Statistics

This blog had 1,600 visits during November, which is an average of 53.3 visits per day. A year ago, the average was 54.9.

Ten Years Gone

Here are the posts from December 2006.

Anniversary

I started this blog 13 years ago today. There have been 310,008 visits, which is an average of 23,846.7 visits per year, 457.0 visits per week, and 65.2 visits per day (taking leap years into account). Here is the first post, on 28 November 2003.

Bernard E. Rollin on the Moral Status of Animals

Philosophers have shown that the standard reasons offered to exclude animals from the moral circle, and to justify not assessing our treatment of them by the same moral categories and machinery we use for assessing the treatment of humans, do not meet the test of moral relevance. Such historically sanctified reasons as “animals lack a soul,” “animals do not reason,” “humans are more powerful than animals,” “animals do not have language,” “God said we could do as we wish to animals” have been demonstrated to provide no rational basis for failing to reckon with animal interests in our moral deliberations. For one thing, while the above statements may mark differences between humans and animals, they do not mark morally relevant differences that justify harming animals when we would not similarly harm people. For example, if we justify harming animals on the grounds that we are more powerful than they are, we are essentially affirming “might makes right,” a principle that morality is in large measure created to overcome. By the same token, if we are permitted to harm animals for our benefit because they lack reason, there are no grounds for not extending the same logic to non-rational humans, as we shall shortly see. And while animals may not have the same interests as people, it is evident to commonsense [sic] that they certainly do have interests, the fulfillment and thwarting of which matter to them.

(Bernard E. Rollin, "The Moral Status of Animals and Their Use as Experimental Subjects," chap. 41 in A Companion to Bioethics, 2d ed., ed. Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer [Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009], 495-509, at 497 [italics in original])

Uppity Human

See here.

Leonard Nelson (1882-1927) on Duties to Animals

Moral philosophers, even those belonging to the Critical School [the followers of Kant and Fries], have often represented duties to animals as indirect duties to oneself or to other men. For instance, maltreatment of animals is forbidden on the ground that it encourages cruelty, that is, a disposition that obstructs fulfillment of duty. Now, maltreatment of animals may have just that effect; nevertheless the argument in question takes no account of the whole truth. For according to this argument, maltreatment of animals is reprehensible because of the incidental effects it has on the character of the agent or of other men. Where the effects are not harmful, maltreatment of animals would thus be permitted.

If we examine the arguments on the basis of which the existence of direct duties to animals has been denied, we are compelled to conclude regretfully that most of these arguments are sophistical—indeed, they are so threadbare that we find it surprising that they could be advanced by people who claim to be schooled in scientific method. The treatment this problem has received in ethics would be devastating testimony to the limitations of human understanding, if it were not clear that interest rather than error accounts for it.

(Leonard Nelson, System of Ethics, trans. Norbert Guterman [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956], 137 [footnote inserted into text in brackets])

Statistics

This blog had 1,219 visits during October, which is an average of 39.3 visits per day. A year ago, the average was 45.7.

Ten Years Gone

Here are the posts from November 2006.

Statistics

This blog had 929 visits during September, which is an average of 30.9 visits per day. A year ago, the average was 34.1.

Ten Years Gone

Here are the posts from October 2006.

Statistics

This blog had 636 visits during August, which is an average of 20.5 visits per day. A year ago, the average was 24.8.

Ten Years Gone

Here are the posts from September 2006.

Mylan Engel Jr and Kathie Jenni on Prejudice Against Animals

While [Peter] Singer's and [Tom] Regan's theoretical approaches are fundamentally different, they converge on a number of important points. First, both argue that all conscious, sentient animals with desires and interests deserve equal moral consideration (regardless of whether these animals are human or nonhuman). The practical implications of their views also converge. Both approaches entail that most contemporary uses of animals—factory farming of animals for meat, eggs, and milk; animal experimentation; use of animals for entertainment in zoos and circuses; hunting and trapping animals in the wild; and so on—are morally unjustified and should be eliminated. Both authors consider the attitudes of most people toward animals to be nothing more than an arbitrary prejudice in favor of our own kind that many now refer to pejoratively as "speciesism" (a term coined by Richard Ryder). Singer, in particular, likens speciesism to racism and sexism, and uses the analogy to argue that a new liberation movement is needed to combat this deep-seated but unjustified prejudice and the many forms of animal exploitation that flow from it.

(Mylan Engel Jr and Kathie Jenni, The Philosophy of Animal Rights: A Brief Introduction for Students and Teachers [New York: Lantern Books, 2010], 27)

Statistics

This blog had 634 visits during July, which is an average of 20.4 visits per day. A year ago, the average was 27.4.

Ten Years Gone

Here are the posts from August 2006.

Statistics

This blog had 794 visits during June, which is an average of 26.4 visits per day. A year ago, the average was 28.8.

Ten Years Gone

Here are the posts from July 2006.

From Today's Los Angeles Times

To the editor:

The gorilla Harambe’s killing at the Cincinnati Zoo surely calls our society to ask if it is moral or just to keep animals in a prison to be used, at worst, as objects of entertainment or, at best, under the guise of “education.” (“Harambe the gorilla dies, meat-eaters grieve,” Opinion, June 5)

Is there no accountability on the part of the parents of the child who found himself in the gorilla exhibit? The zoo, surely, carries responsibility for deficiencies in its enclosure. In light of this horrible incident, is it right for the zoo to carry on a breeding program that subjects more animals to such unnatural lives?

Finally, what of the audience? The hysteria of the crowd surely played a part in escalating an already frightening situation. Further, did those who reacted so strongly to Harambe’s killing go home and serve meat to their children?

This horrible incident has raised some tough questions indeed. In my opinion, neither Harambe nor the child should ever have been at the zoo.

M. Michelle Nadon, Aurora, Canada

To the editor:

Bars? What? Have op-ed article writers Peter Singer and Karen Dawn not seen the beautiful natural habitat at the L.A. Zoo?

It is estimated that due to conflicts with humans, the bushmeat and body parts trade, disease and habitat destruction, large mammals in Africa may be extinct by the end of this century. Many sanctuaries do not permit breeding.

As an intelligent primate, I’d much rather be an ambassador for my species in a secure environment—served the best food and tended to by top-notch veterinarians—than take my chances in a national park where poverty and corruption result in little or no protection for the non-human residents.

Lisa Edmondson, Los Angeles

Statistics

This blog had 1,338 visits during May, which is an average of 43.1 visits per day. A year ago, the average was 42.3.

Animal Rights

Good leftist that he is, Peter Singer doesn't let a crisis go to waste.

Addendum: The argument seems to be as follows:

1. It is inconsistent both (a) to eat meat and (b) to condemn (or mourn) the killing of Harambe;
2. I condemn (or mourn) the killing of Harambe; therefore,
3. I may no longer eat meat.

Here are some objections:

• The first premise is false.
• The first premise is true, but I don't care about inconsistency.
• The first premise is true and I care about inconsistency, but, since I am going to continue to eat meat, I no longer condemn (or mourn) the killing of Harambe.

Singer and his coauthor do nothing to reply to these (obvious) objections. They should have addressed at least the third objection, for I suspect that most readers of their op-ed column, if forced to choose, would stop condemning (or mourning) the killing of Harambe rather than stop eating meat.