30 June 2004
Catfish at Play?
Joanna Lucas sent this. You'll have to provide the context. It looks like a catfish at play to me, but then, I live with dogs, the most playful critters on earth.
29 June 2004
28 June 2004
Confusions and Fallacies About Animals, Part 12
Suppose you’re inclined to eat meat but wonder about the moral permissibility of doing so. You think it might be wrong, since it requires the confinement and killing of sentient beings, but then it occurs to you that your forbearance won’t make a difference. Why deprive yourself of a simple pleasure when it’s not clear that doing so will save an animal’s life? It seems pointless, fruitless, wasteful, abnegating.
If you look at it this way, you’ll probably continue to eat meat. But there’s another way to look at it. I’ve always thought of morality in terms of personal integrity—of having high standards and striving mightily to live up to them. Morality, in this view, is more a matter of what one rules out as unthinkable than of what one decides or does. Do I want to participate in an institution that uses animals as resources—that confines them, deprives them of social lives, frustrates their urges, alters their diets and bodies, and eventually kills them in the prime of their lives? It’s a matter of not getting one’s hands dirty, of not collaborating with evil. Perhaps other people can do these things, I say, but I can’t. I want no part of such a cruel institution. There will be no blood on my hands.
One view of morality sees it as a mechanism of change, with each person being a lever of the mechanism. The other sees it in terms of what sort of person one is. When you hear that billions of animals are killed every year for food, you might think, “My becoming a vegetarian won’t make a difference, so I may as well indulge my tastes.” That’s to take the first view. But why not say that what other people do is not up to you? You control your actions. Your actions reflect your moral values and what sort of person you are. Stand up for something. Say “These things go on, but they do not go on through me!” You’ll feel good about yourself; I guarantee it.
If you look at it this way, you’ll probably continue to eat meat. But there’s another way to look at it. I’ve always thought of morality in terms of personal integrity—of having high standards and striving mightily to live up to them. Morality, in this view, is more a matter of what one rules out as unthinkable than of what one decides or does. Do I want to participate in an institution that uses animals as resources—that confines them, deprives them of social lives, frustrates their urges, alters their diets and bodies, and eventually kills them in the prime of their lives? It’s a matter of not getting one’s hands dirty, of not collaborating with evil. Perhaps other people can do these things, I say, but I can’t. I want no part of such a cruel institution. There will be no blood on my hands.
One view of morality sees it as a mechanism of change, with each person being a lever of the mechanism. The other sees it in terms of what sort of person one is. When you hear that billions of animals are killed every year for food, you might think, “My becoming a vegetarian won’t make a difference, so I may as well indulge my tastes.” That’s to take the first view. But why not say that what other people do is not up to you? You control your actions. Your actions reflect your moral values and what sort of person you are. Stand up for something. Say “These things go on, but they do not go on through me!” You’ll feel good about yourself; I guarantee it.
From NewScientist.com
Dogs can predict epileptic seizures
Some dogs can predict when a child will have an epileptic seizure, a new study has revealed. These dogs not only protect their charges from injuries, such as falling, but also seem to help kids deal with the daily struggle of epilepsy.
Nine of the 60 dogs in the study (15 per cent) were able to predict a seizure by licking, whimpering, or standing next to the child. These dogs were remarkably accurate—they predicted 80 per cent of seizures, with no false reports.
However, those interested in owning a dog with these skills cannot yet just order one. The dogs were not trained, but instead began predicting seizures spontaneously within a month of moving in with their owners.
"No one is reliably training such dogs yet," says Adam Kirton, a neurologist at Alberta Children's Hospital in Canada and lead author of the study. His group is looking into setting up a training program. However, some epilepsy patients do already have dogs that have been trained to protect them during a seizure.
Children with epilepsy are at risk of falling or choking during a seizure. The injury rate is highly variable, but can be about 20 per cent for some types of childhood epilepsy.
"But the worst part of the disease isn't a seizure, it's fear of the next seizure," says Kirton. "By knowing when a seizure might happen, it could liberate them and free them to do what they want to do."
Minutes to hours
Before the new study, reports of dogs predicting seizures had only been anecdotal. So Kirton and colleagues attempted to systematically assess dog behaviour by sending questionnaires to families in their clinic.
Forty-two percent of the families with both an epileptic child and a dog said their dogs responded to seizures. And nine of these dogs actually anticipated the seizure, alerting families minutes to hours before the seizure occurred. Also, dog-owning families reported a higher quality of life than those without, with the owners of seizure-alerting dogs reporting the highest values.
One possible weakness of the study is that the behaviour was reported by the dog-owners themselves, who may overestimated their dog's abilities. Kirton therefore plans to do another study in a more clinical setting, which will also try to determine how these dogs predict seizures.
At present, the mechanism is unknown. But some researchers speculate that the dog could be using subtle visual or olfactory cues that occur before a seizure.
Gregory Holmes, a neurologist at Dartmouth Medical School in New Hampshire, says the dogs could be detecting a change in smell. "People have autonomic changes, such as increased sweating, which a dog could pick up on."
According to Douglas Nordli, director of the children's epilepsy center at Children's Memorial Hospital in Chicago, such external changes could result from a small electrical discharge that occurs in the brain before the full blown electrical seizure.
Journal reference: Neurology (vol 62, p 2303)
Emily Singer
Some dogs can predict when a child will have an epileptic seizure, a new study has revealed. These dogs not only protect their charges from injuries, such as falling, but also seem to help kids deal with the daily struggle of epilepsy.
Nine of the 60 dogs in the study (15 per cent) were able to predict a seizure by licking, whimpering, or standing next to the child. These dogs were remarkably accurate—they predicted 80 per cent of seizures, with no false reports.
However, those interested in owning a dog with these skills cannot yet just order one. The dogs were not trained, but instead began predicting seizures spontaneously within a month of moving in with their owners.
"No one is reliably training such dogs yet," says Adam Kirton, a neurologist at Alberta Children's Hospital in Canada and lead author of the study. His group is looking into setting up a training program. However, some epilepsy patients do already have dogs that have been trained to protect them during a seizure.
Children with epilepsy are at risk of falling or choking during a seizure. The injury rate is highly variable, but can be about 20 per cent for some types of childhood epilepsy.
"But the worst part of the disease isn't a seizure, it's fear of the next seizure," says Kirton. "By knowing when a seizure might happen, it could liberate them and free them to do what they want to do."
Minutes to hours
Before the new study, reports of dogs predicting seizures had only been anecdotal. So Kirton and colleagues attempted to systematically assess dog behaviour by sending questionnaires to families in their clinic.
Forty-two percent of the families with both an epileptic child and a dog said their dogs responded to seizures. And nine of these dogs actually anticipated the seizure, alerting families minutes to hours before the seizure occurred. Also, dog-owning families reported a higher quality of life than those without, with the owners of seizure-alerting dogs reporting the highest values.
One possible weakness of the study is that the behaviour was reported by the dog-owners themselves, who may overestimated their dog's abilities. Kirton therefore plans to do another study in a more clinical setting, which will also try to determine how these dogs predict seizures.
At present, the mechanism is unknown. But some researchers speculate that the dog could be using subtle visual or olfactory cues that occur before a seizure.
Gregory Holmes, a neurologist at Dartmouth Medical School in New Hampshire, says the dogs could be detecting a change in smell. "People have autonomic changes, such as increased sweating, which a dog could pick up on."
According to Douglas Nordli, director of the children's epilepsy center at Children's Memorial Hospital in Chicago, such external changes could result from a small electrical discharge that occurs in the brain before the full blown electrical seizure.
Journal reference: Neurology (vol 62, p 2303)
Emily Singer
27 June 2004
Everydog
You'll enjoy this. First, click here for a reproduction of Vittore Carpaccio's 1503 painting The Apparition of Saint Jerome to Saint Augustine. Study it. Second, click here (PDF) for a wonderful poem about the painting (or rather, what's represented by the painting). Finally, click here for a discussion of the painting by a commencement speaker. Don't you love the little dog?
26 June 2004
25 June 2004
The Animal Rights Library
Khursh Mian Acevedo sent this wonderful resource to me the other day, so I thought I'd pass it on. It looks like more fine work by Pablo Stafforini. Thanks, Khursh! Thanks, Pablo! You work in behalf of animals and speak on behalf of animals.
24 June 2004
Homes for the Abandoned
Joanna Lucas sent a link to this heartwarming story from yesterday's Christian Science Monitor.
22 June 2004
The Hidden Victims of War
When we tally up the costs and benefits of war, we must neither disregard not discount the interests of nonhuman animals. Khursh Mian Acevedo sent a link to this illustrated document. It's in PDF format, so please give it a minute or so to load. You won't regret waiting.
21 June 2004
Confusions and Fallacies About Animals, Part 11
The other day, a reader asked whether it is morally objectionable to eat the flesh of animals who died natural or accidental deaths. For example, suppose I strike a deer with my car. If I’m inclined to eat it, may I? Or suppose some animal companion of mine—a cow, a horse, a pig, a chicken, a goat—dies a natural death. May I eat it?
I don’t see why not. There are two reasons, in general, to refrain from eating animal flesh. The first—the utilitarian reason—is that the animals whose flesh you eat were made to suffer. By eating an animal’s flesh, you become a party to its suffering and contribute to further suffering. The second—the deontological reason—is that you deprive animals of their lives. Why is it wrong to kill normal adult human beings like you and me? It’s because we are deprived of our futures, which contain enjoyments, satisfactions, experiences, activities, and projects. Animals are deprived of the same things (with the possible exception of projects) by being killed, even if they were not made to suffer during life.
If an animal is not made to suffer and is not deprived of its future by having its life cut short, I don’t see any reason not to consume its flesh. I’m not saying that anyone must or should eat it, or even that many people would want to, only that one who is so inclined may. I welcome feedback from anyone who has a different take on this. Perhaps I’m missing some morally relevant consideration.
By the way, if it’s permissible to eat the flesh of animals who died natural or accidental deaths, it’s permissible (for the same reasons) to eat the flesh of humans who died natural or accidental deaths. The only difference I can see is that in the case of humans, others, such as relatives and friends, may be distressed by the knowledge that the corpse of their loved one is being consumed. This is a case where the greater intellectual capacity of humans makes a moral difference.
I don’t see why not. There are two reasons, in general, to refrain from eating animal flesh. The first—the utilitarian reason—is that the animals whose flesh you eat were made to suffer. By eating an animal’s flesh, you become a party to its suffering and contribute to further suffering. The second—the deontological reason—is that you deprive animals of their lives. Why is it wrong to kill normal adult human beings like you and me? It’s because we are deprived of our futures, which contain enjoyments, satisfactions, experiences, activities, and projects. Animals are deprived of the same things (with the possible exception of projects) by being killed, even if they were not made to suffer during life.
If an animal is not made to suffer and is not deprived of its future by having its life cut short, I don’t see any reason not to consume its flesh. I’m not saying that anyone must or should eat it, or even that many people would want to, only that one who is so inclined may. I welcome feedback from anyone who has a different take on this. Perhaps I’m missing some morally relevant consideration.
By the way, if it’s permissible to eat the flesh of animals who died natural or accidental deaths, it’s permissible (for the same reasons) to eat the flesh of humans who died natural or accidental deaths. The only difference I can see is that in the case of humans, others, such as relatives and friends, may be distressed by the knowledge that the corpse of their loved one is being consumed. This is a case where the greater intellectual capacity of humans makes a moral difference.
20 June 2004
Laboratory Experiments
The following news item, which I have had tacked to my bulletin board, appeared in The Dallas Morning News on 19 January 2000:
Champaign, Ill.—The University of Illinois has suspended first-year veterinary school lab experiments that can kill dogs, rabbits and pigs. The decision to stop such experiments through the spring semester followed complaints from veterinary students and members of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals. Twenty-six students, or a quarter of the first-year veterinary class, signed a petition last fall saying they would not participate in animal labs during the spring semester. The veterinary school has used about 100 dogs and pigs annually to teach animal physiology, including a course in which students inject drugs into dogs to change their heartbeat or their rate of breathing.I find it hard to believe that PETA had any influence on the university’s decision. What obviously troubled the university was the fact that its students refused to participate. Now, maybe the students themselves were influenced by PETA, in which case I salute PETA. I haven’t seen a follow-up about this decision. I hope the suspension of experiments became permanent. If anyone has information, let me know.
19 June 2004
18 June 2004
Ad Hominem Arguments and Ad Hominem Fallacies
Just as not all slippery-slope arguments are slippery-slope fallacies (see the post of 19 November 2003 in the AnalPhilosopher archive), not all ad hominem arguments are ad hominem fallacies. If you want to learn the difference between the ad hominem argument (i.e., the argumentum ad hominem, or argument to the person) and the ad hominem fallacy (attack on the person), read my essay “How to Argue,” a permanent link to which appears on the left side of this blog.
Here’s the difference in a nutshell. The ad hominem fallacy consists in dismissing a person’s argument on the basis of some negative characteristic of the person (rather than because of some defect in the argument). That you are a jerk does not make your arguments bad (any more than your being a saint makes your arguments good).
Note that this fallacy requires dismissal of an argument. It has the form:
One does not commit the ad hominem fallacy merely by attacking or disparaging a person. That may be disrespectful, but disrespectfulness is not a fallacy. It’s a vice, a character defect. A fallacy is a psychologically attractive but logically defective argument. It is a mistake in reasoning, not a way of treating someone.
The ad hominem argument, which is perfectly legitimate, indeed essential to effective persuasion, consists in holding people to their beliefs, values, or principles. If you’re a Christian and I point out to you that you’re not living up to your Christian principles, I commit no fallacy. I’m simply helping you be a better Christian, for which you should be grateful, not resentful. I do not need to be a Christian myself for this to work.
All of which is to say that I did not commit an ad hominem fallacy in my post (see here) about Michael Moore. I couldn’t have, since I didn’t dismiss any argument he made. (Does he make arguments?) Perhaps I was disrespectful to Moore, in which case I was bad. Then again, perhaps he doesn’t deserve respect, in which case I wasn’t bad. Respect must be earned.
Here’s the difference in a nutshell. The ad hominem fallacy consists in dismissing a person’s argument on the basis of some negative characteristic of the person (rather than because of some defect in the argument). That you are a jerk does not make your arguments bad (any more than your being a saint makes your arguments good).
Note that this fallacy requires dismissal of an argument. It has the form:
1. S is a bad person (in some respect).Compare:Therefore,2. S is a bad arguer (i.e., S's argument is bad).
1. M is a small animal.That this is invalid is easily seen, for the premise can be true while the conclusion is false (if M is a large mouse). The invalidity consists in transferring a relative term (“bad” or “small”) from one class to another. That this cannot be done is clear; the criteria for smallness in animals differ from (or rather, are not necessarily the same as) the criteria for smallness in mice. The criteria for badness in persons are not necessarily the same as the criteria for badness in arguers. Good people can be bad (or merely nongood) arguers. Bad people can be good (or merely nonbad) arguers. (For further discussion, see my textbook Informal Logic, 3d ed.)Therefore,2. M is a small mouse.
One does not commit the ad hominem fallacy merely by attacking or disparaging a person. That may be disrespectful, but disrespectfulness is not a fallacy. It’s a vice, a character defect. A fallacy is a psychologically attractive but logically defective argument. It is a mistake in reasoning, not a way of treating someone.
The ad hominem argument, which is perfectly legitimate, indeed essential to effective persuasion, consists in holding people to their beliefs, values, or principles. If you’re a Christian and I point out to you that you’re not living up to your Christian principles, I commit no fallacy. I’m simply helping you be a better Christian, for which you should be grateful, not resentful. I do not need to be a Christian myself for this to work.
All of which is to say that I did not commit an ad hominem fallacy in my post (see here) about Michael Moore. I couldn’t have, since I didn’t dismiss any argument he made. (Does he make arguments?) Perhaps I was disrespectful to Moore, in which case I was bad. Then again, perhaps he doesn’t deserve respect, in which case I wasn’t bad. Respect must be earned.
From the Mailbag
Dear Keith Burgess-Jackson:
I'm a former philosophy grad student and freelance writer who enjoys your site. I saw your call for someone to forward Michael Moore's references to animals. As it happens, I had a copy of Herbivore magazine, issue #3, which includes "An Open Letter to Michael Moore," from Bruce Friedrich of PETA. The letter comes with a sidebar quoting two Moore passages concerning animals, which I've included below. Friedrich's letter is quite critical of Moore regarding animals. (For your amusement, if you Google PETA and Moore, you'll see they're also running a campaign making an issue of his weight.)
Unfortunately, the Herbivore article is not available online (and the actual issue of the magazine is sold out). But more information about Herbivore is available here.
Interestingly, Herbivore is a bit like Animal Ethics: both puncture stereotypes about vegetarians. You do it by writing as a conservative for animal ethics, while they do it using humour. I think both kinds of diversity are a terrific development for the animal ethics movement.
As one of your more liberal-minded admirers, I wondered if your item on Moore didn't stray a bit into the ad hominem zone. But I'm happy to see anyone get involved with animal issues, whatever their politics (I quite admired Matthew Scully's book, which I'm sure you're familiar with). Overall I think your site is terrific. I often follow up on the links to philosophical papers. I found especially valuable the recent links to Essays in Philosophy and the paper rebutting Steven Davis. I've interviewed Davis myself, and while he is very pro-animal, I've always thought someone should write a response.
For your interest, here are a couple of links to other conservatives (if libertarians count as conservatives) who are pro-animal rights:
Keep up the great work.
Best,
[name withheld by request]
Ottawa, Ontario
P.S. I see you sometimes post emails on the blog. You're welcome to do so with all or part of this one, but I'd prefer you don't include my name if so.
From Dude, Where's My Country?
By Michael Moore
Page 190: "Vegetarianism is unhealthy. Humans need protein, and lots of it. Put down those sprouts and pick up a T-bone."
Pages 192-3: "Animals don't have rights."
"'Freeing' chickens from their factory farms is idiotic. They don't know how to survive in the wild and they're just going to get hit by a truck."
"You just look like a dumbass if you go on national TV, like PETA does, to argue that beer is better for the body than milk. This shit just makes me wanna go kick my dog."
I'm a former philosophy grad student and freelance writer who enjoys your site. I saw your call for someone to forward Michael Moore's references to animals. As it happens, I had a copy of Herbivore magazine, issue #3, which includes "An Open Letter to Michael Moore," from Bruce Friedrich of PETA. The letter comes with a sidebar quoting two Moore passages concerning animals, which I've included below. Friedrich's letter is quite critical of Moore regarding animals. (For your amusement, if you Google PETA and Moore, you'll see they're also running a campaign making an issue of his weight.)
Unfortunately, the Herbivore article is not available online (and the actual issue of the magazine is sold out). But more information about Herbivore is available here.
Interestingly, Herbivore is a bit like Animal Ethics: both puncture stereotypes about vegetarians. You do it by writing as a conservative for animal ethics, while they do it using humour. I think both kinds of diversity are a terrific development for the animal ethics movement.
As one of your more liberal-minded admirers, I wondered if your item on Moore didn't stray a bit into the ad hominem zone. But I'm happy to see anyone get involved with animal issues, whatever their politics (I quite admired Matthew Scully's book, which I'm sure you're familiar with). Overall I think your site is terrific. I often follow up on the links to philosophical papers. I found especially valuable the recent links to Essays in Philosophy and the paper rebutting Steven Davis. I've interviewed Davis myself, and while he is very pro-animal, I've always thought someone should write a response.
For your interest, here are a couple of links to other conservatives (if libertarians count as conservatives) who are pro-animal rights:
This is a libertarian site.Interestingly (as you may already know), libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick also endorsed ethical vegetarianism in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. I hope it is a trend that is growing.
And this is the blog of a writer for Reason magazine who writes about animals from time to time.
Keep up the great work.
Best,
[name withheld by request]
Ottawa, Ontario
P.S. I see you sometimes post emails on the blog. You're welcome to do so with all or part of this one, but I'd prefer you don't include my name if so.
From Dude, Where's My Country?
By Michael Moore
Page 190: "Vegetarianism is unhealthy. Humans need protein, and lots of it. Put down those sprouts and pick up a T-bone."
Pages 192-3: "Animals don't have rights."
"'Freeing' chickens from their factory farms is idiotic. They don't know how to survive in the wild and they're just going to get hit by a truck."
"You just look like a dumbass if you go on national TV, like PETA does, to argue that beer is better for the body than milk. This shit just makes me wanna go kick my dog."
17 June 2004
From the Mailbag
Keith, I am forwarding this information I found very valuable.
There's a virtual consensus among "food economists" that eating healthfully at the bottom of the food chain (i.e. veganism or near vegetarianism) is the most sustainable way for the human population to eat, animal welfare issues aside. Here is a column on the subject by George Monbiot that makes the basic case. Seemingly the lone dissident, an agricultural academic named Steven Davis, favors a pastured ruminant omnivorous diet for the planet [see here]. He has been rebutted in this paper.Joanna
Michael Moore's View of Animals and Those Who Defend Them
The other day, someone sent some quotations from Michael Moore’s books or essays. I unfortunately deleted them. The quotations were awful. Moore not only expressed indifference to the fate of animals; he poked fun at those who care about them and ridiculed the idea of animal rights. It was vile stuff, which shows the true character of this “man of the people.” I have a friend who cares deeply about animals but also admires and respects Moore. I wonder how he feels about Moore’s mockery of what he holds dear.
This raises a larger question. Leftists profess to be concerned with the disadvantaged, the oppressed, the downtrodden, the exploited. Don’t these terms apply, quite literally, to nonhuman animals? Michael Moore doesn’t see the contradiction between defending working people from greedy capitalists (an instance of exploitation) and dining on the flesh of cows, pigs, and chickens, who were made to suffer horribly (and eventually die) for his trivial pleasure. I don’t think Moore really cares about human beings, if you want to know the truth. I think he cares about himself, and only himself.
If someone has quotations about animals from Moore’s books or essays, please send them to me with full citations, including page numbers. I don’t own any of his writings and never will. He’s a despicable and hypocritical human being, one of the very worst I’ve seen. That he is celebrated in certain quarters—e.g., Hollywood, France, academia—is a symptom of an insidious social disease.
This raises a larger question. Leftists profess to be concerned with the disadvantaged, the oppressed, the downtrodden, the exploited. Don’t these terms apply, quite literally, to nonhuman animals? Michael Moore doesn’t see the contradiction between defending working people from greedy capitalists (an instance of exploitation) and dining on the flesh of cows, pigs, and chickens, who were made to suffer horribly (and eventually die) for his trivial pleasure. I don’t think Moore really cares about human beings, if you want to know the truth. I think he cares about himself, and only himself.
If someone has quotations about animals from Moore’s books or essays, please send them to me with full citations, including page numbers. I don’t own any of his writings and never will. He’s a despicable and hypocritical human being, one of the very worst I’ve seen. That he is celebrated in certain quarters—e.g., Hollywood, France, academia—is a symptom of an insidious social disease.
16 June 2004
From the Mailbag
"But animals are harmed (egregiously, profoundly, irreversibly) by meat-eating, so the presumption in favor of tradition is rebutted in this case, as is the corresponding commonsense belief that meat-eating is morally acceptable." [See here.]
Although I understand what this sentence was about, I think the wording is incorrect, and thinking about alternate meanings led me to some questions.
I think you really meant to say animals are harmed by being killed (for their meat)—the physical act of eating their flesh does not harm their interests, since they are already dead. Even if the meat were not eaten, their interests would be harmed irreversibly, so I don't see how the act of meat-eating would add anything to that.
I don't think it's a minor terminological issue, either, since it raises the question—do you think it's moral to eat meat from animals that died a natural death?
I don't recall this being addressed on your website, but I could have missed it. I believe that lower-caste Indians do actually eat the meat of cows that die of natural causes in India, but not sure how reliable that is.
A related question would be if it's okay to raise animals for that purpose, giving them a reasonable life, then as soon as they die-off to market.
John Crawford
Although I understand what this sentence was about, I think the wording is incorrect, and thinking about alternate meanings led me to some questions.
I think you really meant to say animals are harmed by being killed (for their meat)—the physical act of eating their flesh does not harm their interests, since they are already dead. Even if the meat were not eaten, their interests would be harmed irreversibly, so I don't see how the act of meat-eating would add anything to that.
I don't think it's a minor terminological issue, either, since it raises the question—do you think it's moral to eat meat from animals that died a natural death?
I don't recall this being addressed on your website, but I could have missed it. I believe that lower-caste Indians do actually eat the meat of cows that die of natural causes in India, but not sure how reliable that is.
A related question would be if it's okay to raise animals for that purpose, giving them a reasonable life, then as soon as they die-off to market.
John Crawford
15 June 2004
Peter Singer on the Expanding Circle
The circle of altruism has broadened from the family and tribe to the nation and race, and we are beginning to recognize that our obligations extend to all human beings. The process should not stop there. In my earlier book, Animal Liberation, I showed that it is as arbitrary to restrict the principle of equal consideration of interests to our own species as it would be to restrict it to our own race. The only justifiable stopping place for the expansion of altruism is the point at which all whose welfare can be affected by our actions are included within the circle of altruism. This means that all beings with the capacity to feel pleasure or pain should be included; we can improve their welfare by increasing their pleasures and diminishing their pains.
The expansion of the moral circle should therefore be pushed out until it includes most animals. (I say “most” rather than “all” because there comes a point as we move down the evolutionary scale—oysters, perhaps, or even more rudimentary organisms—when it becomes doubtful if the creature we are dealing with is capable of feeling anything.) From an impartial point of view, the pleasures and pains of non-human animals are no less significant because the animals are not members of the species Homo sapiens. This does not mean that a human being and a mouse must always be treated equally, or that their lives are of equal value. Humans have interests—in ideas, in education, in their future plans—that mice are not capable of having. It is only when we are comparing similar interests—of which the interest in avoiding pain is the most important example—that the principle of equal consideration of interests demands that we give equal weight to the interests of the human and the mouse.
The expansion of the moral circle to non-human animals is only just getting under way. It has still to gain verbal and intellectual acceptance, let alone be generally practiced. Yet the ecology movement has emphasized that we are not the only species on this planet, and should not value everything by its usefulness to human beings; and defenders of rights for animals are gradually replacing the old-fashioned animal welfare organizations which cared a lot for domestic pets but little for animals with less emotional appeal to us. In philosophy departments all over the English-speaking world, the moral status of animals has become a lively topic of debate, and the number of those calling for a change in our present attitude toward animals is growing. The idea of equal consideration for animals strikes many as bizarre, but perhaps no more bizarre than the idea of equal consideration for blacks seemed three hundred years ago. We are witnessing the first stirrings of a momentous new stage in our moral thinking.
(Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology [New York and Scarborough, Ontario: New American Library, 1982], 120-1 [first published in 1981])
The expansion of the moral circle should therefore be pushed out until it includes most animals. (I say “most” rather than “all” because there comes a point as we move down the evolutionary scale—oysters, perhaps, or even more rudimentary organisms—when it becomes doubtful if the creature we are dealing with is capable of feeling anything.) From an impartial point of view, the pleasures and pains of non-human animals are no less significant because the animals are not members of the species Homo sapiens. This does not mean that a human being and a mouse must always be treated equally, or that their lives are of equal value. Humans have interests—in ideas, in education, in their future plans—that mice are not capable of having. It is only when we are comparing similar interests—of which the interest in avoiding pain is the most important example—that the principle of equal consideration of interests demands that we give equal weight to the interests of the human and the mouse.
The expansion of the moral circle to non-human animals is only just getting under way. It has still to gain verbal and intellectual acceptance, let alone be generally practiced. Yet the ecology movement has emphasized that we are not the only species on this planet, and should not value everything by its usefulness to human beings; and defenders of rights for animals are gradually replacing the old-fashioned animal welfare organizations which cared a lot for domestic pets but little for animals with less emotional appeal to us. In philosophy departments all over the English-speaking world, the moral status of animals has become a lively topic of debate, and the number of those calling for a change in our present attitude toward animals is growing. The idea of equal consideration for animals strikes many as bizarre, but perhaps no more bizarre than the idea of equal consideration for blacks seemed three hundred years ago. We are witnessing the first stirrings of a momentous new stage in our moral thinking.
(Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology [New York and Scarborough, Ontario: New American Library, 1982], 120-1 [first published in 1981])
From Today's New York Times
To the Editor:
Re "Finally, an Old Dog That Can Learn New Tricks" (news article, June 11):
The only surprising thing about the news that Rico, a 9-year-old border collie, can understand human language is the attention paid to it by the news media.
On the day I read about this "Albert Einstein" of the dog world, Bailey, my 3-year-old golden retriever, came to me with my daughter Leah's stuffed toy in her mouth. After reminding Bailey that it was Leah's toy, not hers, I told her sternly, "Go ask Leah" if she could have the toy.
Bailey disappeared. Five minutes later, my daughter yelled from downstairs: "Mom! Bailey's following me around and won't leave me alone!"
Of course dogs can understand language. It shouldn't take a scientist and a controlled experiment to discover this.
KATHY FLAKE
Albuquerque, June 11, 2004
To the Editor:
Rico, the 9-year-old border collie from Germany who learns by fast mapping, is impressive, as is Jack, my 8-year-old Australian shepherd. Jack knows, in advance, when a dog will appear on TV.
He will be in an adjacent room where he can hear, but not see, the TV. He'll hear the music of a familiar commercial and run into the living room to the TV. Why? Because he knows that a few seconds after the music starts, a dog will appear that he can bark at.
It's happened dozens of times, with different music, ads and dogs, so it can't be a coincidence. He's learned to identify certain music with the imminent arrival on the screen of another dog in his territory. If there's no animal in the ads, Jack ignores the TV.
DAVID FEHR
Williamstown, Mass., June 12, 2004
To the Editor:
The ability of Rico, a border collie, to learn by inference is seemingly impressive, but I suspect that it's so only because of the assumptions we make about the members of other species.
My cat talks from time to time, yet I have no idea what he's saying, so he compensates for my poor learning skills by using body language that he somehow deduces I'll understand.
There are thousands of stories showing an innate ability of animals to reason. Perhaps we ought to rethink our own reasoning ability when we use it to denigrate the integrity and dignity of members of other species by confining them, exploiting them and knowingly causing them pain and stress in order to dine on their flesh, wear their fur, probe their bodies and force them to perform.
JACQUELINE RAVEN
New York, June 11, 2004
Re "Finally, an Old Dog That Can Learn New Tricks" (news article, June 11):
The only surprising thing about the news that Rico, a 9-year-old border collie, can understand human language is the attention paid to it by the news media.
On the day I read about this "Albert Einstein" of the dog world, Bailey, my 3-year-old golden retriever, came to me with my daughter Leah's stuffed toy in her mouth. After reminding Bailey that it was Leah's toy, not hers, I told her sternly, "Go ask Leah" if she could have the toy.
Bailey disappeared. Five minutes later, my daughter yelled from downstairs: "Mom! Bailey's following me around and won't leave me alone!"
Of course dogs can understand language. It shouldn't take a scientist and a controlled experiment to discover this.
KATHY FLAKE
Albuquerque, June 11, 2004
To the Editor:
Rico, the 9-year-old border collie from Germany who learns by fast mapping, is impressive, as is Jack, my 8-year-old Australian shepherd. Jack knows, in advance, when a dog will appear on TV.
He will be in an adjacent room where he can hear, but not see, the TV. He'll hear the music of a familiar commercial and run into the living room to the TV. Why? Because he knows that a few seconds after the music starts, a dog will appear that he can bark at.
It's happened dozens of times, with different music, ads and dogs, so it can't be a coincidence. He's learned to identify certain music with the imminent arrival on the screen of another dog in his territory. If there's no animal in the ads, Jack ignores the TV.
DAVID FEHR
Williamstown, Mass., June 12, 2004
To the Editor:
The ability of Rico, a border collie, to learn by inference is seemingly impressive, but I suspect that it's so only because of the assumptions we make about the members of other species.
My cat talks from time to time, yet I have no idea what he's saying, so he compensates for my poor learning skills by using body language that he somehow deduces I'll understand.
There are thousands of stories showing an innate ability of animals to reason. Perhaps we ought to rethink our own reasoning ability when we use it to denigrate the integrity and dignity of members of other species by confining them, exploiting them and knowingly causing them pain and stress in order to dine on their flesh, wear their fur, probe their bodies and force them to perform.
JACQUELINE RAVEN
New York, June 11, 2004
From the Mailbag
I was very intrigued by your blog [post] re: eating meat. If I understand your blog, you are saying that because there is a risk (albeit remote) of hurting another, one must consider whether the harm to eating flesh is morally justifiable. Implicit in this argument is the idea that there may, perhaps, be an act of immorality involved in the eating of flesh, and that to be moral, an agent must consider the possibility. (Although I don’t understand how the act of cogitation renders another act moral or not; either it is moral to eat flesh or it is not. If you cogitate and reach an incorrect conclusion, you are behaving both immorally and in error.)
I argue that you have turned it around. Your idea would be valid if there were any reason to assume that animals are anything other than fodder. There can be a risk of immorally harming an animal only if an animal is somehow imbued with sentience, or a soul, or some element of morality. Since animals have none of these elements there is no reason to give thought to eating one any more than there is a need to give thought to eating an ear of corn.
This begs the question: Is there a need to consider the morality of eating corn or animals? I can’t see how there can possibly be. Whether you accept (as I do) the Word of God as it pertains to man’s use of the earth, or if you believe that man is a product solely of the flesh, you have to accept that man is, if nothing else, a product of the natural order. Man’s actions are no more unnatural than any other animal’s, and therefore man’s morality in eating other creatures is no less an issue than any other creature’s consumption of another. Is a wolf immoral for eating a lamb? It seems to me that if I have to consider the morality of consuming a wolf, then the element of sentience that a wolf may possess that would make eating him immoral also places the wolf in the position of behaving immorally when it consumes flesh, which is absurd.
Warmest regards,
Mark T. Gibson
Rockvale, TN
I argue that you have turned it around. Your idea would be valid if there were any reason to assume that animals are anything other than fodder. There can be a risk of immorally harming an animal only if an animal is somehow imbued with sentience, or a soul, or some element of morality. Since animals have none of these elements there is no reason to give thought to eating one any more than there is a need to give thought to eating an ear of corn.
This begs the question: Is there a need to consider the morality of eating corn or animals? I can’t see how there can possibly be. Whether you accept (as I do) the Word of God as it pertains to man’s use of the earth, or if you believe that man is a product solely of the flesh, you have to accept that man is, if nothing else, a product of the natural order. Man’s actions are no more unnatural than any other animal’s, and therefore man’s morality in eating other creatures is no less an issue than any other creature’s consumption of another. Is a wolf immoral for eating a lamb? It seems to me that if I have to consider the morality of consuming a wolf, then the element of sentience that a wolf may possess that would make eating him immoral also places the wolf in the position of behaving immorally when it consumes flesh, which is absurd.
Warmest regards,
Mark T. Gibson
Rockvale, TN
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
