From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

Mark Bittman wants to outlaw confined livestock feeding operations because, he says, they harm the environment, torture animals and make meat less safe (“A Food Manifesto for the Future,” column, Feb. 2).

We take issue with him on all three points.

Yes, there were a couple of highly publicized manure spills involving hog farms in the mid-1990s. But pork producers have made changes to assure that they won’t be repeated. If they are, producers are subject to fines up to $37,500 per day under tough new federal regulations.

Modern livestock housing is temperature-controlled, well lighted and well ventilated. It keeps animals safe and comfortable and protects them from predators and disease. That’s why the incidence of key food-borne illnesses in this country is going down, not up.

As for “sustainable” alternatives, perhaps they can produce enough meat for the wealthy, but not for a world population that is growing and demanding more protein.

Randy Spronk
Chairman, Environment Committee
National Pork Producers Council
Edgerton, Minn., Feb. 4, 2011

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

Re “A Food Manifesto for the Future” (column, Feb. 2):

Let us give thanks for Mark Bittman! He is speaking sensibly about one of the most important issues we face as a nation. Better food creates better health. And yet our government is perversely encouraging food habits that negatively affect our health and our environment.

His call for the end of factory farms (concentrated animal feeding operations) is courageous. But the vested interests are very strong, and consumers have become accustomed to artificially low prices for meat.

When we understand that these prices require “torturing animals,” we will begin to change this system and also improve our diets. His new column offers hope for animals and help for people.

Ken Swensen
Pound Ridge, N.Y., Feb. 2, 2011

Note from KBJ: Only someone who doesn't understand torture could think that meat production involves torture. Torture is the deliberate (not merely intentional) infliction of severe pain for the purpose of (1) punishing an offender, (2) securing a confession from a criminal suspect, (3) eliciting information, or (4) gratifying the sadistic desires of the torturer. Meat production may be cruel or inhumane, but it is not, literally, torturous.

Statistics

This blog had 3,192 visits during January, which is an average of 102.9 visits per day. The average for December was 111.6.

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

Re “Snake Owners See Furry Bias in Invasive Species Proposal” (news article, Jan. 9):

The Fish and Wildlife Service is right to propose a ban on the sale of nine large constricting snakes for the pet trade.

In addition to the effects of these invasive species on ecosystems, there are also compelling humane and public safety arguments for restricting trade. There is a list of human victims of captive snakes, including a 2-year-old girl who was strangled in her crib by a pet Burmese python who had escaped from its enclosure.

The trade is dangerous for people, but also for the snakes. Snakes may die during the capture and transport process, or they may be housed inhumanely in a small aquarium they can barely fit into. They may be set free once people realize they are in over their heads, ultimately facing premature death in the wild by starvation or extremes of climate.

And all of this trouble and suffering for what? You don’t take snakes for a walk or play with them in a field or let them sleep in your bed at night.

Wild animals belong in the wild, and in their native habitats.

Wayne Pacelle
President and Chief Executive
Humane Society of the United States
Washington, Jan. 10, 2011

Philip E. Devine on the Overflow Principle

I propose that the moral significance of the suffering, mutilation, and death of non-human animals rests on the following, which may be called the overflow principle: Act towards that which, while not itself a person, is closely associated with personhood in a way coherent with an attitude of respect for persons. So stated, the overflow principle is intended to express a strict requirement of morality, although the principle will no doubt have ramifications within the aspirational dimension of morality as well.

One might argue for the overflow principle in a rule-consequentialist fashion, arguing that the teaching of such a principle will be ultimately conducive to the happiness of persons. But equally, the overflow principle might be made plausible by being exhibited as part of a way of life having respect for persons at its centre. In any case, the overflow principle would seem to be as well ensconced in the moral consciousness of the plain man as, say, the principle that gratitude is due to benefactors.

One application of the overflow principle is the principle of respect for the dead. Although a dead body is not a person, still the fact that it (so to speak) was a person means that it ought not to be treated like ordinary garbage. Alternatively, we may say that respect for persons overflows to the human body, which forms the visible aspect of the bulk of the persons with whom we are acquainted, and which persists when the person ceases to exist in death. Another and more controversial application is that human sexuality, since it is concerned with the generation of new persons, has a moral significance greater than that possessed by, say, pinball. Yet another application is that members of the human species who are not persons, even by virtue of their potentiality, still ought to be treated, in some respects at least, as if they were persons. Finally, those who do not accept the argument from potentiality will have to rely on the overflow principle to generate any restraints whatever on our behaviour towards the foetus, the infant, the curably or incurably mad, and even, it would seem, the deeply but reversibly unconscious (someone in dreamless sleep for example).

The application of the overflow principle to animals is as follows. Man is not only a rational being, but also an animal. More precisely, he is a rational animal, a being possessed of not only the attributes of thought and intention but also those of shape, size, health or disease, biological gender, and capacity for sensation. And while it is as rational beings that we are in the first place entitled to respect, the respect due to us as rational beings overflows to our animal nature, and to those creatures which, while 'dissociated from us by their want of reason' are nonetheless associated with us in sharing our animal capacities including the ability to suffer pain. If capacity for pain were the only feature of persons which entitled them to our consideration, then vegetarians would be right in attacking the person/animal distinction. But I see no reason to admit this premise.

This approach to animal suffering allows us to reach a happy compromise between the utilitarian and non-utilitarian approaches to the problem of cruelty to animals. Animal pain will be bad in itself, apart from any consequence of that pain to human beings, but the badness of that pain will derive from a moral principle whose ultimate reference is to persons. Thus the ethics proposed here is anthropocentric (or person-centred) though only mildly so.

(Philip E. Devine, "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism," Philosophy 53 [October 1978]: 481-505, at 503-4 [italics in original; footnote omitted])

Statistics

There were 3,461 visits to this blog during December. That's an average of 111.6 per day (down from 130.0 in November).

J. J. C. Smart on the Moral Elite

Let us think of the more moral members of society as a moral elite, much as the generality of scientists form a scientific elite. I hope I do not need to stress that such a moral elite must not be confused with a social or intellectual elite. Many people of no great education and of no prestigious social position certainly belong to my envisaged moral elite. If we judge this moral elite by its adherence to something like the Golden Rule of the New Testament, there is not all that much room for its improvement, except, as I suggested earlier, for the extension of our moral sympathies to nonhuman animals. This last implies of course an improvement in ethics, as opposed to morality, as I have defined it, unless we already understand 'Do as you would be done by' as applicable to whales, cattle, chickens, and so on, as it is to human beings. Of course fully to understand what this injunction comes to we need to take into account theories about the degree of consciousness that various creatures possess. I would suppose that the consciousness of whales is comparable to ours, that of chickens very different, and that of lizards very conjectural. When our philosophical and scientific knowledge of minds is greater we may be able to improve on our estimates. Of course even though they may not have the capacity for happiness and suffering that whales have, nevertheless I would suppose that chickens can suffer quite a lot, even though their consciousness should be very much a sort of daze, and this should be taken into account in our dealings with them. Perhaps in order to qualify for a moral elite one should become a heroic vegetarian like Peter Singer. I am myself not so heroic. I eat eggs though they may come from battery hens. Moreover at present I see no moral objection to eating the flesh of free range cattle, which seem to me to have a happy life which they would not have at all if they were not destined to be eaten. But this is a digression and I must return to my main theme.

(J. J. C. Smart, "Ethics and Science," Philosophy 56 [October 1981]: 449-65, at 453 [italics in original])

An Invitation to Live Consistently in 2011

In her well-reasoned and thoughtful Huffington Post column, Kathy Stevens invites all of us to let 2011 be the year that we finally decide to live in accordance with our own most cherished values.

Happy Holidays!

H. J. McCloskey on Animal Rights

As regards animals, the position is clear. If an animal has the relevant moral capacities, actually or potentially, then it can be a possessor of rights. The evidence available to date about the rational capacities of animals is far from complete, but to date it appears to be decidedly unfavourable to the view that any animals possess the relevant moral capacities. Thus, whilst research on chimpanzees, monkeys, and many other animals, reveals a significant degree of rationality which provides an important ground for justified moral demands that they be better treated than they now are, the degree and kind of rationality fall far short of that necessary for moral judgment and moral self-determination. Although there is limited evidence in respect of certain animals of a capacity for seeming 'self-sacrificing', 'disinterested', 'benevolent' actions in limited, somewhat arbitrary areas, there is no real evidence of a capacity to make moral judgments, morally to discriminate when self-sacrifice, gratitude, loyalty, benevolence is morally appropriate, and more relevantly, to assess their moral rights and to exercise them within their moral limits. However, further research on animals such as whales and dolphins, although seemingly not in respect to monkeys, apes, chimpanzees, may yet reveal that man is not the only animal capable of being a bearer of rights. It may for this reason be morally appropriate for us meanwhile to act towards the former animals as if they are possessors of rights.

(H. J. McCloskey, "Moral Rights and Animals," Inquiry 22 [summer 1979]: 23-54, at 42-3 [italics in original])

Statistics

This blog had 3,902 visits during November, which is an average of 130.0 per day.

Seventh Anniversary

I started this blog seven years ago today: on 28 November 2003. There have been 179,090 visits during that time, which is an average of 25,584.2 visits per year (70.0 per day). The past year has been quite successful, with 34,463 visits (an average of 94.4 per day). I post only rarely, but the blog should be useful as an archive. Please use the search box in the upper left corner to locate posts on various topics.

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

Re “Hero Dog From Afghan Base Is Killed by Mistake in Arizona” (front page, Nov. 19):

The story of Target, the Afghan hero dog, is truly heartbreaking. The important lesson, however, one that would add to Target’s legacy, is that all of us who love our dogs need to make sure that they have a tag and, even better, a microchip. This misadventure could have been avoided!

Sandy Brenner
Elkins, N.H., Nov. 19, 2010

Henry S. Salt (1851-1939) on the Ridicule of Vegetarians

But what of the many individual failures, it is asked, among those who make trial of Vegetarianism? Taking the circumstances into account, the failures cannot be regarded as numerous; for in every such movement there are half-hearted people who are impelled by motives of restlessness and curiosity, rather than of real conviction, and in view of the personal obstacles that beset the path of the Vegetarian, it is not surprising that in food-reform, as in drink-reform, there are a certain number of backsliders. In an ordinary household every possible influence, social and domestic, is brought to bear on the heretic who abstains from flesh foods. Anxious relatives and indignant friends adjure him to remember the duty he owes to himself and to his family, and urge him for the sake of those dear to him, if not for his own, to return to that great sacramental bond of union between man and man—the eating of our non-human fellow-beings. Is he smitten by one of the numberless ailments that are the stock-in-trade of the physician, and of which flesh-eaters are daily the victims in every part of the world? The doctor looks wise, shakes his head, and informs a sorrowing circle that it is the direct result of "his vegetarianism." Above all, the fear of ridicule, acting on the natural unwillingness of mankind to venture along unknown paths, is a strong deterrent; for there are still many persons to whom the idea of abstinence from butchers' meat is positively a matter for merriment, and it seems fated that Vegetarianism, like every new principle, must be a target for such shafts. Well, so be it! We know that the struggle will be a long one; and if Vegetarianism has got to run the blockade of Noodledom, and a huge amount of foolish talk must perforce be fired off, the sooner the battle commences, and the sooner it is concluded, the better for all concerned. And ridicule, as the flesh-eater will learn, is a weapon which can be wielded by more parties than one.

(Henry S. Salt, The Logic of Vegetarianism: Essays and Dialogues [London: The Ideal Publishing Union, 1899], 114-5)

Statistics

This blog had 2,945 visits during October, which is an average of 95.0 visits per day. The average for September was 78.0.

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

Re “New Way to Help Chickens Cross to Other Side” (front page, Oct. 22):

PETA is proud to see that its hard work behind the scenes with Bell & Evans and other companies to encourage implementation of this new, less cruel form of slaughter is finally coming to fruition. By carrying out a slaughter system that greatly reduces the suffering of chickens, Bell & Evans and Mary’s Chickens show that animal welfare and good business go hand in hand.

With controlled-atmosphere killing, chickens aren’t dumped from their transport crates and do not suffer broken wings and legs while being shackled upside down, they’re never scalded to death in defeathering tanks, and there is no opportunity for workers to further abuse birds at the slaughterhouse, as PETA has documented in undercover investigations.

While ever more consumers are going vegetarian or vegan, almost every consumer is demanding that companies take steps to reduce animal suffering. Bell & Evans has heard them and set a new standard in the chicken-supply industry.

McDonald’s, are you listening?

Tracy Reiman
Executive Vice President
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
Los Angeles, Oct. 25, 2010

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

Re “Working to Keep a Heritage Relevant” (news article, Sept. 26):

The “heritage” of hunting will continue its decline into irrelevance and will eventually disappear.

It is useful to dispel two myths. First, there is no “heritage” of hunting as it is practiced today. In the early days trappers and others hunted for survival. They would be appalled to see how their survival “heritage” has been transformed.

Second, hunting is not a “sport,” since any true sport involves two or more competitors, either individuals or teams, similarly equipped, playing by the same rules, let the best individual or team win. There is no “sport” when one “competitor,” the hunter, equipped with a high-powered weapon, camouflage clothing and other devices, pursues an unsuspecting animal.

The reason hunting has no future in this country is that the next generation of potential hunters will not accept these myths. The next generation understands that the slaughter of our precious wildlife is unethical and has no place in modern society.

Robert H. Aland
Winnetka, Ill., Sept. 29, 2010

Statistics

This blog had 2,340 visits during the month of September. That's an average of 78.0 visits per day, which is an increase over the 62.7 of August.

Philip E. Devine on Demi-Vegetarianism

Some might argue that while eating meat is in general acceptable, we are under an obligation to abstain from meat produced in particularly harsh ways: from veal perhaps, or from lobster or from pâté de foie gras. Others might argue that what is important is the level of the animal's evolutionary development, so that while it is acceptable to eat poultry one should abstain from the flesh of animals, or while it is acceptable to eat fish one should abstain from the flesh of warm-blooded animals. Or one might distinguish according to the kinds of value which may justify the eating of meat: turkey dinners on holidays with the family might be thought legitimate, while a bachelor cooking for himself would be under an obligation to abstain from meat. And there are many who see nothing wrong with buying meat at a supermarket, while disapproving of hunting even when the resulting meat is eaten by the hunter's family. Finally, one might, without accepting vegetarian ideas oneself, still feel that vegetarians are entitled to the kind of respect frequently accorded to pacifists by those who do not share their convictions.

(Philip E. Devine, "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism," Philosophy 53 [October 1978]: 481-505, at 502 [footnote omitted])

H. J. McCloskey on Punishment of Cruelty to Animals

[T]here is another class of cases where the state is accorded the right to interfere with the individual when he is not interfering with any other person, namely, where cruelty to animals is involved. We accept that the state has the right to ban cruelty to animals, even when such cruelty is in the interests of the person being cruel, for example, of the greyhound owner who trains his dog on cats, first removing the cat's claws to protect his dog from injury, or of the householder who half-starves his dog so that he can have an extra beer or two, or of the person who hunts kangaroos, wounding many and killing a few, for the fun of the sport. Legislation forbidding cruelty to animals represents the use of coercion against the interests of the individual coerced, and not to further the interests of any other person (it may do so but need not to be justified). Yet it is legislation that few of us should wish to condemn as lacking in justification. (It is, of course, arguable that the liberal who is prepared to allow state legislation against cruelty to animals is compromising his liberalism, even though it is typically in liberal societies that we find such legislation. Certainly a strange mode of justification is offered along the lines of interpreting animals as weaker members of the community, as individuals who cannot protect their own interests, and who therefore need the sort of protection extended to others such as children, lunatics, etc., who cannot protect their interests. Animals, in fact, are not members of the community, they are not weaker individuals in the sense that children are, and this is recognised in very many ways.)

(H. J. McCloskey, "Some Arguments for a Liberal Society," Philosophy 43 [October 1968]: 324-44, at 330-1)

President Clinton Goes Vegan!

Former president Bill Clinton has been following an essentially vegan diet since May for its health benefits. (A vegan diet is an entirely plant-based diet centered around whole grains, vegetables, fruit, and beans, and contains absolutely no animal products—i.e., it contains no meat of any sort, no fish, no seafood, no dairy products, and no eggs.) The only thing that prevents his diet from being completely vegan is that once in a while, he eats fish, but not often. He notes that 82% of people who follow a low-fat vegan diet (like the diet recommended by Dr. Caldwell Esselstyn, Dr. Dean Ornish, and Dr. T. Colin Campbell) are able to reverse heart disease, and he is trying to be in that 82% so that he can live long enough to enjoy his grandchildren. President Clinton discusses his decision to go vegan here. If you'd like to join President Clinton in adopting a heart-healthy vegan diet, you can find menus, recipes, and other meal-planning ideas at the PCRM's 21-Day Vegan Kickstart Mealplan.