Human Mad Cow May Be More Widespread
By EMMA ROSS, AP Medical Writer
LONDON—Scientists have found evidence suggesting that the human form of mad cow disease might be infecting a wider group of people than seen so far and that some may develop a milder form of the illness.
Since variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was first identified in 1996, little has been learned about it. Until now, the fatal brain-wasting disease was found only in people who have a certain genetic profile.
But research published this week in The Lancet medical journal reported the infection in a person with a more common genetic makeup and with no symptoms of the illness.
That means more people than previously believed could be incubating the disease, thought to come from eating processed beef products from cattle infected with mad cow disease, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy. It also raises the possibility that some people may get only a mild infection, as opposed to the fatal disease.
Scientists don't know how many people are infected with the human form of mad cow disease. Projections vary wildly—from just 10 more cases in the future to hundreds of thousands—because so many factors that play into the disease remain a mystery and because there have been so few cases to study.
Experts don't know how long the incubation period is; whether everybody is equally vulnerable; exactly how the disease spreads and whether it can be easily passed on before symptoms develop. There is no test to diagnose it, no treatment and no cure.
The latest finding means that forecasts need to be radically revised because they were based on the assumption that the disease only affects people with a particular genetic profile found in about 35 percent of Caucasians, said James Ironside, director of Britain's national Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease surveillance unit, which did the study.
In new research, an autopsy found the disease in a person whose genetic signature is shared by about 50 percent of Caucasians.
Ironside said, "I think we have to go back and redo all the calculations based on this case."
So far, 147 people in Britain, and another 10 elsewhere, are known to have contracted the disease. Five are still alive.
The illness occurs when normal proteins found in the brain, known as prions, change shape and prompt adjacent healthy prions to do the same. When enough prions are altered, they deposit a plaque on the brain and surround the mark with spongy holes, killing the victim.
The latest discovery was made during an autopsy of an elderly person who died of an unrelated cause but who had received a blood transfusion five years earlier from a donor who later died of the human form of mad cow disease.
Strangely, the infection was found only in the spleen, but not in the brain or other places the disease typically turns up. It is unknown whether the disease might eventually have killed this person after a longer incubation period or whether the infection was milder and may have done no harm.
Dr. Kumanan Wilson, a blood safety expert at Toronto General Hospital in Canada, said the finding is a vindication of policies by some countries that have taken steps to protect against what was previously a theoretical risk of spreading the disease through blood transfusions. During the HIV epidemic, the blood supply wasn't protected until HIV began spreading through transfusions.
"By acting in advance of complete certainty, policy makers have potentially protected against vCJD emerging as a new large-scale blood-borne epidemic," said Wilson, who was not connected with the study.
06 August 2004
From Today's New York Times
To the Editor:
Indeed, the United Nations should step up efforts to confront the avian flu crisis in Asia before it takes the world by storm ("The Enduring Avian Flu Problem," editorial, Aug. 4). But it is our penchant for international trade in birds—whether for eggs, meat, live poultry or pets—that already spins these local animal disease challenges into a complex web of global threats to agriculture, wildlife and human health.
In this year alone, avian flu outbreaks in Asia, Africa, Canada and the United States have inspired a dizzying array of international trade bans on poultry and pet birds, as well as calls for the killing of wild cranes in parts of Asia. Although disruptive, the bans are necessary because existing border controls and quarantines fail to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.
Because recent outbreaks have cost hundreds of millions of taxpayers' dollars and because current science predicts that avian flu is becoming more lethal, shouldn't we be asking whether any international trade in these animals is worth the risk? Do these niche-market profits for a few justify the financial and health risks borne by us all?
James D. Gilardi
Director, World Parrot Trust
Davis, Calif., Aug. 4, 2004
Indeed, the United Nations should step up efforts to confront the avian flu crisis in Asia before it takes the world by storm ("The Enduring Avian Flu Problem," editorial, Aug. 4). But it is our penchant for international trade in birds—whether for eggs, meat, live poultry or pets—that already spins these local animal disease challenges into a complex web of global threats to agriculture, wildlife and human health.
In this year alone, avian flu outbreaks in Asia, Africa, Canada and the United States have inspired a dizzying array of international trade bans on poultry and pet birds, as well as calls for the killing of wild cranes in parts of Asia. Although disruptive, the bans are necessary because existing border controls and quarantines fail to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.
Because recent outbreaks have cost hundreds of millions of taxpayers' dollars and because current science predicts that avian flu is becoming more lethal, shouldn't we be asking whether any international trade in these animals is worth the risk? Do these niche-market profits for a few justify the financial and health risks borne by us all?
James D. Gilardi
Director, World Parrot Trust
Davis, Calif., Aug. 4, 2004
05 August 2004
Vivisection
People who would never accept the use of a human being as a mere means to the ends of others are quite willing to use animals as mere means to human ends. See here for the result of this duplicitous thinking. Caution: The images are disturbing. Actually, that's not quite right. The images aren't disturbing; the events they depict are disturbing.
02 August 2004
Welcome to My Nightmare
It’s been almost five days since I had high-speed Internet access. Something—perhaps the thunderstorm that awakened me several times Wednesday evening and early Thursday morning—messed up my DSL modem. I spent almost all day Thursday on the telephone with EarthLink technicians, trying to get the modem working again. I was told that a technician would come to my house between eight and twelve o’clock Friday morning. Nobody came. I cleaned the house for nothing.
I called at three o’clock and was told that somebody had read my “ticket” and canceled the appointment. Nobody had informed me. For all they knew, I had taken a half day off work to be home for the technician. I was told to call back at eight. When I did, I was told that it was a telephone-company problem and that it might be Monday before it was solved. Unbelievable.
I waited patiently all weekend, using my EarthLink dial-up connection for as long as I could stand it (which wasn’t long). Today, exasperated, I called EarthLink. I was told that the telephone company had sprung into action. Sure enough, a telephone technician arrived shortly thereafter. He did some stuff on the outside of the house, then brought his equipment inside. He ran some tests and said everything appeared to be working up to and including the DSL modem. But still I couldn’t get connected, so, when he left, I called EarthLink back.
The technician ran some tests, had me do a few things on my computer, and concluded that something, somewhere, had to be reset. Sounds simple, right? Nope. He personally couldn’t do it; some other office had to do it. He told me to call back in one hour. When I called back, another technician told me he couldn’t reset whatever had to be reset until the telephone company’s report is submitted. He told me to call back at nine o’clock in the morning.
How would you feel if this happened to you? Responsibility is diffused, so each person can honestly say, “Things are working fine where I am.” Everything works, but my DSL doesn’t work. If this is how EarthLink does business, it deserves to go out of business. Someone should be assigned to each customer, the way lawyers are assigned to cases. That person handles every aspect of the case and stays in touch with the customer until the problem is solved. Most people, I assume, would be happy to pay a little more for this. I know I would.
I should have left EarthLink long ago, and certainly before five days passed; but I hold out hope that somebody will reset something tomorrow morning and I’ll be back online. I’m told by various people (including some friendly correspondents who read my blog) that a cable Internet connection is faster and more reliable. If I get no satisfaction in the morning from EarthLink, I’ll call Charter, my cable-television company. I can’t live like this, knowing that at any time, through no fault of my own, I can lose my high-speed Internet connection for five days. Five hours is too long. Five days is nightmarish. I’ve come to depend on high-speed Internet access. To lose it is equivalent to losing air conditioning, electricity, or water.
You’re probably thinking, “What a crybaby he is.” But I haven’t begun to describe the problems I’ve had. They breed like rabbits. I have two computers, an old Compaq and a new Dell. I keep the Compaq as a backup. For some reason, I can’t get a dial-up connection with the Dell. Maybe its modem is shot, but I don’t know why it would be. So to use the dial-up connection, I have to use the Compaq, which is slower.
It gets worse. The dial-up connection is squirrelly. I lose my connection right in the middle of doing something. I’ve had to redial many, many times in the past several days. A few minutes ago, I couldn’t open any web pages. I could get my e-mail, so I knew I had a connection, but no web page would open. Finally, after trying for several minutes, it worked. Will it work next time? Who knows? The various components of my system seem to have formed a league against me.
When you put it all together, I’m shell-shocked. I’m beyond frustrated; I’m livid. What’s happening could easily be the plot of a Kafka novel. My comfortable, scholarly world has been turned upside down. About the only escape I’ve had from the madness was during Saturday’s bike rally in Cleburne. I rode seventy-one miles in brilliant sunshine, enjoying the scenery, the people, and my music. Wish me luck with tomorrow’s “reset.” I hope to be back to blogging soon.
I called at three o’clock and was told that somebody had read my “ticket” and canceled the appointment. Nobody had informed me. For all they knew, I had taken a half day off work to be home for the technician. I was told to call back at eight. When I did, I was told that it was a telephone-company problem and that it might be Monday before it was solved. Unbelievable.
I waited patiently all weekend, using my EarthLink dial-up connection for as long as I could stand it (which wasn’t long). Today, exasperated, I called EarthLink. I was told that the telephone company had sprung into action. Sure enough, a telephone technician arrived shortly thereafter. He did some stuff on the outside of the house, then brought his equipment inside. He ran some tests and said everything appeared to be working up to and including the DSL modem. But still I couldn’t get connected, so, when he left, I called EarthLink back.
The technician ran some tests, had me do a few things on my computer, and concluded that something, somewhere, had to be reset. Sounds simple, right? Nope. He personally couldn’t do it; some other office had to do it. He told me to call back in one hour. When I called back, another technician told me he couldn’t reset whatever had to be reset until the telephone company’s report is submitted. He told me to call back at nine o’clock in the morning.
How would you feel if this happened to you? Responsibility is diffused, so each person can honestly say, “Things are working fine where I am.” Everything works, but my DSL doesn’t work. If this is how EarthLink does business, it deserves to go out of business. Someone should be assigned to each customer, the way lawyers are assigned to cases. That person handles every aspect of the case and stays in touch with the customer until the problem is solved. Most people, I assume, would be happy to pay a little more for this. I know I would.
I should have left EarthLink long ago, and certainly before five days passed; but I hold out hope that somebody will reset something tomorrow morning and I’ll be back online. I’m told by various people (including some friendly correspondents who read my blog) that a cable Internet connection is faster and more reliable. If I get no satisfaction in the morning from EarthLink, I’ll call Charter, my cable-television company. I can’t live like this, knowing that at any time, through no fault of my own, I can lose my high-speed Internet connection for five days. Five hours is too long. Five days is nightmarish. I’ve come to depend on high-speed Internet access. To lose it is equivalent to losing air conditioning, electricity, or water.
You’re probably thinking, “What a crybaby he is.” But I haven’t begun to describe the problems I’ve had. They breed like rabbits. I have two computers, an old Compaq and a new Dell. I keep the Compaq as a backup. For some reason, I can’t get a dial-up connection with the Dell. Maybe its modem is shot, but I don’t know why it would be. So to use the dial-up connection, I have to use the Compaq, which is slower.
It gets worse. The dial-up connection is squirrelly. I lose my connection right in the middle of doing something. I’ve had to redial many, many times in the past several days. A few minutes ago, I couldn’t open any web pages. I could get my e-mail, so I knew I had a connection, but no web page would open. Finally, after trying for several minutes, it worked. Will it work next time? Who knows? The various components of my system seem to have formed a league against me.
When you put it all together, I’m shell-shocked. I’m beyond frustrated; I’m livid. What’s happening could easily be the plot of a Kafka novel. My comfortable, scholarly world has been turned upside down. About the only escape I’ve had from the madness was during Saturday’s bike rally in Cleburne. I rode seventy-one miles in brilliant sunshine, enjoying the scenery, the people, and my music. Wish me luck with tomorrow’s “reset.” I hope to be back to blogging soon.
30 July 2004
A Lull in the Action
Sorry I haven't posted anything in a few days. My DSL modem has been blinking (literally) since yesterday morning, so I'm reduced to using (1) my old (slow) computer and (2) a dial-up connection. Going back to dial-up after having a high-speed connection is like going back to black-and-white television after having color. You can't go back. Until I solve the problem, I'll post only sporadically. (You probably think I was doing that already!) It's been all I can do to post my travelogue of twenty years ago on AnalPhilosopher. Today is the third day of The Great Bike Ride of 1984 (Across Arizona). The journal is illustrated with photographs I took along the route. See here for the introduction.
27 July 2004
26 July 2004
Confusions and Fallacies About Animals, Part 16
Several readers have asked me in recent weeks whether there is anything morally objectionable about raising animals humanely and then killing them painlessly. If the animals are raised humanely and killed painlessly, it is said, there’s no suffering being inflicted. Yes, a happy animal’s life is ended, but if it is replaced by an equally happy animal, how could it be wrong? The amount of happiness in the world is the same. Actually, the amount of happiness is greater, since presumably humans who consume the animal’s flesh and make use of its other body parts are made happier by it.
This line of thought will appeal to certain theorists: those who believe that the sole aim of morality is to maximize overall happiness. But notice that hardly anyone thinks this way about humans. Would it be acceptable to humanely raise and painlessly kill humans if there were a use for their body parts, or if, all of a sudden, many humans acquired a taste for human flesh? I suspect you will say no. But why?
Isn’t it because humans aren’t interchangeable? Each human has an inherent worth or dignity. Each life is precious. If we didn’t think this, we would not mourn the loss of an infant, for in most cases the infant can be replaced in a matter of months via another pregnancy. While we care very much about human happiness, we don’t think that the moral value of humans is exhausted by it. Happiness is just one dimension of human value.
Why is it different for animals? Why do people think that animals, but not humans, are interchangeable, and therefore replaceable? Why do we reduce animals to their happiness, such that, if one happy animal is replaced by an equally happy animal, nothing morally significant has been lost? I submit that this is irrational. Just as each human life is precious and irreplaceable, so is each animal life. That animals can’t protest their treatment as happiness-receptacles is morally irrelevant. Babies can’t protest. The severely retarded can’t protest. The senile can’t protest. You can be sure that if animals could protest, they would.
There needs to be a revolution in our thinking about animals. They are no more replaceable than humans are. Unless you are indifferent about replacing one of your children with an equally happy child, you should not be indifferent about replacing a cow or a pig with an equally happy cow or pig. It may be convenient to apply consequentialist reasoning to animals and deontological reasoning to humans, but there is no warrant for it. It’s as arbitrary as applying consequentialist reasoning to other races and deontological reasoning to one’s own race.
This line of thought will appeal to certain theorists: those who believe that the sole aim of morality is to maximize overall happiness. But notice that hardly anyone thinks this way about humans. Would it be acceptable to humanely raise and painlessly kill humans if there were a use for their body parts, or if, all of a sudden, many humans acquired a taste for human flesh? I suspect you will say no. But why?
Isn’t it because humans aren’t interchangeable? Each human has an inherent worth or dignity. Each life is precious. If we didn’t think this, we would not mourn the loss of an infant, for in most cases the infant can be replaced in a matter of months via another pregnancy. While we care very much about human happiness, we don’t think that the moral value of humans is exhausted by it. Happiness is just one dimension of human value.
Why is it different for animals? Why do people think that animals, but not humans, are interchangeable, and therefore replaceable? Why do we reduce animals to their happiness, such that, if one happy animal is replaced by an equally happy animal, nothing morally significant has been lost? I submit that this is irrational. Just as each human life is precious and irreplaceable, so is each animal life. That animals can’t protest their treatment as happiness-receptacles is morally irrelevant. Babies can’t protest. The severely retarded can’t protest. The senile can’t protest. You can be sure that if animals could protest, they would.
There needs to be a revolution in our thinking about animals. They are no more replaceable than humans are. Unless you are indifferent about replacing one of your children with an equally happy child, you should not be indifferent about replacing a cow or a pig with an equally happy cow or pig. It may be convenient to apply consequentialist reasoning to animals and deontological reasoning to humans, but there is no warrant for it. It’s as arbitrary as applying consequentialist reasoning to other races and deontological reasoning to one’s own race.
An Enemy of Animals
The man described in this story claims to care about animals, but his willingness to endorse (use?) violence in their behalf does them no good. In fact, it alienates many people who would otherwise support the cause of animal welfare and animal liberation. What part of self-defeatingness does he not understand? Even Peter Singer, a consequentialist, believes that violence is unproductive. Defenders of animals are in the right. They have the moral high ground. They should use the most powerful tool of social change ever invented: reason. They should eschew and condemn nonrational means, such as force, coercion, and manipulation.
I hereby call upon all of my animal-respecting and animal-loving friends and colleagues to repudiate violence. Nonviolent civil disobedience is one thing, as Dr Martin Luther King Jr showed, but violence toward either person or property is unacceptable. It is unacceptable for two reasons: first, because it's intrinsically wrong (i.e., wrong in and of itself, whatever its consequences); and second, because it has bad long-term consequences. (Thanks to Dan Gifford for the link.)
I hereby call upon all of my animal-respecting and animal-loving friends and colleagues to repudiate violence. Nonviolent civil disobedience is one thing, as Dr Martin Luther King Jr showed, but violence toward either person or property is unacceptable. It is unacceptable for two reasons: first, because it's intrinsically wrong (i.e., wrong in and of itself, whatever its consequences); and second, because it has bad long-term consequences. (Thanks to Dan Gifford for the link.)
25 July 2004
Veal
Here is a page from the website of a veal producer. Notice the language that suggests that the farming techniques are for the calves' benefit. In fact, nothing is done for the calves' benefit. Every aspect of veal-production is profit-driven. The calf is a living flesh-making machine. It's enough to make a person cry. By the way, there's another side to the story. See here and here.
24 July 2004
Religion and Meat-Eating
I still get e-mail from people who say, in response to my posts, that meat-eating is allowed by their religion. This puzzles me. Do you disobey your god’s commands (or violate your god’s laws) by forswearing meat? Is vegetarianism prohibited by your religion? Will you go to hell if you decide to do better by animals than you have to? Surely the answer to these questions is “No.”
Let’s make a typology of actions. Every action is either permissible or impermissible. Every permissible action is either required or not required. So there are three categories of action:
Suppose you enjoy the taste of meat. You might reason that, since you enjoy it and it’s not prohibited by your religion, there is nothing wrong with eating it. But the meat you eat was produced, in all likelihood, in atrocious conditions. The animals whose flesh you consume were made to suffer terribly in its production. Do you think your god is indifferent to this suffering? Wouldn’t a rational god expect his or her subjects to refrain from inflicting suffering on his or her creatures, especially if the only reason for doing so is taste? Don’t say that animals lack souls. That’s irrelevant. The question is not whether animals have souls but whether they can suffer, and surely they can. Suffering does not require ensoulment.
Please don’t use your religious beliefs to rationalize self-interested behavior. That your religion doesn’t forbid meat-eating doesn’t imply that you should do it, all things considered, much less that you should do it no matter how the meat was produced. You have a responsibility to your god (I assume) to act wisely and benevolently. If you’re Christian, ask yourself whether Jesus would look kindly on factory farms and those who support them. I tend to believe that if there is a god, he or she will consign meat-eaters to hell, for they disrespect divine creation. But that’s a subject for another post.
Let’s make a typology of actions. Every action is either permissible or impermissible. Every permissible action is either required or not required. So there are three categories of action:
1. The required (i.e., the obligatory or mandatory).No religion, to my knowledge, requires meat-eating, although some religions forbid the eating of certain meats. So meat-eating is discretionary. The decision whether to eat meat must be based on nonreligious grounds, such as what effect it has on overall happiness or the amount of misery in the world.
2. The impermissible (i.e., the prohibited or forbidden).
3. The permissible but not required (i.e., the discretionary or optional).
Suppose you enjoy the taste of meat. You might reason that, since you enjoy it and it’s not prohibited by your religion, there is nothing wrong with eating it. But the meat you eat was produced, in all likelihood, in atrocious conditions. The animals whose flesh you consume were made to suffer terribly in its production. Do you think your god is indifferent to this suffering? Wouldn’t a rational god expect his or her subjects to refrain from inflicting suffering on his or her creatures, especially if the only reason for doing so is taste? Don’t say that animals lack souls. That’s irrelevant. The question is not whether animals have souls but whether they can suffer, and surely they can. Suffering does not require ensoulment.
Please don’t use your religious beliefs to rationalize self-interested behavior. That your religion doesn’t forbid meat-eating doesn’t imply that you should do it, all things considered, much less that you should do it no matter how the meat was produced. You have a responsibility to your god (I assume) to act wisely and benevolently. If you’re Christian, ask yourself whether Jesus would look kindly on factory farms and those who support them. I tend to believe that if there is a god, he or she will consign meat-eaters to hell, for they disrespect divine creation. But that’s a subject for another post.
From Today's Dallas Morning News
I was quite amused by Ira J. Hadnot's column about dogs going to heaven ("A dog is gone—will we meet again?" Religion, June 26).
I am sure it brought much comfort to ardent dog lovers. However, the only creation of God that has an eternal soul is mankind. Genesis 1:26 says, "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." Genesis 2:7 says, "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul."
Dogs and other animals were just spoken into existence.
Dogs lack the intelligence of mankind and therefore are not capable of understanding what mankind has to do in order to go to heaven. Mankind has a choice. He can accept Jesus as his personal savior and go to heaven or reject him and go to hell. Dogs don't have the ability to make that choice.
Isn't it just like a loving God to make dogs for humans to love and enjoy? We have a great God.
Ann L. Wilson, Garland
I am sure it brought much comfort to ardent dog lovers. However, the only creation of God that has an eternal soul is mankind. Genesis 1:26 says, "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." Genesis 2:7 says, "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul."
Dogs and other animals were just spoken into existence.
Dogs lack the intelligence of mankind and therefore are not capable of understanding what mankind has to do in order to go to heaven. Mankind has a choice. He can accept Jesus as his personal savior and go to heaven or reject him and go to hell. Dogs don't have the ability to make that choice.
Isn't it just like a loving God to make dogs for humans to love and enjoy? We have a great God.
Ann L. Wilson, Garland
23 July 2004
Factory Farming
Here is a page on factory farms by The Humane Society of the United States. If you insist on eating meat, at least be choosy about the source. If you buy factory-farmed meat, you are supporting a most abominable institution. But why not eschew all meat, even if it's produced "humanely"? Wouldn't that reflect a commitment not to treat sentient beings as mere means to your ends? Animals are not resources for human use and consumption. They are fellow travelers, with lives and interests of their own. The interest in life is an ulterior interest, one that is necessary for the flourishing of all other interests. To deprive an animal of its life is to deprive it of the most valuable thing it has.
22 July 2004
The Immorality of Eating Meat
If you eat meat purchased from a grocery store, you are supporting an institution—factory farming—that inflicts terrible deprivation and suffering (not to mention death) on animals. The suffering is your doing, even though you do not personally inflict it and even though you never experience it. You are paying people to inflict the suffering, which, in all likelihood, you could not and would not do yourself. I assume that you believe suffering to be bad (and therefore in need of justification), and I assume that your only reason for eating meat is that you like the taste. So why do you eat meat? It’s immoral (wrong) by your own standards.
One of my teachers at The University of Arizona, Ronald D. Milo, who is now retired, published a wonderful book twenty years ago: Immorality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). His aim in the book is to describe the varieties (or sources) of immorality. He says there are six. Three of them involve belief, by the agent, that his or her action is wrong. In the other three, the agent does not believe that the action is wrong, even though it is. Two of the varieties involve bad preferences (or values); two involve lack of (rational) self-control; and two involve lack of moral concern (i.e., lack of concern for the interests of others). In effect, Ron created a two-by-three diagram of types of immorality. Here are his names for the six types, together with their characteristics:
One of my teachers at The University of Arizona, Ronald D. Milo, who is now retired, published a wonderful book twenty years ago: Immorality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). His aim in the book is to describe the varieties (or sources) of immorality. He says there are six. Three of them involve belief, by the agent, that his or her action is wrong. In the other three, the agent does not believe that the action is wrong, even though it is. Two of the varieties involve bad preferences (or values); two involve lack of (rational) self-control; and two involve lack of moral concern (i.e., lack of concern for the interests of others). In effect, Ron created a two-by-three diagram of types of immorality. Here are his names for the six types, together with their characteristics:
1. Perverse wickedness. The agent believes (falsely) that the action is right, and acts accordingly; the agent’s moral defect is bad preferences (values).I believe that meat-eaters exhibit all six types of immorality. Here is a brief discussion of each:
2. Preferential wickedness. The agent believes (correctly) that the action is wrong, but does it anyway because of bad preferences (values).
3. Moral negligence. The agent does not believe that the action is wrong (even though it is); the agent’s moral defect is lack of self-control. (Put differently, one fails to prevent one’s desires and emotions from obscuring or distorting one’s judgment.)
4. Moral weakness. The agent believes (correctly) that the action is wrong, but does it anyway because of lack of self-control. (Put differently, one allows one’s desires and emotions to prevent one from acting on one’s judgment.)
5. Amorality. The agent does not believe that the action is wrong (even though it is); the agent’s moral defect is lack of moral concern. (Put differently, one’s lack of moral concern accounts for one’s not bothering to make any moral judgment.)
6. Moral indifference. The agent believes (correctly) that the action is wrong, but does it anyway because of lack of moral concern. (Put differently, one’s lack of moral concern accounts for one’s not acting on one’s moral judgment.)
1. Perversely wicked meat-eaters believe that meat-eating is morally permissible, or even required, when in fact it is impermissible. This class includes (but is not limited to) those who believe that their god requires or allows meat-eating, those who believe that animals can’t (and hence don’t) suffer, and those who believe that animals lack interests (i.e., those who believe that animals have no moral status).I should point out that Ron Milo does not apply his typology to animals. He does mention animals from time to time, however. If you’re interested in ethics, you should acquire and read Ron’s book. It’s one of the best books I’ve ever read.
2. Preferentially wicked meat-eaters believe, correctly, that meat-eating is morally impermissible, but do it anyway, because they prefer the pursuit of some other desired end to the avoidance of wrongdoing. In other words, they believe that meat-eating is prima facie wrong, but not ultima facie wrong (wrong all things considered). This class includes (but is not limited to) those who believe that meat is essential to health and who assign a moral value to their health. They prefer their health (or the health of their loved ones) to the welfare of the animals whose flesh they eat.
3. Morally negligent meat-eaters allow their desire for animal flesh (or certain emotions) to obscure or distort their judgment. Their tastes prevent them from taking vegetarian arguments seriously, from thinking clearly, from reasoning soundly, from attending to the facts of animal suffering, &c. They are (culpably) ignorant that what they do is in violation of their own moral principles. This class has many members, unfortunately.
4. Morally weak meat-eaters believe, correctly, that they act wrongly, but don’t exercise requisite self-control. They fail to make their behavior conform to their moral principles. They succumb to temptation. If you’ve eaten meat for a long time and decide to give it up for moral reasons, you will be tempted to backslide. It’s only natural. If you fail to resist the temptation, you exhibit moral weakness. This class has more members than you might think.
5. Amoral meat-eaters lack moral concern for animals, or for certain animals (those they eat). As a result, they have no moral principles (convictions) pertaining to the act of meat-eating. They don’t even bother to consider whether it is right or wrong. They don’t see it as a moral issue.
6. Morally indifferent meat-eaters judge, correctly, that meat-eating is wrong, but don’t care that it’s wrong, and therefore do not act on their judgment. They are insensitive or indifferent to the feelings and interests of animals.
21 July 2004
With Friends Like This, PETA Doesn’t Need Enemies
Yesterday, as you may have noticed, I posted a New York Times story about PETA on both AnalPhilosopher and Animal Ethics. Someone who is too cowardly to identify him- or herself posted a comment: a quotation from my blog. Some time back, I had written that, “With friends like PETA, animals don’t need enemies.” Since nothing else was said, I’m left to speculate about the meaning of the comment.
My guess is that the writer thinks I contradicted myself. But how exactly is that? Suppose I believed that PETA did well in exposing cruelty in chicken-processing plants. Would it follow that PETA does well by animals, all things considered and in the long run? Of course not. Even bad organizations can act rightly, just as broken clocks are right twice a day. Even Hitler and Stalin, who were bad to the bone, acted rightly from time to time. Nobody, with the possible exception of Paul Krugman, is omnimalevolent.
What this incident shows, if anything, is PETA’s unscrupulousness. PETA’s operatives will do anything to achieve its goals. They have little or no respect for persons, property, or privacy. The animal-liberation movement must disavow such tactics. Ultimately, only rational persuasion will benefit animals. PETA resorts to force, coercion, and manipulation to achieve its ends. Certainly no self-respecting philosopher can endorse these methods.
Philosophers care at least as much about how one changes the world as that one changes it. A philosopher would rather not change the world at all than change it by using force, coercion, or manipulation. Philosophers, as such, are deontologists, not consequentialists. That is why they devote so much time and energy to identifying and classifying fallacies. A fallacy is an argument that, while psychologically appealing, is logically defective. A fallacy is a bad argument masquerading as a good one.
The larger point is this. My posting news items, editorial opinions, and letters to the editor does not constitute an endorsement of the views they express. Anyone who reads my blog regularly should know this. Perhaps the coward isn’t a regular reader.
My guess is that the writer thinks I contradicted myself. But how exactly is that? Suppose I believed that PETA did well in exposing cruelty in chicken-processing plants. Would it follow that PETA does well by animals, all things considered and in the long run? Of course not. Even bad organizations can act rightly, just as broken clocks are right twice a day. Even Hitler and Stalin, who were bad to the bone, acted rightly from time to time. Nobody, with the possible exception of Paul Krugman, is omnimalevolent.
What this incident shows, if anything, is PETA’s unscrupulousness. PETA’s operatives will do anything to achieve its goals. They have little or no respect for persons, property, or privacy. The animal-liberation movement must disavow such tactics. Ultimately, only rational persuasion will benefit animals. PETA resorts to force, coercion, and manipulation to achieve its ends. Certainly no self-respecting philosopher can endorse these methods.
Philosophers care at least as much about how one changes the world as that one changes it. A philosopher would rather not change the world at all than change it by using force, coercion, or manipulation. Philosophers, as such, are deontologists, not consequentialists. That is why they devote so much time and energy to identifying and classifying fallacies. A fallacy is an argument that, while psychologically appealing, is logically defective. A fallacy is a bad argument masquerading as a good one.
The larger point is this. My posting news items, editorial opinions, and letters to the editor does not constitute an endorsement of the views they express. Anyone who reads my blog regularly should know this. Perhaps the coward isn’t a regular reader.
20 July 2004
From Today's New York Times
U.S.D.A.'s Testing Problem
In the past seven months—ever since a case of mad-cow disease was discovered in Washington State—the United States Department of Agriculture has been working hard to reduce the risk of the disease spreading. It is slowly introducing restrictions on how the most susceptible bovine tissues can be used, and it has found money to begin developing a national animal-identification system. But there are still gaps in the department's efforts to guarantee a safe meat supply. One is chronological. America squandered a decade in which it could have been absorbing the lessons learned from the British mad-cow crisis. The other critical failing is the U.S.D.A.'s testing program itself.
In Britain and Japan, every cow bound for market is tested for the disease. The number of cattle tested in the United States has risen tenfold, but is still just a small fraction of the national slaughter herd. And in a draft report, the department's inspector general has sharply criticized its new testing program. The chief objection? Testing is voluntary, which undermines the statistical validity of the program. The new rules' design assumes what only careful testing can confirm, that mad-cow disease is probably very scarce in this country.
Agriculture Department officials have said that the inspector general's draft report contains nothing that "would suggest there has been any compromise to public health." But it is impossible to know whether public health has been compromised without a competent testing program. Quite clearly, the U.S.D.A. balks at the cost and logistics of mandatory inspections of cattle at meatpacking plants. And it seems convinced that the threat of mad-cow disease can be evaluated by voluntary inspections of cattle that appear sick. But one reason other countries are so strict about inspections is that mad-cow disease can be present in cattle that look healthy. The best way to ensure public safety and global confidence in the American beef market is to require testing that is stringent and extensive enough to tell us how safe we really are and how confident we really should be.
In the past seven months—ever since a case of mad-cow disease was discovered in Washington State—the United States Department of Agriculture has been working hard to reduce the risk of the disease spreading. It is slowly introducing restrictions on how the most susceptible bovine tissues can be used, and it has found money to begin developing a national animal-identification system. But there are still gaps in the department's efforts to guarantee a safe meat supply. One is chronological. America squandered a decade in which it could have been absorbing the lessons learned from the British mad-cow crisis. The other critical failing is the U.S.D.A.'s testing program itself.
In Britain and Japan, every cow bound for market is tested for the disease. The number of cattle tested in the United States has risen tenfold, but is still just a small fraction of the national slaughter herd. And in a draft report, the department's inspector general has sharply criticized its new testing program. The chief objection? Testing is voluntary, which undermines the statistical validity of the program. The new rules' design assumes what only careful testing can confirm, that mad-cow disease is probably very scarce in this country.
Agriculture Department officials have said that the inspector general's draft report contains nothing that "would suggest there has been any compromise to public health." But it is impossible to know whether public health has been compromised without a competent testing program. Quite clearly, the U.S.D.A. balks at the cost and logistics of mandatory inspections of cattle at meatpacking plants. And it seems convinced that the threat of mad-cow disease can be evaluated by voluntary inspections of cattle that appear sick. But one reason other countries are so strict about inspections is that mad-cow disease can be present in cattle that look healthy. The best way to ensure public safety and global confidence in the American beef market is to require testing that is stringent and extensive enough to tell us how safe we really are and how confident we really should be.
From Today's New York Times
KFC Supplier Accused of Animal Cruelty
By DONALD G. McNEIL Jr.
An animal rights group involved in a long legal dispute with Kentucky Fried Chicken about the treatment of the 700 million chickens it buys each year is to release a videotape today showing slaughterhouse workers for one supplier jumping up and down on live chickens, drop-kicking them like footballs and slamming them into walls, apparently for fun.
After officials of the KFC Corporation saw the videotape yesterday, they said they would seek dismissal of the workers, inspect the slaughterhouse more often and end their relationship if the cruelty was repeated. The company that owns the slaughterhouse, the Pilgrim's Pride Corporation, the country's second-largest poultry processor, said it was "appalled" by the tape.
Animal rights groups have long complained that sheer malicious behavior-on top of the expected confinement and bloodletting-goes on in slaughter plants, but this is the first time such graphic proof has been produced. The tape was taken surreptitiously by an investigator for People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals who worked from October 2003 to May 2004 at a Pilgrim's Pride plant in Moorefield, W.Va., that won KFC's "Supplier of the Year" award in 1997.
KFC and its parent, Yum Brands, have repeatedly committed themselves to a promise that all suppliers would treat animals humanely. Yesterday, a spokeswoman for KFC said the company "wouldn't tolerate the type of behavior in the video."
KFC "will require that the employee or employees responsible be terminated," said Bonnie Warschauer, director of public relations, and further violations will "result in termination of our relationship."
Prominent veterinarians, including those on the company's animal welfare advisory board, called for shutting the plant and dismissing or prosecuting its managers. Dr. Ian J. H. Duncan, an animal and poultry science professor at the University of Guelph in Ontario, who is a KFC adviser, said the tape "contains some of the worst scenes of animal cruelty that I have ever witnessed."
A Pilgrim's Pride spokesman said the company had an anonymous report about poultry mistreatment at the plant in April and had made it clear to its workers that "any such behavior would result in immediate termination." In light of the tape, the company said, it will reopen its investigation.
The tape includes loud music the workers listen to, the screeching of the birds and the sound of each hitting the wall. When released, it will be on a Web site of the animal-rights group, which is known as PETA, at kentuckyfriedcruelty.com.
The undercover investigator, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he feared retaliation and still does undercover work for the group, said in a telephone interview that he saw "hundreds" of acts of cruelty, including workers tearing beaks off, ripping a bird's head off to write graffiti in blood, spitting tobacco juice into birds' mouths, plucking feathers to "make it snow," suffocating a chicken by tying a latex glove over its head, and squeezing birds like water balloons to spray feces over other birds.
He said the behavior was "to alleviate boredom or vent frustrations," especially when so many birds were coming in that they would have to work late.
On April 6, one day he filmed, workers made a game of throwing chickens against a wall; 114 were thrown in seven minutes. A supervisor walking past the pile of birds on the floor said, "Hold your fire," and, once out of the way, told the crew to "carry on."
On another day, he said, the supervisor told the crew to kill correctly because inspectors were visiting.
To document cruelty and position his tiny camera, he said, he spent eight months working in the "hang pen," where workers attach newly arrived chickens by their feet to a conveyor that carries them upside-down through an electrified "stun bath" and then into the whirling blades of the throat-cutting machine.
KFC says all its suppliers train their workers in animal welfare, but the investigator said Pilgrim's Pride had nothing on the topic in its orientation manual and the only instruction he received was after five months, and then only in how to wring a chicken's neck by hand. The Web site of Pilgrim's Pride does not note any animal welfare policy.
Last year, PETA sued Kentucky Fried Chicken and called for a boycott, demanding that it require its suppliers to give chickens more room in factory barns, stop forcing growth so rapid that it cripples birds, and to gas birds before hanging them so they feel no pain.
The group has won similar concessions from Burger King, McDonald's and Wendy's.
Yum Brands did not do as PETA requested, but its KFC Web site says the company is "committed to the humane treatment of animals." It describes steps taken to assure such treatment, including creating an advisory council and promising to "only deal with suppliers who provide an environment that is free from cruelty, abuse and neglect."
Dr. Temple Grandin, a well-known veterinary scientist who designs plants for humane slaughter, called the behavior shown on the videotape "absolutely atrocious."
Dr. Grandin is on KFC's animal welfare advisory board, but said PETA had not told her when it sent her the tape this month where it had been taken. "They need to fire the plant manager," she said.
Both Ms. Warschauer of KFC and a spokesman for Pilgrim's Pride said they would ask Dr. Grandin to visit the plant.
PETA said it planned to ask a West Virginia prosecutor to prosecute plant employees and managers under state laws that make torture or malicious killing of animals a felony. It has also written to KFC and Pilgrim's Pride, asking them to use gas to knock the animals out before they are killed and to mount video cameras to forestall employee cruelty.
The PETA investigator said he would testify, calling it "the right thing to do."
Several American and British veterinary experts to whom PETA sent the videotape expressed disgust.
"I have visited many poultry slaughterhouses but I have never seen cruelty to chickens to the extent shown in this video," said Dr. Donald M. Broom, professor of animal welfare at Cambridge University and chairman of the European Union's animal welfare scientific committee. "It would be grounds for a successful prosecution for cruelty to animals in most countries."
By DONALD G. McNEIL Jr.
An animal rights group involved in a long legal dispute with Kentucky Fried Chicken about the treatment of the 700 million chickens it buys each year is to release a videotape today showing slaughterhouse workers for one supplier jumping up and down on live chickens, drop-kicking them like footballs and slamming them into walls, apparently for fun.
After officials of the KFC Corporation saw the videotape yesterday, they said they would seek dismissal of the workers, inspect the slaughterhouse more often and end their relationship if the cruelty was repeated. The company that owns the slaughterhouse, the Pilgrim's Pride Corporation, the country's second-largest poultry processor, said it was "appalled" by the tape.
Animal rights groups have long complained that sheer malicious behavior-on top of the expected confinement and bloodletting-goes on in slaughter plants, but this is the first time such graphic proof has been produced. The tape was taken surreptitiously by an investigator for People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals who worked from October 2003 to May 2004 at a Pilgrim's Pride plant in Moorefield, W.Va., that won KFC's "Supplier of the Year" award in 1997.
KFC and its parent, Yum Brands, have repeatedly committed themselves to a promise that all suppliers would treat animals humanely. Yesterday, a spokeswoman for KFC said the company "wouldn't tolerate the type of behavior in the video."
KFC "will require that the employee or employees responsible be terminated," said Bonnie Warschauer, director of public relations, and further violations will "result in termination of our relationship."
Prominent veterinarians, including those on the company's animal welfare advisory board, called for shutting the plant and dismissing or prosecuting its managers. Dr. Ian J. H. Duncan, an animal and poultry science professor at the University of Guelph in Ontario, who is a KFC adviser, said the tape "contains some of the worst scenes of animal cruelty that I have ever witnessed."
A Pilgrim's Pride spokesman said the company had an anonymous report about poultry mistreatment at the plant in April and had made it clear to its workers that "any such behavior would result in immediate termination." In light of the tape, the company said, it will reopen its investigation.
The tape includes loud music the workers listen to, the screeching of the birds and the sound of each hitting the wall. When released, it will be on a Web site of the animal-rights group, which is known as PETA, at kentuckyfriedcruelty.com.
The undercover investigator, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he feared retaliation and still does undercover work for the group, said in a telephone interview that he saw "hundreds" of acts of cruelty, including workers tearing beaks off, ripping a bird's head off to write graffiti in blood, spitting tobacco juice into birds' mouths, plucking feathers to "make it snow," suffocating a chicken by tying a latex glove over its head, and squeezing birds like water balloons to spray feces over other birds.
He said the behavior was "to alleviate boredom or vent frustrations," especially when so many birds were coming in that they would have to work late.
On April 6, one day he filmed, workers made a game of throwing chickens against a wall; 114 were thrown in seven minutes. A supervisor walking past the pile of birds on the floor said, "Hold your fire," and, once out of the way, told the crew to "carry on."
On another day, he said, the supervisor told the crew to kill correctly because inspectors were visiting.
To document cruelty and position his tiny camera, he said, he spent eight months working in the "hang pen," where workers attach newly arrived chickens by their feet to a conveyor that carries them upside-down through an electrified "stun bath" and then into the whirling blades of the throat-cutting machine.
KFC says all its suppliers train their workers in animal welfare, but the investigator said Pilgrim's Pride had nothing on the topic in its orientation manual and the only instruction he received was after five months, and then only in how to wring a chicken's neck by hand. The Web site of Pilgrim's Pride does not note any animal welfare policy.
Last year, PETA sued Kentucky Fried Chicken and called for a boycott, demanding that it require its suppliers to give chickens more room in factory barns, stop forcing growth so rapid that it cripples birds, and to gas birds before hanging them so they feel no pain.
The group has won similar concessions from Burger King, McDonald's and Wendy's.
Yum Brands did not do as PETA requested, but its KFC Web site says the company is "committed to the humane treatment of animals." It describes steps taken to assure such treatment, including creating an advisory council and promising to "only deal with suppliers who provide an environment that is free from cruelty, abuse and neglect."
Dr. Temple Grandin, a well-known veterinary scientist who designs plants for humane slaughter, called the behavior shown on the videotape "absolutely atrocious."
Dr. Grandin is on KFC's animal welfare advisory board, but said PETA had not told her when it sent her the tape this month where it had been taken. "They need to fire the plant manager," she said.
Both Ms. Warschauer of KFC and a spokesman for Pilgrim's Pride said they would ask Dr. Grandin to visit the plant.
PETA said it planned to ask a West Virginia prosecutor to prosecute plant employees and managers under state laws that make torture or malicious killing of animals a felony. It has also written to KFC and Pilgrim's Pride, asking them to use gas to knock the animals out before they are killed and to mount video cameras to forestall employee cruelty.
The PETA investigator said he would testify, calling it "the right thing to do."
Several American and British veterinary experts to whom PETA sent the videotape expressed disgust.
"I have visited many poultry slaughterhouses but I have never seen cruelty to chickens to the extent shown in this video," said Dr. Donald M. Broom, professor of animal welfare at Cambridge University and chairman of the European Union's animal welfare scientific committee. "It would be grounds for a successful prosecution for cruelty to animals in most countries."
Compartmentalized Thinking
Suppose I tell you that I don’t care about Ohioans. When I act, I disregard their interests. They are as nothing to me. You would be aghast. “Why treat Ohioans differently from others, such as Texans?” you ask. Because they’re Ohioans, I say. I don’t care about Ohioans. “But why not? They have the same interests you and I do. They can suffer every bit as much.” “I know, but I just don’t care about them,” I reply.
You would rightly accuse me of inconsistency. Unless I can point to some morally relevant difference between Ohioans and nonOhioans that would justify my differential treatment, I act wrongly in treating them differently. As Aristotle pointed out long ago, justice consists in treating like cases alike and different cases differently—and in strict proportion to the differences.
This is the situation of people who eat meat. Unless they’re stupid, they know that the meat they eat is the result of a process that inflicts a great deal of undeserved suffering. They would never think to inflict such suffering on a fellow human. “Why treat animals differently from humans?” I ask. “Because they’re animals,” you say. “I just don’t care about animals.”
One reader accused me of going emotional. Where’s the emotion in what I just wrote? It’s an argument. I’m claiming that meat-eaters are inconsistent in treating suffering differently depending on the species of the individual who suffers. If you think animals don’t matter, morally, then the burden is on you to point to a morally relevant difference. If you think blacks don’t matter, morally, then the burden is on you to point to a morally relevant difference. Can we agree that this is where the burden lies?
Racists disregard or discount the interests of other races. Sexists disregard or discount the interests of the other sex. Ethnocentrists disregard or discount the interests of other ethnicities. Nationalists disregard or discount the interests of other nationalities. Speciesists disregard or discount the interests of other species.
One reader said that not all the animals he eats have suffered. Does he know that? If you buy meat in a grocery store, the probability is near 1.0 that it came from an animal that was made to suffer. Do you know the facts about factory farming? If not, then you’re culpably ignorant. There is no excuse for not inquiring into the means by which all of the products you use were produced. Would you buy a pair of sneakers if you had reason to believe that they were made by slave labor? What if you went out of your way to remain ignorant of how your sneakers were produced? Does that exculpate you? Surely not. Personal responsibility means being responsible (accountable) for whatever went into the products one buys. If you buy sneakers made with slave labor, you enslaved someone. That you didn’t see the sneakers made is irrelevant.
Unless you know for a fact that the animal whose flesh you eat did not suffer, it is morally irresponsible for you to eat its flesh. I suspect that only a tiny fraction of meat consumed satisfies this requirement.
Another reader asked what meat-eating has to do with war, since I discussed the two issues in a single post. The obvious answer is that both involve the infliction of harm. Any reasonable person, and certainly a philosopher, should strive to develop a coherent view of the permissibility of harm-infliction (including killing). If you think that the suffering of Iraqis counts for as much as the suffering of Americans, how can you consistently discount or disregard the suffering of animals? Why do you insist that Iraqis be given full moral consideration but allow that animals be given less than full moral consideration (or none at all)?
As every psychologist knows, people compartmentalize their thinking. It’s a defense mechanism, a way of avoiding cognitive dissonance and uncomfortable feelings such as guilt and shame. For example, people have a view about abortion, about capital punishment, about war, about meat-eating, about suicide, and about self-defense. Is there an underlying principle for these views? Shouldn’t there be? Isn’t it the job of a philosopher to induce people to work out a coherent ethic of killing?
One reason people are so testy about my posts on animals is that they’ve compartmentalized their thinking. I can see it in their letters. They put animals into a separate moral category. Either animals don’t count at all or they don’t count for as much as humans. This compartmentalization allows people to eat meat with a clear conscience. Well, I’m here to dirty your conscience. Stop compartmentalizing and start being consistent. Unless you can cite a morally relevant difference between humans and animals that justifies discounting or disregarding the suffering of the latter, you are irrational and irresponsible. Why not stop eating meat until you’ve thought things through? Isn’t that what a conscientious person would do?
By the way, one person keeps saying that animals aren’t innocent. What the hell are they, guilty? For the last time, animals are innocent in the same sense as Iraqi children. All this means is that they don’t deserve to suffer. If you care about the suffering of Iraqi children, you must, to be consistent, care about the suffering of animals. Suffering is suffering, whether it’s in a black body, a white body, an Iraqi body, an American body, a human body, or an animal body. Suffering is intrinsically bad. Therefore, it is prima facie wrong to inflict it. Since there is no need or other justification for inflicting it on animals, it is wrong, all things considered, to do so. That’s my argument. If you can’t find anything wrong with it, then either stop eating meat or admit that you’re too weak to do so.
You would rightly accuse me of inconsistency. Unless I can point to some morally relevant difference between Ohioans and nonOhioans that would justify my differential treatment, I act wrongly in treating them differently. As Aristotle pointed out long ago, justice consists in treating like cases alike and different cases differently—and in strict proportion to the differences.
This is the situation of people who eat meat. Unless they’re stupid, they know that the meat they eat is the result of a process that inflicts a great deal of undeserved suffering. They would never think to inflict such suffering on a fellow human. “Why treat animals differently from humans?” I ask. “Because they’re animals,” you say. “I just don’t care about animals.”
One reader accused me of going emotional. Where’s the emotion in what I just wrote? It’s an argument. I’m claiming that meat-eaters are inconsistent in treating suffering differently depending on the species of the individual who suffers. If you think animals don’t matter, morally, then the burden is on you to point to a morally relevant difference. If you think blacks don’t matter, morally, then the burden is on you to point to a morally relevant difference. Can we agree that this is where the burden lies?
Racists disregard or discount the interests of other races. Sexists disregard or discount the interests of the other sex. Ethnocentrists disregard or discount the interests of other ethnicities. Nationalists disregard or discount the interests of other nationalities. Speciesists disregard or discount the interests of other species.
One reader said that not all the animals he eats have suffered. Does he know that? If you buy meat in a grocery store, the probability is near 1.0 that it came from an animal that was made to suffer. Do you know the facts about factory farming? If not, then you’re culpably ignorant. There is no excuse for not inquiring into the means by which all of the products you use were produced. Would you buy a pair of sneakers if you had reason to believe that they were made by slave labor? What if you went out of your way to remain ignorant of how your sneakers were produced? Does that exculpate you? Surely not. Personal responsibility means being responsible (accountable) for whatever went into the products one buys. If you buy sneakers made with slave labor, you enslaved someone. That you didn’t see the sneakers made is irrelevant.
Unless you know for a fact that the animal whose flesh you eat did not suffer, it is morally irresponsible for you to eat its flesh. I suspect that only a tiny fraction of meat consumed satisfies this requirement.
Another reader asked what meat-eating has to do with war, since I discussed the two issues in a single post. The obvious answer is that both involve the infliction of harm. Any reasonable person, and certainly a philosopher, should strive to develop a coherent view of the permissibility of harm-infliction (including killing). If you think that the suffering of Iraqis counts for as much as the suffering of Americans, how can you consistently discount or disregard the suffering of animals? Why do you insist that Iraqis be given full moral consideration but allow that animals be given less than full moral consideration (or none at all)?
As every psychologist knows, people compartmentalize their thinking. It’s a defense mechanism, a way of avoiding cognitive dissonance and uncomfortable feelings such as guilt and shame. For example, people have a view about abortion, about capital punishment, about war, about meat-eating, about suicide, and about self-defense. Is there an underlying principle for these views? Shouldn’t there be? Isn’t it the job of a philosopher to induce people to work out a coherent ethic of killing?
One reason people are so testy about my posts on animals is that they’ve compartmentalized their thinking. I can see it in their letters. They put animals into a separate moral category. Either animals don’t count at all or they don’t count for as much as humans. This compartmentalization allows people to eat meat with a clear conscience. Well, I’m here to dirty your conscience. Stop compartmentalizing and start being consistent. Unless you can cite a morally relevant difference between humans and animals that justifies discounting or disregarding the suffering of the latter, you are irrational and irresponsible. Why not stop eating meat until you’ve thought things through? Isn’t that what a conscientious person would do?
By the way, one person keeps saying that animals aren’t innocent. What the hell are they, guilty? For the last time, animals are innocent in the same sense as Iraqi children. All this means is that they don’t deserve to suffer. If you care about the suffering of Iraqi children, you must, to be consistent, care about the suffering of animals. Suffering is suffering, whether it’s in a black body, a white body, an Iraqi body, an American body, a human body, or an animal body. Suffering is intrinsically bad. Therefore, it is prima facie wrong to inflict it. Since there is no need or other justification for inflicting it on animals, it is wrong, all things considered, to do so. That’s my argument. If you can’t find anything wrong with it, then either stop eating meat or admit that you’re too weak to do so.
19 July 2004
From Today's New York Times
To the Editor:
It is possible to lower cholesterol levels significantly if substantial dietary and lifestyle changes are made.
No one would deny the role that cholesterol-lowering drugs have to play in the battle against heart disease, but many people's lives and billions of dollars in money spent on medicine and related health care costs could be saved if people were aware of the important results in the battle against high cholesterol and heart disease that have been made as the result of a diet that eliminates or almost totally eliminates animal products and consists primarily of unrefined grains, legumes, fruits and vegetables, coupled with moderate exercise.
MICHAEL PITKOWSKY
Bronx, July 13, 2004
It is possible to lower cholesterol levels significantly if substantial dietary and lifestyle changes are made.
No one would deny the role that cholesterol-lowering drugs have to play in the battle against heart disease, but many people's lives and billions of dollars in money spent on medicine and related health care costs could be saved if people were aware of the important results in the battle against high cholesterol and heart disease that have been made as the result of a diet that eliminates or almost totally eliminates animal products and consists primarily of unrefined grains, legumes, fruits and vegetables, coupled with moderate exercise.
MICHAEL PITKOWSKY
Bronx, July 13, 2004
Selective Concern
I’ve made a decision. Henceforth, when someone tells me that he or she opposed the war in Iraq, I’ll ask why. If the answer includes concern for innocent Iraqis who were killed during the war, I’ll ask whether the speaker eats meat. If the answer is yes, I’ll end the discussion.
How can I take seriously someone who professes concern for innocent human beings but willingly inflicts terrible suffering on innocent nonhuman animals? This is as flagrant an inconsistency as can be imagined. That people don’t notice it testifies to an almost infinite human capacity for denial, delusion, rationalization, and self-servingness.
Someone might say that there are morally relevant differences between humans and animals. Of course there are. But to say that there are morally relevant differences between X and Y is not to say that there are no morally relevant similarities between X and Y. Two beings can be alike in some respects but different in others. Suppose one of my children has been bad and another good. There’s a morally relevant difference between them that would justify differential treatment; but this doesn’t mean the bad child loses all moral status.
Follow along with me. Sentient beings, i.e., beings who have the capacity to suffer, have an interest in not suffering. Suffering is intrinsically bad. Therefore, it’s prima facie wrong to inflict suffering. This means that, unless there is a good reason to inflict suffering, it is wrong to do so. But what is the good reason for making animals suffer? That you like the taste of their cooked flesh? If that’s a moral reason at all, it’s extremely weak. Certainly it’s not strong enough to justify the infliction of pain! How would you like it if someone put his or her trivial interests ahead of your significant interests? You would be outraged. Morally outraged.
Meat-eaters are walking contradictions. They violate their own moral principles. How can I take seriously someone whose heart bleeds for innocent Iraqis but who happily kills and eats innocent animals? I can’t. Until meat-eating opponents of the war in Iraq change their diets, they forfeit their right to be taken seriously.
How can I take seriously someone who professes concern for innocent human beings but willingly inflicts terrible suffering on innocent nonhuman animals? This is as flagrant an inconsistency as can be imagined. That people don’t notice it testifies to an almost infinite human capacity for denial, delusion, rationalization, and self-servingness.
Someone might say that there are morally relevant differences between humans and animals. Of course there are. But to say that there are morally relevant differences between X and Y is not to say that there are no morally relevant similarities between X and Y. Two beings can be alike in some respects but different in others. Suppose one of my children has been bad and another good. There’s a morally relevant difference between them that would justify differential treatment; but this doesn’t mean the bad child loses all moral status.
Follow along with me. Sentient beings, i.e., beings who have the capacity to suffer, have an interest in not suffering. Suffering is intrinsically bad. Therefore, it’s prima facie wrong to inflict suffering. This means that, unless there is a good reason to inflict suffering, it is wrong to do so. But what is the good reason for making animals suffer? That you like the taste of their cooked flesh? If that’s a moral reason at all, it’s extremely weak. Certainly it’s not strong enough to justify the infliction of pain! How would you like it if someone put his or her trivial interests ahead of your significant interests? You would be outraged. Morally outraged.
Meat-eaters are walking contradictions. They violate their own moral principles. How can I take seriously someone whose heart bleeds for innocent Iraqis but who happily kills and eats innocent animals? I can’t. Until meat-eating opponents of the war in Iraq change their diets, they forfeit their right to be taken seriously.
Confusions and Fallacies About Animals, Part 15
I’m always stunned to hear intelligent people defend meat-eating on the ground that animals kill and eat each other. (See here.) To quote Ronald Dworkin from another context, this is an “album of confusions.”
First, not all animals kill and eat each other. Some animals are herbivores. Perhaps we should emulate them rather than omnivores or carnivores.
Second, what’s the underlying principle? Is it that we may (morally) do anything any animal does? But surely that’s not acceptable, for it implies, inter alia, that we may dominate other humans. Do we really want to look to animals for moral guidance? Any less-inclusive principle runs the risk of being self-serving. People who want to eat meat will justify it by citing the fact that some animals eat meat; but they won’t cite animal behavior as justification for behaviors they dislike, such as incest and conquest.
Third, even if it’s in our nature as human beings to eat meat, it doesn’t follow that we may. It’s in our nature as human beings to do many things that are wrong, such as inseminate women against their will, aggress on others, disregard the interests of those of other races and religions, and deceive others. That something is natural for humans goes no way toward showing that it’s morally permissible. This violates Hume’s law, which prohibits inferences from “is” to “ought.”
Fourth, there’s a relevant difference between humans and animals. Only humans are moral agents. (Animals are moral patients.) Only humans have the capacity to reflect on their desires and act against them. Only humans can act on the basis of principle. Only humans are responsible for their conduct. To blame an animal for harming another animal would be as absurd and pointless as blaming lightning for causing a fire. Since humans can decide how to act, we must decide, using reason, how to act. This difference between humans and animals imposes a special responsibility on humans. With moral agency comes responsibility. To say that we ought to act as animals do is to shirk this responsibility and become mere animals. It is a rationalization of something one wants to do but can’t justify doing.
By the way, I wrote about this confusion on 26 April (see here), but I keep getting letters from people that suggest that they haven’t read or understood it. Some things bear repeating.
First, not all animals kill and eat each other. Some animals are herbivores. Perhaps we should emulate them rather than omnivores or carnivores.
Second, what’s the underlying principle? Is it that we may (morally) do anything any animal does? But surely that’s not acceptable, for it implies, inter alia, that we may dominate other humans. Do we really want to look to animals for moral guidance? Any less-inclusive principle runs the risk of being self-serving. People who want to eat meat will justify it by citing the fact that some animals eat meat; but they won’t cite animal behavior as justification for behaviors they dislike, such as incest and conquest.
Third, even if it’s in our nature as human beings to eat meat, it doesn’t follow that we may. It’s in our nature as human beings to do many things that are wrong, such as inseminate women against their will, aggress on others, disregard the interests of those of other races and religions, and deceive others. That something is natural for humans goes no way toward showing that it’s morally permissible. This violates Hume’s law, which prohibits inferences from “is” to “ought.”
Fourth, there’s a relevant difference between humans and animals. Only humans are moral agents. (Animals are moral patients.) Only humans have the capacity to reflect on their desires and act against them. Only humans can act on the basis of principle. Only humans are responsible for their conduct. To blame an animal for harming another animal would be as absurd and pointless as blaming lightning for causing a fire. Since humans can decide how to act, we must decide, using reason, how to act. This difference between humans and animals imposes a special responsibility on humans. With moral agency comes responsibility. To say that we ought to act as animals do is to shirk this responsibility and become mere animals. It is a rationalization of something one wants to do but can’t justify doing.
By the way, I wrote about this confusion on 26 April (see here), but I keep getting letters from people that suggest that they haven’t read or understood it. Some things bear repeating.
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