. Perhaps its content would be useful for your readers.
Thanks
Nathan Nobis, Ph.D.
07 May 2008
Farm Sanctuary
(0) CommentsBabies and Animals, Part 2
Seven months after R. G. Frey's essay was published, philosophers Dale Jamieson and Tom Regan replied to it. (Dale Jamieson and Tom Regan, "Animal Rights: A Reply to Frey," Analysis 38 [January 1978]: 32-6.) They make the following points:
(0) Comments1. Nobody makes the argument Frey criticizes. It is certainly not an "important argument," as Frey claims.I think point 2 is shaky. Animals are not rational in any meaningful sense, and if they are not rational, then they are not potentially rational. Point 3 is a good reply, in my opinion. The right not to be made to suffer derives from (i) sentience and (ii) the intrinsic badness of pain. As for point 1, I don't see why it matters whether anyone has made the argument. It's an argument in favor of animal rights. Those who deny that animals have rights (e.g., Frey) must find fault with it. As for whether it's an "important" argument, I don't know. Nothing hinges on whether it is.
2. Frey claims that there are only three grounds for premise 2 of the argument: potentiality, similarity, and immortality. None of these grounds, he says, applies to animals. Jamieson and Regan reply that some animals are potentially rational. If so, then it is not the case, as Frey claims, that every ground for affirming premise 2 renders premise 1 false. At least one ground for affirming premise 2 renders premise 1 true.
3. The three grounds Frey supplies for premise 2 are not exhaustive. There is at least one other ground—namely, sentience—for the proposition that babies have rights. Unfortunately for Frey, this ground, unlike the three he supplies, does not preclude animals from having rights. Since both babies and animals are sentient, both have rights.
06 May 2008
Babies and Animals
Here is a common argument in favor of animal rights:
What is Frey's argument? Frey claims that (i) there are only three grounds for ascribing rights to babies and (ii) none of them applies to animals. Thus, what makes premise 2 true makes premise 1 false. What are the three grounds?
(0) Comments1. If babies have rights, then animals have rights.In 1977, philosopher R. G. Frey argued that at least one of the premises of this argument must be false, and hence that the argument is unsound. (R. G. Frey, "Animal Rights," Analysis 37 [June 1977]: 186-9.) This doesn't show that animals don't have rights, for an unsound argument can have a true conclusion; but it does show—if Frey is right—that there must be some other basis for animal rights than the one provided by this argument.
2. Babies have rights.
Therefore,
3. Animals have rights.
What is Frey's argument? Frey claims that (i) there are only three grounds for ascribing rights to babies and (ii) none of them applies to animals. Thus, what makes premise 2 true makes premise 1 false. What are the three grounds?
1. Potentiality. Babies may not be rational, but they're potentially rational. If we ascribe rights to babies on the basis of their potential rationality, we thereby deny rights to animals, for animals are not even potentially rational.One way to challenge Frey is to show that (i) there is a ground other than these three for ascribing rights to babies and (ii) it applies to animals. Can you think of such a ground?
2. Similarity. Babies may not be rational, but they're similar in many other respects to "other members of our species." If we ascribe rights to babies on the basis of their similarity to other human beings, we thereby deny rights to animals, for animals are not similar in many other respects to human beings.
3. Immortality. Babies may not be rational, but they have immortal souls. If we ascribe rights to babies on the basis of their immortality, we thereby deny rights to animals, for animals are not immortal.
04 May 2008
Plant Rights
Here is an essay by Wesley J. Smith. There is no inconsistency in rejecting plant rights while accepting animal rights. If Smith thinks that plant rights and animal rights stand or fall together, then he is confused, for there is a morally relevant difference between plants and animals, namely, that only the latter are sentient.
Addendum: Smith appears not to understand the animal-rights movement. He writes:
Addendum 2: Smith wants the circle of moral concern to be the same as the circle of biological humanity. In his view, neither animals nor plants have rights. He seems to think that if we expand the circle to include animals, we will have to expand it, on pain of inconsistency, to include plants. This is false, for there is, as I say, a morally relevant difference between animals and plants that justifies drawing a line between them. The circle of moral concern should include all sentient beings, not all living organisms.
Addendum 3: When I was a law student at Wayne State University in the early 1980s, I took a graduate philosophy course in ethics with Bruce Russell. He allowed me to write a term paper entitled "Do Plants Have Rights?" Little did I know that I'd be coming back to that topic a quarter of a century later!
Addendum 4: Smith should grapple with the biocentric arguments of Paul W. Taylor in Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). It is one of the best books I've read. It sounds to me as though Europeans are taking Taylor's theory seriously.
(1) CommentsAddendum: Smith appears not to understand the animal-rights movement. He writes:
The animal rights movement grew out of the same poisonous soil. Animal rights ideology holds that moral worth comes with sentience or the ability to suffer. Thus, since both animals and humans feel pain, animal rights advocates believe that what is done to an animal should be judged morally as if it were done to a human being. Some ideologues even compare the Nazi death camps to normal practices of animal husbandry. For example, Charles Patterson wrote in Eternal Treblinka—a book specifically endorsed by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals—that "the road to Auschwitz begins at the slaughterhouse."Animal-rights advocates do not believe "that what is done to an animal should be judged morally as if it were done to a human being." What they believe is that animals matter, morally. Animals have weight on the moral scale. Morally speaking, animals are something, not nothing. Inflicting pain on animals must be justified. This is not to say that it can't be justified, only that it must be.
Addendum 2: Smith wants the circle of moral concern to be the same as the circle of biological humanity. In his view, neither animals nor plants have rights. He seems to think that if we expand the circle to include animals, we will have to expand it, on pain of inconsistency, to include plants. This is false, for there is, as I say, a morally relevant difference between animals and plants that justifies drawing a line between them. The circle of moral concern should include all sentient beings, not all living organisms.
Addendum 3: When I was a law student at Wayne State University in the early 1980s, I took a graduate philosophy course in ethics with Bruce Russell. He allowed me to write a term paper entitled "Do Plants Have Rights?" Little did I know that I'd be coming back to that topic a quarter of a century later!
Addendum 4: Smith should grapple with the biocentric arguments of Paul W. Taylor in Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). It is one of the best books I've read. It sounds to me as though Europeans are taking Taylor's theory seriously.
H. J. McCloskey on Animal Rights
The issue as to who or what may be a possessor of rights is not simply a matter of academic, conceptual interest. Obviously, important conclusions follow from any answer. If, for instance, it is determined that gravely mentally defective human beings and monsters born of human parents are not the kinds of beings who may possess rights, this bears on how we may treat them. It does not settle such questions as to whether it is right to kill them if they are a burden or if they are enduring pointless suffering, but it does bear in an important way on such questions. Even if such beings cannot be possessors of rights it might still be wrong to kill them, but the case against killing those who endure pain is obviously easier to set out if they can be shown to be capable of possessing rights and in fact possess rights. Similarly, important conclusions follow from the question as to whether animals have rights. If they do, as Salt argued, it would seem an illegitimate invasion of animal rights to kill and eat them, if, as seems to be the case, we can sustain ourselves without killing animals. If animals have rights, the case for vegetarianism is prima facie very strong, and is comparable with the case against cannibalism.
(H. J. McCloskey, "Rights," The Philosophical Quarterly 15 [April 1965]: 115-27, at 122 [footnote omitted])
(0) Comments(H. J. McCloskey, "Rights," The Philosophical Quarterly 15 [April 1965]: 115-27, at 122 [footnote omitted])
01 May 2008
Animal Prosthetics
(0) CommentsStatistics
I almost feel guilty about not posting more often (and more substantively) on this blog, given its expanding readership. This past month, there were 5,208 visitors to the blog, which is an average of 173.6 per day. The previous records (set in March 2008) were 4,200 and 135.4. I have a number of posts about animals waiting in the wings, but I have been saving them for summer, when I have more time. One of them is a long critique of philosopher David Oderberg's argument against animal rights. Mylan and I appreciate your interest in our blog. Perhaps Jonathan will post some items this summer as well. He has been busy with his studies at UT-Austin.
(0) Comments