Cholesterol

I lifted the following from the website of the American Heart Association:

Your total blood cholesterol level
Your total blood cholesterol will fall into one of these categories:

Desirable—Less than 200 mg/dL
Borderline high risk—200–239 mg/dL
High risk—240 mg/dL and over

Here is some more explanation about each of these categories.

Desirable
If your total cholesterol is less than 200 mg/dL, your heart attack risk is relatively low, unless you have other risk factors. Even with a low risk, it's still smart to eat foods low in saturated fat and cholesterol, and also get plenty of physical activity. Have your cholesterol levels measured every five years—or more often if you're a man over 45 or a woman over 55.

Borderline high risk
People whose cholesterol level is from 200 to 239 mg/dL are borderline high risk. About a third of American adults are in this (borderline) group; almost half of adults have total cholesterol levels below 200 mg/dL.

Have your cholesterol and HDL rechecked in one to two years if:

Your total cholesterol is in this range.
Your HDL is less than 40 mg/dL.
You don’t have other risk factors for heart disease.

You should also lower your intake of foods high in saturated fat and cholesterol to reduce your blood cholesterol level to below 200 mg/dL. Your doctor may order another blood test to measure your LDL cholesterol. Ask your doctor to discuss your LDL cholesterol with you. Even if your total cholesterol is between 200 and 239 mg/dL, you may not be at high risk for a heart attack. Some people—such as women before menopause and young, active men who have no other risk factors—may have high HDL cholesterol and desirable LDL levels. Ask your doctor to interpret your results. Everyone's case is different.

High risk
If your total cholesterol level is 240 or more, it's definitely high. Your risk of heart attack and stroke is greater. In general, people who have a total cholesterol level of 240 mg/dL have twice the risk of coronary heart disease as people whose cholesterol level is 200 mg/dL.

You need more tests. Ask your doctor for advice. About 20 percent of the U.S. population has high blood cholesterol levels.

I received the results of my annual physical examination today. My total cholesterol is 115. My doctor wrote "fantastic!" I attribute it to two things: first, lifelong aerobic exercise (mainly bicycling and running); and second, a demi-vegetarian diet. As I've said many times in this blog, if you care only about yourself, and don't give a damn about animals, you'll eat very few animal products. I've had no dairy products (milk, cheese, ice cream, butter, or yogurt) since 1972. I've had no red meat (i.e., meat other than chicken and fish) since 1981.

Chimpanzee Society

Because individual interests diverge, conflict is inevitable. Because individual interests converge, cooperation is possible. See here.

Terrorism

Somebody explain to me how this helps animals.

Animals and Ethics

Here is Scott Wilson's entry "Animals and Ethics" from The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Shelly Kagan on Animal Rights

In what is probably the broadest sense of the term, to say of something that it has moral rights is only to say that it has moral standing—that it counts from the moral point of view. In this sense, most of us believe that people and animals have rights of some sort, but books and rocks do not. That is to say, we think that people and animals matter, morally speaking, in their own right (unlike books and rocks). Put another way, if something has rights in this broad sense of the term, our treatment of it is not morally irrelevant, nor is it of mere derivative significance (due, perhaps, to possible effects on other things that do count in their own right).

(Shelly Kagan, Normative Ethics, Dimensions of Philosophy Series, ed. Norman Daniels and Keith Lehrer [Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998], 170-1 [italics in original])

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

"Which Cut Is Older? (It's a Trick Question)" (news article, Feb. 21) needlessly alarms consumers about a packaging system that the Food and Drug Administration has affirmed as safe three separate times.

The technology, similar to what other food manufacturers use to package many non-meat products, uses minute quantities of carbon monoxide.

The packaging provides distinct benefits for manufacturers, retailers and consumers. By maintaining the freshness and color of meat, the packaging prevents retailers from discarding safe products because of the unappealing and premature browning at the store.

The "sell by" or "use by" date that appears on most packages is there to help protect consumers from buying spoiled meat. When meat products go past their sell-by date, consumers will notice obvious indicators that the product is not safe to eat, including a bad odor, bulging packages and a slimy texture.

J. Patrick Boyle
President and Chief Executive
American Meat Institute
Washington, Feb. 23, 2006

Richard A. Posner on Vegetarianism

Because the academic mind prizes consistency, academic moralists believe that pointing out that a person’s moral beliefs or behaviors are inconsistent can be a powerful agent for moral change. They believe that if you point out to a meat eater that because he considers suffering a bad thing and animals suffer as a result of his diet he is being inconsistent, you may persuade him to become a vegetarian. But behavioral consistency is a weaker ordering principle than logical consistency. To defend a proposition and its negation is a lot more difficult than to tell a story that will make a unity of “inconsistent” behavior or reconcile one’s behavior with an inconsistent belief about how one should behave. The meat eater can distinguish between human and animal suffering; can deny that animals have to suffer in being killed for food (they can be killed painlessly, and since they do not know what is going to be done to them, they do not suffer psychologically in anticipation); can point out that his own consumption of meat is too slight to affect the number of animals killed; can even argue that to put animals on a par, as it were, with human beings could make us less sensitive to human suffering (could, for example, put the annual slaughter of tens of millions of turkeys for Thanksgiving on a level with the Holocaust); can point out that Genesis explicitly invites us to eat meat; or can equivocate, by confining his meat eating to the meat of animals raised and killed humanely, or to road kill, or by adopting the position that the moral philosopher R. M. Hare calls “demi-vegetarianism.” If you want to turn a meat eater, especially a nonacademic one, into a vegetarian, you must get him to love the animals that we raise for food; and you cannot argue a person into love.

(Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory [Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1999], 51-2 [italics in original] [footnote omitted])

Say No to Big Meat

The beef industry will do virtually anything to get you to consume its products. Take a gander at this. Why don't you send Big Meat a message that you don't like being manipulated? Boycott beef. Come to think of it, the beef industry processes its customers—you!—the same way it processes cows. You're a mere means to its ends.

Hounded, Cowed, & Badgered

Here is a cool new blog on animals and the law.

An Interview with Darian M. Ibrahim, B.S., J.D.

Darian Ibrahim is an associate professor of law at The University of Arizona. One of his scholarly interests is the legal status of nonhuman animals. I asked Professor Ibrahim whether he would "sit" for an interview via e-mail. He graciously agreed to do so. Rather than ask the questions all at once, I asked them one at a time, so that I could follow up on his answers. I hope you enjoy—and learn from—the interview.

KBJ: Tell us about your background, Professor Ibrahim. Where were you born and reared; where were you educated; what were your main influences? I'll ask specifically about animals in my next question.

DI: Thanks for having me. I grew up in Clemson, South Carolina, where I also went to undergraduate school and earned a B.S. in Chemical Engineering. This was followed by law school at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. I gravitated toward corporate law, which I practiced first as a summer associate at a large firm in New York City, and then as an associate at a large firm in Atlanta. I worked in my father's small businesses while growing up, which may have had something to do with my choice of corporate law, and particularly corporate law as applied to small businesses, as a field of legal practice. I now teach and write on corporate law at Arizona.

KBJ: How and when did you become interested in animals? Would you say that you love animals, or only that you respect them? Did you take a course on animal law in law school? What did you think about Pierson v. Post, which I assume you studied in your property-law course? (You might want to state the facts of the case—and the court's ruling—for readers who are unfamiliar with it.)

DI: I became interested in animal rights after my wife and I decided to get a dog, which quickly led to two, and then three. Although I had always realized, as an intellectual matter, that there was much animal suffering in the world, the experience of rescuing dogs from bad situations (literally) brought it home for me. After struggling with the realization that the animals on my dinner plate were morally indistinguishable from the dogs I was doting on, I gave up eating meat and a few months later became a vegan.

I both love and respect animals, but more importantly, recognize that they have inherent value inconsistent with the law's treatment of them as mere property like tables and chairs. Pierson v. Post, which dealt with the claims of two hunters regarding ownership of a fox both were pursuing, illustrates that the law sees animals as nothing more than resources to be owned and used for human ends. I did not take a course on animals in law school—I'm not sure Cornell even offered such a course, or that it does now. My education on animal law has come primarily from the works of Rutgers law professor Gary Francione, who explains the importance of abolishing animal exploitation through the incremental eradication of the property status—a position I fully agree with.

KBJ: Is it important that those who agitate for animal rights be vegetarians? As you know, philosophers say that arguments stand or fall on their own merits. If this is so, then the fact that the person making the argument consumes animal flesh is irrelevant to whether the argument is sound. Even hypocrites can make sound arguments. And yet, many people think it a criticism of an argument that the person making it does not live in accordance with its conclusion. They say to the arguer, in effect, "Who are you to try to get me to abstain from meat, when you don't?" How do you make sense of all this?

DI: Great question. I think that veganism is mandatory for those who argue in favor of animal rights. Anything less is inconsistent and irrational. There is no logic in arguing that animal exploitation is wrong, on the one hand, but then supporting it through purchases and consumption, on the other hand. While the source of an argument may not matter logically if the argument is sound, as a practical matter it is unrealistic to ask others to stop eating animals if we as animal advocates will not even do so.

What I think is even more troublesome is that many animal advocates are not even arguing for or focusing on vegetarianism, let alone veganism, despite the fact that food accounts for 98% of our domestic animal use. The fallback position is often something to the effect of "eating animals is okay if they are treated humanely," which is the essence of the animal-welfare (as opposed to animal-rights) position. In my opinion, "humane treatment" is an oxymoron. Most of our uses of animals, including for food and experimentation, simply cannot be accomplished without inflicting tremendous suffering and also death upon the animals used. To think it can be otherwise is unrealistic. Whether one is an advocate of animal rights or animal welfare, the choice as I see it is either to avoid animal exploitation or to support it largely as is.

KBJ: Isn't there a morally relevant difference between factory-farmed meat and meat from free-range animals? Peter Singer argues that there is. Our first goal, he says, should be to end factory farming, since that is where most of the suffering occurs. Many people who do not object to the use of animals as resources find it troubling that the animals whose flesh they eat were made to suffer. It seems to me that there is room here for rational persuasion. Surely it would be a better world without factory farming than with it, even if animal flesh is still consumed. Do you agree?

DI: It is not possible to produce affordable meat, dairy, or eggs without factory farming. Commentators including James Rachels have recognized that large-scale food production necessarily involves much animal suffering and cruel methods. Even Peter Singer writes in Animal Liberation that "It is not practically possible to rear animals for food on a large scale without inflicting considerable suffering. Even if intensive methods are not used, traditional farming involves castration, separation of mother and young, breaking up social groups, branding, transportation to the slaughterhouse, and finally slaughter itself. It is difficult to imagine how animals could be reared for food without these forms of suffering. . . . The flesh of animals reared and killed with equal consideration for the welfare of animals while they were alive would be a delicacy available only to the rich." (Animal Liberation, 3rd ed., p. 160)

I think the "free-range" concept is very dangerous. Contrary to common opinion, it does not mean a return to family farming; rather, it is a non-legal, industry concept that allows corporations to charge more for animals who are treated largely the same as factory-farmed animals. It also allows consumers who might otherwise become vegetarians or vegans to continue purchasing animal products under the false premise that the products are "cruelty-free." (A quick search revealed this website discussing the free-range myth.)

Apart from my view that the humane treatment of exploited animals is possible only in theory, I disagree with Singer and others who claim that animal suffering is all that matters. I believe that animals have an interest in continuing to live above and beyond their interest in not suffering, and that to kill an animal for food or other human purposes under even the best circumstances is a moral wrong in and of itself. And I hope to convince those who think otherwise!

KBJ: Let's turn to the law, Professor Ibrahim. You mentioned that the law treats animals as "mere property." What is the alternative? Surely you're not advocating that animals be treated as persons for legal purposes. But what other legal status is there? What exactly would you like to see changed, and how would these changes play out in practice? In other words, describe what you would consider a just legal regime with respect to nonhuman animals.

DI: I am in fact advocating that animals be treated as legal persons, but only for very limited purposes. The law treats even artificial constructs such as corporations as legal persons for a multitude of purposes. For instance, corporations are considered persons under the Constitution's equal-protection clause enacted for the benefit of freed slaves. Given that, animal personhood does not seem that strange an idea to me.

Of course it is silly to say that animals should be given all the rights that human persons have. Rights should correspond to interests. Humans have an interest in education; animals do not. Therefore, only humans should attend schools. But both humans and animals are sentient, which means they both have interests in not suffering and in their own lives that should be respected. To classify animals as property by definition negates all of their interests. To classify animals as persons solely for purposes of recognizing that they are not human resources is what I would consider to be a just legal regime.

KBJ: What about insects, reptiles, and rodents? How would the law deal with these animals? Would you abolish hunting? How about rodeos, circuses, and zoos?

DI: If an animal is sentient, we should respect its interest in not suffering and continuing to live. Sometimes we do not know whether an animal is sentient—insects are a perfect example. But there is no doubt that the animals we eat, experiment on, hunt, and use for entertainment in rodeos, circuses, and zoos are sentient. Therefore, all of these activities must be abolished under the theory I adopt.

Interestingly, Professor Francione points out that there is already widespread agreement on most of this, if you really think about it. We all agree that because animals can suffer, we should not cause them to suffer without a good reason. Indeed, every state has an anticruelty law that purports to prevent "unnecessary suffering." The problem is that almost every use of animals these laws allow cannot be described as "necessary" in any sense of that word. It is not necessary to eat meat, and in fact it is bad for us—we only do so because we like the taste. But this is not necessity, it is something far less. So the problem is that we do not practice what we preach. If we did, we would not use animals for any of these unnecessary purposes because they cause unnecessary suffering—the very thing we claim to reject.

KBJ: Is there a prima facie obligation to obey the law? If so, under what circumstances is disobedience justified to protect animals? If you believe that disobedience is sometimes justified to protect animals, must it be nonviolent? I guess what I'm wondering is what you think about the tactics of organizations such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). If you believe violence is sometimes permissible to protect animals, do you believe that it's prudent? Won't it alienate precisely the people you hope to bring around to your view of animals? I believe this is Peter Singer's position on violence. As a utilitarian, he won't rule it out categorically, but he thinks it is counterproductive. If you share his view, will you publicly condemn violence in behalf of animals, by ALF or others? And if you do condemn it, do you condemn it categorically or only conditionally? If only conditionally, what are the conditions in which it is justified?

DI: I categorically condemn violence as a means of protecting animals. I believe it alienates those who could be convinced, and is inconsistent with a movement whose ideal is based on peace and non-violence toward all beings. While I understand the frustration felt by those who engage in such tactics—the amount of animal suffering in the world is mind-boggling, after all—I think they are going about things in absolutely the wrong way.

KBJ: Name some people—lawyers, philosophers, scientists, laypeople—who have inspired you in your work on animal law. Please explain the nature and extent of the inspiration. Do you feel as though you are standing on the shoulders of giants? From whom have you learned the most?

DI: I am most inspired by the work of Gary Francione and his rights-based theory of animal law. The way he has combined philosophy and law to show how Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism and the property status of animals combine to eviscerate the force of animal protection laws is just brilliant, in my opinion. He has been criticized within the movement for drawing a hard line between animal rights and animal welfare, but I think he has many good reasons for doing so, which I attempt to expand on in my work. I think the rights position is far more coherent than the welfare position, even if the goal is simply to protect animals from suffering. I do not consider myself to be a radical person, actually—I am a corporate lawyer after all—but animal rights and veganism as its baseline makes sense to me.

I have learned the most from Professor Francione, and also a good deal from UCLA law professor Taimie Bryant. I very much hope to come to know other animal-law and animal-rights scholars as I continue my work, as I still have much to learn.

KBJ: What can humans learn from dogs?

DI: I learn the meaning of unconditional love and kindness from my three incredible dogs each day. What is also important is that nowadays the only animals with which most humans interact are the dogs or cats they keep as companions. As I said in my first answer, my dogs caused me to rethink my relationship with other animals, and ultimately to make the connection that I was harming these animals through my purchases and consumption of their flesh. If other people who love their dogs and cats also made this connection, I think there could be many, many more vegans in the world and a significant reduction in animal use and suffering. Also, whenever scientists "discover" that animals are intelligent or have distinct personalities, as we sometimes read about in the news, I imagine that anyone who lives with a dog or cat finds this rather obvious.

KBJ: Tell us about your animal-related scholarly projects. Can we expect a book from you anytime soon?

DI: I have three forthcoming law-review articles on animal law, each of which should be in print sometime in 2006. For those who might be interested, these will appear in the Journal of Animal Law & Ethics (Penn Law); the University of Chicago Legal Forum (Chicago Law); and Law & Contemporary Problems (Duke Law). Then I will turn to other projects that expand my work on the connection between corporate law and animal mistreatment, which I hope will include a book at some point. Animal law is a rapidly growing field, and I am thrilled to be a part of its expansion.

Thanks again for interviewing me—it has been a pleasure. And keep up the blogging!

KBJ: You're welcome, Professor Ibrahim. Thanks for taking the time to answer my questions. Keep up the good work in behalf of animals.

Addendum: If you would like to read Professor Ibrahim's forthcoming essay on anticruelty statutes, click here, scroll, and download the essay from one of the four sites provided.

Addendum 2: If you enjoyed this interview and would like to see other interviews with professors, let me know.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) on Reasoning to First Principles

I may begin by regarding some limited and qualified statement as self-evident, without seeing the truth of the simpler and wider proposition of which the former affirms a part; and yet, when I have been led to accept the latter, I may reasonably regard this as the real first principle, and not the former, of which the limitations and qualifications may then appear accidental and arbitrary. Thus, to take an illustration from the subject of Ethics, with which I am here primarily concerned, I may begin by laying down as a principle that "all pain of human or rational beings is to be avoided"; and then afterwards may be led to enunciate the wider rule that "all pain is to be avoided"; it being made evident to me that the difference of rationality between two species of sentient beings is no ground for establishing a fundamental ethical distinction between their respective pains. In this case I shall ultimately regard the wider rule as the principle, and the narrower as a deduction from it; in spite of my having been led by a process of reasoning from the latter to the former.

(Henry Sidgwick, "The Establishment of Ethical First Principles," Mind 4 [January 1879]: 106-11, at 106-7)

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

Low fat is not the whole story. It is possible to have a very low-fat and unhealthy diet made up entirely of processed foods and animal products.

Fifty-one percent of our calories comes from processed foods; 42 percent from animal foods; 2 percent from white potato products; and just 5 percent from vegetables, fruits, legumes, whole grains and unprocessed nuts and seeds—foods that we know prevent disease and obesity.

We must make the healthy choice the easy and less expensive choice not just in schools, but in all parts of the community.

Amie Hamlin
Bellport, N.Y., Feb. 14, 2006
The writer is executive director, New York Coalition for Healthy School Lunches.

Journal of Animal Law and Ethics

Here is a new journal devoted to animals. I wish the editors would invite me to contribute. I'm a lawyer, a moral philosopher, and an animal-rights advocate.

Anticruelty Statutes

Darian Ibrahim is a law professor at The University of Arizona. If you'd like to read his essay on anticruelty statutes, click here, scroll, and download the essay.

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

Re "At Bronx Zoo, an Elephant Exhibit's End Plays Out in Elephant Time" (news article, Feb. 7):

The world's largest land mammals suffer in captivity, and so do the smallest.

Despite their small size, mice are thinking, feeling creatures with wants and needs and a capacity to suffer. In the lab, racks of tiny "shoe box" cages are routinely supplied only with a water bottle, a sprinkle of sawdust and lumps of processed chow to be nibbled through the bars.

Studies find that mice and rats are highly motivated to perform important natural behaviors like foraging, running, burrowing, climbing and choosing social partners. Thwarting them has harmful physical and psychological effects.

About half of the hundred million mice kept in labs suffer from pathological repetitive movement patterns commonly seen in animals confined in zoos.

Jonathan Balcombe
Washington, Feb. 8, 2006
The writer is a research scientist with the Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine.

Dogs

Here is a New York Times op-ed column about our responsibilities to dogs.

Twenty-Five Years

Today is my silver anniversary. It's been 25 years since I consumed red meat. See here. No cow, pig, sheep, or deer has suffered or died on my account.

Four Forms of Influence

There are four ways to change the world:

1. Force.
2. Coercion.
3. Manipulation.
4. Persuasion.

Of the four, only the last is respectful of the person. I also believe that it's the most secure form of change. This is why I say that PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) is bad for animals. Its chosen methods are coercion (changing the law) and manipulation (appealing to emotion, rhetoric, vanity, celebrity, &c). If you really care about animals and want to make things better for them, you will try to persuade rationally. This involves showing your interlocutor that he or she already believes, without realizing it, that it's wrong to treat animals as resources for human use and consumption. Rational persuasion is not only the most effective means (in the long run) to helping animals; it's the right means. See here for a superb example of rational persuasion. I don't know how anyone can read this essay and not become a vegetarian.

Compassionate Conservatism

Khursh Mian Acevedo sent a link to this story.

Intrinsic Value

See here for my post on intrinsic value.

From the Mailbag

Dear Professor Burgess-Jackson:

I'm a law professor at the University of Arizona, where I see you earned your Ph.D. in philosophy. I write to you after discovering your animal ethics blog. One of my primary areas of scholarly interest is animal rights law—I teach and write in this area. I have a couple of working papers that I'd be happy to share with you (and your blog readers) if you have the interest. One addresses the deficiencies of anticruelty statutes; the other the deficiencies of the Animal Welfare Act and the "reduce, refine, replace" approach to opposing animal experimentation. A draft of the anticruelty statute paper will be ready this week—the other in about a month or so.

In any event, it's a pleasure to learn of your interest in this area.

Warm regards,

Darian M. Ibrahim
Associate Professor of Law
University of Arizona - Rogers College of Law
1201 E. Speedway Blvd.
Tucson, AZ 85721

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

Re "Hidden Cost of Shark Fin Soup: Its Source May Vanish" (Manta Journal, Jan. 5):

It's very disturbing knowing what these fishermen are doing to these defenseless sharks. It is bad enough that they hunt these magnificent creatures, but then to cut off their fins and throw them back into the ocean to watch them slowly sink while trying their best to swim, this is beyond cruelty—it is murderous.

These sharks die a slow and painful death all in the name of food. Shame on anyone who eats shark fin soup, and also shame on any fishermen participating in this slaughter.

Tia Triplett
Los Angeles, Jan. 6, 2006

Peter Singer on the Importance of Vegetarianism

I advocate vegetarianism as something which “underpins, makes consistent, and gives meaning to all our other activities on behalf of animals” (Animal Liberation, p. 171). I remain convinced that for those concerned to change the situation of animals in our society, vegetarianism is of real practical importance. It provides an irrefutable answer to the oft-repeated claim that we need factory farms to feed our growing population. It allows the animal welfare campaigner to defeat ad hominem attacks, for instance: ‘How can you object to killing seals when you eat pigs and calves?’ By eliminating one’s personal involvement in the production of animals for food, it makes it easier to take a detached view of the animal industry, and to avoid compromising the interests of the animals with one’s own interest as a consumer of animals. Calling on the public not to buy the produce of factory farms can be an important part of a campaign against factory farming. It holds out a threatening prospect to farmers—one which is beginning to be noticed in farming magazines—and it enables those who support the campaign against factory farming to make a personal commitment which goes beyond signing petitions and writing letters to their elected representatives. One cannot convincingly ask others to do this if one does not do it oneself. (Unless one eats animal flesh in secret—which hardly seems worth the hypocrisy and risk of discovery involved.)

(Peter Singer, “Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 [summer 1980]: 325-37, at 336-7)

Peter Singer on the Vegetarian Movement

It might be said that the best solution would be neither the perpetuation of factory farming nor its sudden abolition, but a gradual phasing out which would allow the industry to be wound down in an orderly fashion. But this is likely to happen in any case. I have no illusions about seeing vegetarianism sweep America overnight. If the vegetarian movement succeeds at all, it will succeed gradually enough for factory farming to be phased out over many years. On utilitarian grounds, this is what we want.

(Peter Singer, “Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 [summer 1980]: 325-37, at 334)

The Vegan Family Cookbook

If you're interested in trying vegan cuisine, see here. Remember: It's not all or nothing. There's such a thing as cutting back on the amount of animal products one consumes. The animals you don't eat will thank you!

Animal Rights

Khursh Mian Acevedo sent a link to this page of quotations.

Peter Singer on Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism

There are three ways in which a utilitarian condemnation of the treatment of farm animals might fall short of entailing that we should switch to a vegetarian diet. Firstly, if the objection is not to all raising and killing of animals for food, but only to particular methods of raising and killing them, it would seem that we can avoid the necessity of vegetarianism by restricting our diet to the flesh of animals not reared or killed by methods involving suffering. Secondly, one might argue that, bad as factory farming is, the consequences of abolishing it are not clearly better than the consequences of continuing it. And thirdly, those who admit that it would be better if factory farming were abolished may deny that there is any utilitarian connection between this conclusion and the obligation to avoid consuming the products of factory farms.

(Peter Singer, “Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 [summer 1980]: 325-37, at 331)

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

Re "For Environmental Balance, Pick Up a Rifle," by Nicholas D. Kristof (column, Dec. 4):

Yes, deer overpopulation is a serious problem in parts of our country. But the correct solution in the short term includes the development and employment of birth-control techniques for deer. In the long term, the correct solution includes re-establishing ecological balance through the reintroduction of the predators that we hunted into local extinction.

Mr. Kristof defends hunting by calling it "natural," but not all "natural" activities (making war, for example) are morally acceptable.

The factors that make it generally immoral to kill a human are the same factors that make it generally wrong to kill a deer: making a sentient creature suffer and, more important, taking from that creature the thing that is of greatest value to it, the remainder of its life.

Hunting is not wrong where the practice is essential to maintaining human life. But it is wrong to hunt in the United States in the 21st century.

Howard Pospesel
Grand Island, Fla., Dec. 4, 2005

Vegan 4U

Here is a site that contains links about veganism.

Vegetarian Diets

One of my readers asked me for information about vegetarian diets. While researching the matter, I found this. I thought I'd share it with everyone.

Two Years of Animal Ethics

It's hard to believe, but I started this blog two years ago today. Here is the first post; here is the first-anniversary post. Where did the time go? As of this moment, there have been 26,662 visitors to the blog. That computes to 36.4 visitors per day, on average. Unless people are coming here by accident or mistake, this shows that the site is serving a purpose. I don't post as much as I once did, but the site is useful even if I never post again, for it contains many posts in its archive and many animal-related links. I wonder where the readers come from. Why are you here? Drop me a line to explain. By the way, my main blog is AnalPhilosopher. You will find a link to it in the sidebar.

Animal Rights

One of my readers brought this book to my attention. I don't own it and haven't read it, but I will.

Animal and Man at Princeton

Here is a newspaper report of a debate between Roger Scruton and Peter Singer on the moral status of nonhuman animals.

Animal Acres

Khursh Mian Acevedo brought this site to my attention.

Vegan Bodybuilding & Fitness

Khursh Mian Acevedo brought this site to my attention.

Just Like the Old Days

Bison hunting is coming to Montana. See here and here.

Stuart Hampshire on the Inapplicability of Moral Terms to Animals and Infants

Moral terms are inapplicable to animals and infants, just because animals and infants are not language-users and do not entertain arguments or self-consciously make up their minds to act differently; we can train them and we may cause them to act in one way rather than another, but we cannot persuade them.

(Stuart Hampshire, “Freedom of the Will,” The Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 25 [1951]: 161-78, at 165)

Peter Singer on Vegetarianism and Absolutism

Vegetarianism is, for me, a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Whether we ought to be vegetarians depends on a lot of facts about the situation in which we find ourselves.

Some writers find this strange. They think of vegetarians as moral absolutists, who will stick to their belief in the immorality of eating meat no matter what. Thus Cora Diamond writes: “. . . one curious feature of the Peter Singer sort of argument . . . is that your Peter Singer vegetarian should be perfectly happy to eat the unfortunate lamb that has just been hit by a car.” Why is this curious? It is only curious on the assumption that vegetarians must think it always wrong to eat meat. No doubt some vegetarians are moral absolutists, just as there are absolute pacifists, absolute antiabortionists and absolutist truth-tellers who would never tell a lie. I reject all these forms of moral absolutism.

(Peter Singer, “Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 [summer 1980]: 325-37, at 327-8 [italics and ellipses in original; footnote omitted])

In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave

Here is Peter Singer's latest book.

Tom Regan on Factory Farming

Anyone writing on the topic of the treatment of animals must acknowledge an enormous debt to [Peter] Singer. Because of his work, as well as the pioneering work of Ruth Harrison, the gruesome details of factory farming are finding a place within the public consciousness. All of us by now know, or at least have had the opportunity to find out, that chickens are raised in incredibly crowded, unnatural environments; that veal calves are intentionally raised on an anemic diet, are unable to move enough even to clean themselves, are kept in the dark most of their lives; that other animals, including pigs and cattle, are being raised intensively in increasing numbers. Personally, I do not know how anyone pretending to the slightest sensitivity or powers of empathy can look on these practices with benign indifference or approval.

(Tom Regan, “Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 [summer 1980]: 305-24, at 308-9 [footnote omitted])

ALF

The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) is using one of my essays without permission and without attribution. It's one thing to link to something that's posted on the Internet. It's another to reproduce it in its entirety without permission, especially when (1) I'm easily contacted and (2) I say, on my blog, that all material is copyrighted. Worst of all is that my name doesn't appear on the page. This is plagiarism, folks.

By the way, I repudiate the aims and methods of ALF. See here. The only method of belief revision and behavior modification I endorse is rational persuasion. I reject force, coercion, and manipulation.

May I ask a favor, dear reader? Please write to ALF to complain about its use of my essay without permission or attribution. Tell ALF that you will not support it until it does right by me. (This assumes that you might otherwise support it, which may not be the case.) I don't want to have to take legal action, but I will.

Addendum: I sent a copy of this post (together with a link) to ALF. The plagiarized page has been taken down. I'm glad to see that someone at ALF has a conscience (or perhaps a healthy fear of litigation). By the way, it's easy to find my essay on the Internet. All I have to do is copy and paste a string of words from the essay into Google, using quotation marks. Google will find any document that contains that string. As of this moment, all is well. I'll keep checking. It would give me a great deal of pleasure to sue the creeps at ALF, who have no respect for property rights.

Bear Farming

Sometimes people don't get their just deserts. Sometimes they do. See here for a case of the latter.

Walter Woodburn Hyde on Porcine Justice

One of the most amusing cases of the trial of a domestic animal was that of a sow together with her six pigs at Savigny-sur-Etang, in Bourgogne, France, in January, 1457. The charge against her was murdering and partly devouring an infant. The sow was found guilty and sentenced to death by hanging, though her offspring, partly because of their youth and innocence and the fact that their mother had set them a bad example, but chiefly because proof of their complicity was not forthcoming, were pardoned.

(Walter Woodburn Hyde, “The Prosecution and Punishment of Animals and Lifeless Things in the Middle Ages and Modern Times,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 64 [1916]: 696-730, at 707 [footnote omitted])

Husbandry

Here is an essay by one of my favorite writers, Wendell Berry.

Rescue

Humans are not the only sentient beings harmed and displaced by hurricanes. See here for a worthy organization.

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

Re "Girls and Boys, Meet Nature. Bring Your Gun" (front page, Sept. 18):

I was saddened to read about children being taught to hunt.

It is dangerous to put guns in the hands of children, and it is cruel to teach them to enjoy killing animals for sport. A smart and sensitive child will never forget the horror involved in getting such a bloody "trophy."

Children should look forward to hanging diplomas on their walls, not the ghoulish, stuffed heads of their victims.

Carole Raphaelle Davis
Los Angeles, Sept. 19, 2005

To the Editor:

As a "liberal, tree-hugging" teacher, I agree with hunting advocates that there is value in being out in the woods, getting exercise and even in developing the skills to sneak up on animals unnoticed. But don't give children guns. Give them cameras.

Dena Abramowitz
Shorewood, Wis., Sept. 19, 2005

To the Editor:

It seems ironic that many Americans are uncomfortable with hunting because it seems cruel and involves killing animals, yet they don't give a second thought to sitting down and eating a burger.

Animals killed in the wild at least had the luxury of a life of relative freedom; animals we eat for dinner are generally confined to small, overcrowded cages.

The point is that most people care little whether the procedure is cruel or unkind. It's worth opposing only if it involves getting your hands dirty.

Peter Hsu
Emeryville, Calif., Sept. 18, 2005

Arizonans for Humane Farms

Khursh Mian Acevedo sent this.

Teaching Kids to Kill

See here.

Revenge

Animals are mad as hell and not going to take it anymore. See here.

Animal Theory

Here is a new blog.

Animal Rights and Stupidity

Look at this site. I was shocked to come across this sentence: "We do not believe that animals have rights but we do believe that people have responsibilities." Question: Who are the beneficiaries of these "responsibilities"? There are two possibilities: humans and the animals themselves. I assume this organization is not making the Kantian claim that our responsibilities to animals are really just duties to humans who happen to be interested in them. So the beneficiaries of our responsibilities are the animals themselves. But how does this differ from saying that the animals have rights? If our responsibilities are to refrain from harming animals, then they have negative rights against us. If our responsibilities are to promote the welfare of animals, then they have positive rights against us. I'm starting to think that people who deny animal rights are stupid. See here.

J. J. C. Smart on Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism

[E]ven though they may not have the capacity for happiness and suffering that whales have, nevertheless I would suppose that chickens can suffer quite a lot, even though their consciousness should be very much a sort of daze, and this should be taken into account in our dealings with them. Perhaps in order to qualify for a moral elite one should become a heroic vegetarian like Peter Singer. I am myself not so heroic. I eat eggs though they may come from battery hens. Moreover at present I see no moral objection to eating the flesh of free range cattle, which seem to me to have a happy life which they would not have at all if they were not destined to be eaten.

(J. J. C. Smart, Ethics, Persuasion and Truth, International Library of Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984], 134 [italics in original])

Location of Readers

If you want to see where the readers of this blog live, click on "Location of Readers" to the left of this post. If you want to see just the continental U.S. or just Europe, for example, click on the appropriate link. If you roll your mouse cursor over a dot, you'll see the exact location of that visitor. If you left-click your mouse while over a dot, you'll see details of the visitor. I wish Mylan Engel would keep his promise to start posting on this blog. He would reach far more people through this blog than he does through his academic writings, which are read by only a handful of philosophers, most of whom are already concerned about animals. Therefore, if he really cares about animals, as he says he does, he will post. I know you're reading this, Mylan, because I saw a visitor from De Kalb, Illinois.

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

I was heartbroken reading "The Lamb on the Runway" (Thursday Styles, Aug. 11), about astrakhan, a fur previously known as Persian lamb that is a trend for fall.

Just when I thought that the buying public was showing compassion by going "faux," I hear that fetal lambs are being killed for their fur. How many animals must be tortured and killed for so-called beauty?

There is nothing beautiful about a human wearing the fur of another animal. I have seen footage of precious animals screaming in agony as they are caught in steel-claw leg traps or killed in various other torturous methods for "fashion."

As smart as mankind proposes to be, why can't anyone invent a fashion that is soft and luxurious without viciously killing animals?

Oh wait! Isn't that what faux is?

Donna Dixon
Woodbridge, Va., Aug. 11, 2005

Animal Writings

Here is a new blog.

A Critique of PETA

A reader sent a link to this essay by Tim Wise. I renew my claim—which I have made many times in this blog—that PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) does more harm than good to animals. Why anyone would support it is beyond me.

Animal Sexual Abuse

Here is a web page devoted to the prevention of animal sexual abuse.

J[ohn] D[avid] Mabbott (1898-1988) on Legislating Morality

[I]t is unlikely that anyone in England refrains from bear-baiting or from torture in fear of the police. Even the education of children is probably now accepted as the ‘natural’ thing, and is not due nearly so much as in 1880 to the Attendance Officer. (In many areas he has been abolished.) A custom dies and a new one takes its place. One of the strongest points in favour of much of the legislation protecting animals is just this—that an enormous amount of the cruelty involved is the result of unconscious acquiescence due to simple ignorance or lack of imagination and continuing mainly through convention and fashion. When bear-baiting was abolished other entertainments took its place. The controls of the training of performing animals, of the trapping of animals for fur, of the making of foie gras, if enforced by law would cause only slight changes in what is at its best mainly caprice, the fashions of amusement or clothing or food. Animals which could be trained only by fear or trapped only with prolonged suffering would disappear from the circus and the fur market and in a year or two be forgotten altogether.

(J. D. Mabbott, The State and the Citizen: An Introduction to Political Philosophy, 2d ed. [London: Hutchinson University Library, 1967 (1st ed. 1948)], 67)

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

The cloning innovation achieved by a team of South Korean scientists heralded in your Aug. 5 editorial "The Duplicate Dog" should be cause for concern, not celebration.

Genetic duplicates may turn out far different than their forebears. More to the point, with millions of healthy and adoptable cats and dogs being killed each year for lack of suitable homes, it is a little frivolous to be cloning pets.

Behind the cloned pets are far grander schemes to clone animals for use in agriculture and research. Before such projects become the norm, we should all pause and think carefully about where it is all leading—for animals and for humanity.

Congress and regulatory bodies must step in and provide some ethical precepts before the brave new world of animal cloning yields a commercial industry of its own.

Wayne Pacelle
Pres. and Chief Exec., Humane Society of the United States
Washington, Aug. 8, 2005

Cattle Congestion

There are many reasons to abstain from meat. Here is one of them.

GEARI

Here is a new blog.

Canine Suicide?

Can dogs commit suicide? See here.

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

Verlyn Klinkenborg misjudged the motive for our popular "PETA Kills Animals" Times Square billboard ("The Story Behind a New York Billboard and the Interests It Serves," Editorial Observer, July 24). We simply thought it was time more Americans saw People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals as we do: a group of well-practiced hypocrites who relish throwing stones from their well-financed glass house.

It is certainly hypocritical for PETA to kill 80 percent of the animals that come through its doors, including many adoptable puppies and kittens. PETA raised $29 million last year alone, money that its donors believe is being spent caring for flesh-and-blood creatures instead of staging tawdry spectacles that highlight the supposed evils of not being a strict vegetarian.

Traditional animal shelters near PETA's Norfolk headquarters euthanize unwanted animals as well, but at a rate only one-third what PETA has quietly pursued under the public's radar. PETA's stated goal is "total animal liberation," and Americans deserve to know that this apparently includes "liberating" vulnerable, healthy pets from life itself.

Richard Berman
Executive Director
Center for Consumer Freedom
Washington, July 25, 2005

Cruelty-Free Baseball and Softball

Khursh Mian Acevedo sent a link to this interesting site.

John Rawls (1921-2002) on the Moral Status of Animals

Last of all, we should recall here the limits of a theory of justice. Not only are many aspects of morality left aside, but no account is given of right conduct in regard to animals and the rest of nature. A conception of justice is but one part of a moral view. While I have not maintained that the capacity for a sense of justice is necessary in order to be owed the duties of justice, it does seem that we are not required to give strict justice anyway to creatures lacking this capacity. But it does not follow that there are no requirements at all in regard to them, nor in our relations with the natural order. Certainly it is wrong to be cruel to animals and the destruction of a whole species can be a great evil. The capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain and for the forms of life of which animals are capable clearly imposes duties of compassion and humanity in their case. I shall not attempt to explain these considered beliefs. They are outside the scope of the theory of justice, and it does not seem possible to extend the contract doctrine so as to include them in a natural way. A correct conception of our relations to animals and to nature would seem to depend upon a theory of the natural order and our place in it. One of the tasks of metaphysics is to work out a view of the world which is suited for this purpose; it should identify and systematize the truths decisive for these questions. How far justice as fairness will have to be revised to fit into this larger theory it is impossible to say. But it seems reasonable to hope that if it is sound as an account of justice among persons, it cannot be too far wrong when these broader relationships are taken into consideration.

(John Rawls, A Theory of Justice [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1971], 512)

George F. Will

See here for my column about conservatism and animal rights.

New Harvest

Joanna Lucas sent a link to this interesting site. See here as well. And if you have an inexplicable craving for human flesh, see here.

Animal Rights

Can animals have rights? Not do they have rights, but can they have rights? If they can, then it's an open question whether they do. If they can't, then they don't. See here.

Happy Birthday, Peter

Peter Singer—“the dangerous philosopher”—is 59 years old today. He has been writing at a furious pace since at least 1970, when his first philosophical publication (on determinism) appeared. I have always had a love-hate relationship with Singer. I detest his leftist politics. I reject his consequentialism. I even disagree with him about the nature of philosophy. Singer thinks the aim of philosophy is to change the world. I think the aim of philosophy is to understand the world—specifically, its logical structure. To the extent that Singer advocates change, he is acting not as a philosopher but as what Richard A. Posner calls a “moral entrepreneur.”

But I love Singer’s concern for nonhuman animals. Reading his book Animal Liberation (1975) during law school changed my life. It is one of the most important books ever written. Singer says he’s an animal liberationist because he’s a utilitarian, but his argument for changing our treatment of animals—as he admitted to me in correspondence—doesn’t presuppose utilitarianism or any other normative ethical theory. All it presupposes is a principle of equal consideration of interests. Animals have interests. Disregarding or discounting these interests, while giving full weight to the like interests of humans, is irrational, a kind of self-contradiction. What would you say of someone who accorded full weight to the interests of whites, or men, but disregarded or discounted the interests of nonwhites, or women? Speciesism has the same logical structure, and hence the same moral status, as racism and sexism. That we put animals in a separate moral category doesn’t make it right, any more than our putting blacks or women in a separate moral category would make it right.

Even when I disagree with Singer, I admire his courage, his honesty, his adherence to principle (the principle of utility), and his decency. He has been badly treated over the years, and yet he keeps working. Six years ago, in correspondence with the late James Rachels, I mentioned the controversy surrounding Singer’s recent hiring by Princeton University. Rachels wrote back: “Hi Keith, thanks for forwarding the item about Peter. He’s catching a lot of flack, which is a tribute to his stature—no one cares much what the rest of the crazy philosophers think! But it’s too bad that he is having to endure this sort of press, since he’s about the most admirable human being I know.” I agree. Happy birthday, Peter! May you have many more “dangerous” years.

Addendum: Here is a column I wrote about Singer almost two years ago.

Addendum 2: Here is my review of Dale Jamieson's book Singer and His Critics.

Animal-Centered History

Khursh Mian Acevedo sent a link to this interesting story about the history of nonhuman animals. I wrote a history of wolf legislation when I was in law school. The title was "The Legal Status of the Wolf (Canis Lupus) in Michigan, 1805-1982." I also wrote a philosophical essay entitled "Do Plants Have Rights?" A year later, I wrote an historical essay entitled "Hunting in Colonial America: An Essay on Nationalism and Popular Culture." More recently, I have written about the moral status of animal companions. See here.

Mercy for Animals

Here is a website devoted to compassionate, respectful living.

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

Re "Face to Face With the Foie Gras Problem," by Lawrence Downes (Editorial Observer, June 26):

If it quacks like a duck, it probably is a duck. And so, too, I would argue that if a duck is force-fed by shoving a tube down its throat three times a day until its liver grows to as much as 10 times its normal size, you have animal cruelty.

Farmed animals deserve to lead their brief, often tortured lives as animals, not units of production unable to experience their natural instincts.

Although Mr. Downes suggests that there were no signs of suffering at the foie gras farm, polls show that the public rejects the practice. New York should make foie gras production illegal.

Brad Goldberg
President, Animal Welfare Trust
Mamaroneck, N.Y., June 27, 2005

To the Editor:

"Face to Face With the Foie Gras Problem," by Lawrence Downes, is a clarion call to do nothing.

Because billions of chickens and millions of pigs and cows are slaughtered in this country each year, should we not try to end the suffering of some? Should we stop trying to alleviate poverty in Africa because millions are in poverty in Asia and South America?

Will stopping foie gras production end the suffering of the billions of other animals we torture in factory farms and slaughterhouses each year? No, but it is a step in the right direction, and that is better than standing still.

Rebecca Wittman
Waterville, N.Y., June 27, 2005

Another Reason Not to Be a Consequentialist

Russ Shafer-Landau is a philosopher at The University of Wisconsin-Madison. He taught at The University of Kansas for many years. Russ and I went to graduate school together at The University of Arizona in the 1980s. In January 1994, Russ published an essay entitled “Vegetarianism, Causation and Ethical Theory” in Public Affairs Quarterly. I read it in April of that year and then again today, because I’ve been grappling with the question he takes up. The question is whether buying (and consuming) meat causes harm to animals. Russ thinks it doesn’t, and since two of the three main normative ethical theories—consequentialism and deontology—require the causation of harm in order for an action to be wrong, neither of them grounds an obligation to abstain from meat.

Russ concedes that the third main normative ethical theory—virtue ethics—has the resources to ground such an obligation, but he doesn’t make the case here. As for deontology, I’m not convinced by Russ’s claim that it lacks the theoretical resources to condemn meat-eating. He himself provides a plausible deontological principle (to wit: “one must refuse (even symbolic) support of essentially cruel practices, if a comparably costly alternative that is not tied to essentially cruel practices is readily available”), but then, puzzlingly, he makes a wholesale attack on deontological principles. This (pardon the metaphor) is using a cannon to kill an ant. And he missed!—for reasons I give in my essay “Deontological Egoism.”

But Russ may be right that consequentialism lacks the resources to condemn meat-eating. (Consequentialism is the theory that the rightness or wrongness of an action is a function solely of its consequences. That an act is of a certain type, such as killing an innocent person, lying, or torturing, is morally irrelevant. Consequentialism requires that the good be maximized, and it insists that in calculating the amount of good, everyone’s interests—including those of the agent—be considered equally. Consequentialists hold that we are as responsible for what we allow as for what we bring about. Hence, each of us, at all times, is to make the world the best place it can be, remaining strictly impartial as we do so.) Here is the suspect inference:

1. Factory farming is wrong.
Therefore,
2. It is wrong to purchase and eat (factory-farmed) meat.

Russ accepts the premise for the sake of argument. What he denies is that the conclusion follows from it. Here is Russ’s criticism of this argument (he calls his criticism “the inefficacy argument”):

[O]ne cannot, in one’s purchase and eating of meat, have any direct influence on the amount of cruelty and harm inflicted on the animals in a factory farm. Whether one purchases a steak, or several steaks, for personal or family consumption will have no influence whatever on the amount of cruelty perpetrated on today’s farms. One’s meat-purchasing habits essentially make no difference at all to the total amount of suffering experienced by the billions of animals currently maltreated. The ordinary consumer of meat is so remote in the causal nexus of animal suffering, that one cannot properly attribute to any such consumer any causal, hence moral, responsibility for the admittedly wretched fates suffered by farm animals. One is morally free to do as one likes so long as one does no harm. Meat purchases do no harm. Therefore one is morally free to make them. (page 85)

If Russ is right, then one cannot consistently (1) be a consequentialist and (2) believe that meat-eating is wrong. Consequentialism, he says, implies nothing about the wrongness of eating meat.

I’m not as sure as Russ appears to be that consequentialism lacks the theoretical resources to condemn meat-eating. But suppose he’s right. It doesn’t follow that one must accept the moral permissibility of meat-eating. What follows is a disjunction: Either one accepts the moral permissibility of meat-eating or one rejects consequentialism. What Russ has done, perhaps unwittingly, is give a knock-down, drag-out argument against consequentialism. Any theory that has an unacceptable implication is unacceptable. Meat-eating is wrong; therefore, since consequentialism implies that it’s not wrong, consequentialism is to be rejected.

Let me put it differently. There are two ways to preserve consistency if Russ is right. The first is to bite the bullet and believe that meat-eating is morally permissible. (A bullet-biter is someone who sticks with a theory even though—even when—it gives counterintuitive results.) The second is to continue believing that meat-eating is morally impermissible (you do believe that, don’t you?) and to reject consequentialism for entailing the denial of this belief. Nor is this the only case in which consequentialism gives the wrong result. It gives the wrong result in so many cases of so many different types that you wonder why anyone, much less a philosopher, endorses it. Russ has simply added another nail to the consequentialist coffin.

From the Mailbag

Hello Dr. Burgess-Jackson,

Good analysis of [Roger] Scruton's article. I know you've mentioned [Matthew] Scully a few times recently, but have you read Dominion? Scully does quite a job on Scruton. I count Dominion among the best non-fiction books I've ever read. As one reviewer put it, "A master of language, he leaves a memorable phrase on virtually every page." (Nichols Fox, Washington Post Book World)

Regarding Scruton: I think that many people (probably most of them) form their beliefs on a gut level and then proceed to look around for a logical justification for those beliefs (even if the resulting arguments don't really hold water). Scruton, in his heart of hearts, seems not to respect animals—so he cobbles together a rationalization that would justify his prejudice.

What I found most appalling about Scruton's article is his utter misinterpretation of Richard Dawkins's elegant theories. I suspect that Scruton never even read The Selfish Gene and simply judged it by its title. I'll have more to say about Dawkins in my next e-mail message.

On another note: What is your secret to time management? You seem to engage in an awful lot of activities: teaching, publishing academic papers, writing your blogs, walking your dogs, exercising, participating in bike rallies, watching movies and sports events, etc. How do you do it?

Regards,

Alex Chernavsky
Rochester, NY

Note from KBJ: No children.

Scruton on Animal Rights

See here.

Scully on the Radio

Longtime reader Khursh Mian Acevedo sent a link to a radio interview with animal-rights advocate Matthew Scully, who happens (like me) to be a conservative. See here. Thinking that animals matter, morally, is not a liberal cause. How it came to be seen as a liberal cause puzzles me. Was the abolition of slavery a liberal cause? Must one be a liberal to think that making sentient beings suffer for trivial reasons is wrong? And by the way, not all liberals have been proponents of animal rights. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), one of history's great liberals, was decidedly not a proponent of animal rights. Indeed, he thought animals had the moral status of inanimate objects.

Animal Rights

Many people have a visceral response to the idea of animal rights. They say it’s impossible, nonsensical, absurd. But why? To say that an animal has a particular right, such as a right not to be harmed, isn’t to say that it has any other particular right, such as a right to vote, much less that it has all rights. We know that children, for example, have certain rights but not others. Why can’t the same be true of animals?

Another important distinction, often ignored, is that between positive and negative rights. A positive right is a right to do or have something. If there is a right to health care, as liberals claim, it is a positive right. Voting is a positive right. But many rights are negative. I have a right not to be killed, battered, robbed, stolen from, or defamed. Why can’t animals have negative rights? Perhaps animals have only one right: a negative right not to be made to suffer.

Yet another confusion is between absolute and defeasible rights. An absolute right may not be infringed; a defeasible right may be infringed under certain circumstances. Most of our rights are defeasible. There is a right to speak, but not to yell fire in a crowded theater. There is a right to exercise your religion, but not if it requires human sacrifice. Rights are defeasible because there is more than one valuable thing. Even the right to life is defeasible, which is why execution of murderers is not a violation of it.

There are many other important distinctions to be made in the realm of rights. Let me mention just one more: between legal rights and moral rights. Legal rights are conferred by government and would not exist without government. Moral rights exist independently of government. Indeed, they set limits on what government may do. Read Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence to see an example of moral (often called “natural”) rights. There are two sorts of argument one can have about legal rights. The first is whether a particular legal right exists. Lawyers are expert in answering this question. The second is whether a particular legal right should exist. Everyone is competent to answer this question, since it’s a moral question. (There are no moral experts.) Even if animals had no legal rights, it could be true that they should.

When I say that I’m a proponent of animal rights, all I mean is that I believe that animals have moral status. They’re not nothing, morally speaking. There are moral limits to what we can do to them. We can wrong them. They have (valid) claims on us. They’re entitled to be treated a certain way. There’s nothing mysterious about any of these claims. Indeed, we say such things all the time about humans.

By the way, utilitarians don’t believe in rights (even for humans), but this doesn’t prevent them from using the language of rights. Here is Peter Singer:

In misguided attempts to refute the arguments of this book, some philosophers have gone to much trouble developing arguments to show that animals do not have rights. They have claimed that to have rights a being must be autonomous, or must be a member of a community, or must have the ability to respect the rights of others, or must possess a sense of justice. These claims are irrelevant to the case for Animal Liberation. The language of rights is a convenient political shorthand. It is even more valuable in the era of thirty-second TV news clips than it was in [Jeremy] Bentham’s day; but in the argument for a radical change in our attitude to animals, it is in no way necessary. (Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 2d ed. [New York: The New York Review of Books, 1990], 8 [endnote omitted])

The question is not whether animals can have rights, or even whether they do in fact have rights, but which rights they have. I submit to you that they have one basic right: the right to have their suffering taken into consideration in our deliberations. If that right were respected, it would change the world.

Frum on Scully on Animals

Here is David Frum's review of Matthew Scully's book Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy. I suspect most people think of animal rights as a liberal cause. It has nothing to do with liberalism or conservatism.

Scully

Here are some essays by Matthew Scully, who, like me, is both a conservative and a proponent of animal rights.

Addendum: Here is the PDF version of "Fear Factories." Please read it.

Wayne Pacelle on the Future of the Animal-Protection Movement

We are now at a new and strange juncture in human experience. Never has there been such massive exploitation of animals—from the puppy mills to the canned hunting ranches to the laboratories to the billions of animals raised on factory farms. At the same time, never have there been so many people determined to stop this exploitation. One force or the other has to prevail, and it is the goal of the animal protection movement to see the forces of kindness and mercy triumph over custom, complaisance, and selfishness, and to usher in a new era of respect and concern for animals.

The means of effecting these sweeping changes take many forms. There is enlightenment and education, and the personal transformation that occurs when people of conscience become aware of abuse and misconduct. There is direct care and relief, and the humane movement has spent the bulk of its resources during the last century and a half providing shelter, sanctuary, food and water, and other animal care services to creatures in need.

In a market-oriented economy—in which many animals are treated only as commodities—the humane movement must influence corporate practices and policies. We vote for or against animal cruelty with our dollars in the marketplace, and our ability to spur corporate policy changes has enormous implications for animals. When major corporations halted animal testing, or when fast food giants stipulated that producers had to observe basic welfare standards, these decisions affected the lives of millions of creatures.

And then there is the matter of the law. When it comes to animals, the law must speak, and set a standard in society for personal, corporate, and government conduct. Matters dealing with the treatment of animals cannot be left entirely to personal choice or conscience, since many people would knowingly flout society’s voluntary proscriptions. As elsewhere in the law, people must be held to clear standards of conduct, and those standards must be enforceable.

(Wayne Pacelle, “Law and Public Policy: Future Directions for the Animal Protection Movement,” Animal Law 11 [2005]: 1-6, at 1-2)

Hubris

This says it all about human arrogance. (Thanks to Michael W. Gross for the link.)

Addendum: Two faithful readers have pointed out to me that The Onion is a satirical site. I know that. I've been reading it for years. This satirical story makes fun of human arrogance. It wouldn't be funny if we didn't see the awful truth in it.

Whole Foods

Here is a bizarre column about Peter Singer and Whole Foods Market.

Humans and Animals

Why is it acceptable to treat nonhuman animals as mere means to human ends? Why are we deontologists with respect to humans but consequentialists with respect to animals? Why are humans morally special? Are whites morally special? Are men morally special? See here for disturbing video footage. (See here as well.) If it doesn't enrage you, then you aren't wired properly. (Thanks to Khursh Mian Acevedo, a tireless animal advocate, for the links.)

LocalHarvest

If you want fresh, organic, locally produced food, see here.

Was Jefferson a Vegetarian?

See here.

They Die Piece by Piece

I may have linked to this already. Think about it before you bite into that hamburger or steak. Ask yourself whether you want to support this industry.

Animal Cruelty

Sophie, Shelbie, and I take two walks every day, without fail. On weekdays, we walk around the neighborhood in the morning and around the school grounds in the evening. On weekends, we walk around the school grounds both morning and night. Dogs love to run, which my girls get to do on the school grounds. At a minimum, they need to be able to move around. For several weeks now, I’ve noticed a reddish Chow chained to a dog house in my neighborhood. The poor dog has only two or three feet of chain. It’s heartbreaking. Twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year, this dog remains in the same small area. What are the dog’s owners thinking? How would they like to be confined to an area that size, with the only choice whether to stand up or lie down? The area must be covered with excrement. A few minutes ago, I called The Humane Society of North Texas, which will investigate. State law requires at least six feet of chain. I asked that the investigator request that the dog be allowed to roam freely in the back yard, which is fenced. It should be illegal to chain a dog, even with a long chain.

Gary E. Varner on Hunting

When teaching the hunting issue, I find it useful to distinguish among three types of hunting in terms of the purposes hunting is taken to serve. By therapeutic hunting I mean hunting motivated by and designed to secure the aggregate welfare of the target species and/or the integrity of its ecosystem. . . . By subsistence hunting I mean hunting aimed at securing food for human beings. By sport hunting I mean hunting aimed at maintaining religious or cultural traditions, reenacting national or evolutionary history, honing certain skills, or just securing a trophy. Many would prefer to recognize a distinction within this third category between hunting for sport and hunting as a ritual. Although there may be some important differences, I class them together because both activities serve human needs (which is what distinguishes both sport and subsistence hunting from therapeutic hunting), but needs which are less fundamental (in the sense of universal) than nutrition (which is what distinguishes subsistence hunting from both ritual and sport hunting).

(Gary E. Varner, “Can Animal Rights Activists Be Environmentalists?” in People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees: Basic Issues in Environmental Ethics, 2d ed., ed. Christine Pierce and Donald VanDeVeer [Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1995], 254-73, at 257-8 [italics in original])

The Pope on Animals

Here is PETA's letter to Pope Benedict XVI. If you're Catholic, please read what the pope has said about factory-farmed animals.

Vegan Police

Khursh Mian Acevedo sent a link to this.

For the Sake of the Animals

If you're a meat-eater and want to eliminate meat from your diet—because you care about animals, because you care about your health, because you care about the environment, or because you care about humans—see here for a vegetarian starter guide.

J. J. C. Smart on Progress in Ethics

One way in which there has indeed been progress in ethics recently has been through the realization by some ethicists that animal happiness and suffering has to be considered equally with that of human beings. I should draw attention here to the remarkable book Animal Liberation by Peter Singer. Christian ethics has been deficient in this respect, since animals have been regarded as things made by God for the use of men. Even St Francis has a not too clear record on this question. If we are to believe the tradition (but perhaps we should not take this as good historical evidence), one of his disciples cut a trotter off a living pig to give to another of the brethren who was ill. St Francis told the disciple to apologize to the owner of the pig, not for his cruelty but for having damaged the property. However, utilitarianism has been mindful of animals. Unlike Kantians, who are primarily concerned with the rationality of those with whom we deal, Bentham, for example, was clear that the important question was not whether animals are rational, but was whether they can suffer. At any rate, the increased attention to the sufferings of animals is one of the most notable examples of progress in ethics over the last hundred years or so. We should, of course, be equally mindful of extra-terrestrial consciousnesses, should we come across any such and have to interact with them.

(J. J. C. Smart, Ethics, Persuasion and Truth, International Library of Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984], 129-30 [endnotes omitted])

Birds

PETA and PETCO have reached an agreement under which PETCO stops selling large birds and PETA ends its boycott of the store. See here. Wild animals should not be kept as pets. It frustrates their natural urges.

Speciesism

What would you say of someone who, while deliberating about what to do, either disregarded or discounted the suffering of blacks? You would say that the person is racist, right? Suffering is suffering, whether it is experienced by someone with black skin or white skin. What, then, do you say of someone who, while deliberating about what to do, either disregards or discounts the suffering of animals? Shouldn't you say that the person is speciesist—and isn't speciesism just as wrong as racism? Why should it matter, morally, what kind of being experiences suffering? If suffering is intrinsically bad, and you believe it is, then it's irrational and wrong (specifically, unjust) to count only some of it.

Human-Animal Conflicts

One of the malcontents who left The Conservative Philosopher several weeks ago commented, before leaving, on one of my posts about animals. In response to my claim that animals have moral status, he asked whether I wear a face mask to keep from ingesting—and therefore killing—insects. I can only speculate about the force of this question; but let me try. Is the writer suggesting that, since it’s impossible to avoid harming all animals, we have no duty to refrain from harming any of them? But that’s a flagrant non sequitur. It’s impossible to avoid harming all humans, yet nobody thinks this precludes our having a duty (a stringent duty, in fact) to refrain from harming them, or that we have no duty of reparation when we do harm them.

Think about all the steps we take to avoid harming humans, and to minimize the harm that’s unavoidable. There are rules of the road, replete with punishment for their violation. There are norms (legal and moral) against taking human life, violating bodily integrity, inflicting pain and suffering, and depriving individuals of liberty. That it’s hard to live a life free of harm to humans doesn’t mean we shouldn’t strive mightily to do it. Why is the case any different with animals? Perhaps we haven’t worked as hard at avoiding and minimizing conflicts with animals because we haven’t taken them seriously. But that’s no reason to continue doing so! At one time, the interests of blacks and women were disregarded or discounted. That was an injustice. Respect for them as individuals meant taking them fully into account in our deliberations and in our actions. This is what justice requires with respect to animals.

When the writer says (or implies) that it would be too hard to avoid harming animals, he’s simply admitting that he doesn’t take them seriously. But that’s question-begging, for I’m arguing precisely the opposite: that they must—by virtue of their capacity to be harmed—be taken seriously. Animals have interests. Equal interests must be considered equally. To disregard or discount the interests of those we affect is an injustice to them.

The Prairie Progress

Here is the spring 2005 issue of The Prairie Progress, which is published by Peaceful Prairie Sanctuary.

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

Re "Drug Makers Race to Cash In on Fight Against Fat" ("Obesity Inc." series, front page, April 3):

With all the information available these days about the benefits of vegetarian and vegan diets, I am surprised that people are still popping pills to lose weight.

I have been a vegan for eight years, and at 51 years old I am slim and extremely healthy.

A diet rich in vegetables, legumes, fruits and soy products is the way to go for weight loss. It is not a quick fix but a lifestyle change for the long run—guaranteed to keep off the weight.

Laura Frisk
Encinitas, Calif., April 5, 2005

Thank You, Charlie Trotter

This is a great story. If you put your own trivial interests ahead of someone else's important interests, you're selfish, right? And that's bad. Meat-eaters are selfish.

Animals

See here for my defense of Peter Singer from an attack by Roger Scruton.

From Today's New York Times

To the Editor:

Re "When Cute Deer Go Bad" (editorial, March 20):

White-tailed deer, one of America's most adaptable and elegant mammals, should never be viewed as vermin, but your editorial and the New Jersey Audubon Society are exactly right about the need to better manage the species.

One hike through our denuded forests will show that this is not just a suburban problem. Many of this animal's predators are missing from the ecosystem, but a few remain, including one of the best: humans, who have been hunting deer in North America for thousands of years.

It may be hard for the typical urbanite to grasp that we are as "natural" a predator as wolves or mountain lions. Sport hunting is safe, effective and ecologically sound. Relying on hunters who use traditional skills and woodsmanship to bring home venison for their families is infinitely more palatable than having sharpshooters mow down entire herds under cover of darkness.

Anthony Licata
Brooklyn, March 20, 2005
The writer is senior editor, Field & Stream magazine.

To the Editor:

One could justifiably substitute Homo sapiens for white-tailed deer in "When Cute Deer Go Bad" (editorial, March 20).

It is the human animal that inflicts the most rapacious assault on the environment by polluting air and waterways and despoiling the forests because of its need for more lumber for more developments. The human predator has blasted more species into extinction than the Bambi Barbarians ever could.

Each year humans kill more than 41,000 of their own species in car accidents, many times more than the number of people killed by accidents with deer.

Those of us whose morals transcend "slaughter everything that's in my way or that inconveniences me" know that it is not wildlife that regularly invades and destroys suburban habitat; it is almost invariably the other way around.

Gloria S. Feldscher
Plymouth Meeting, Pa.
March 21, 2005