KFC Supplier Accused of Animal Cruelty
By DONALD G. McNEIL Jr.
An animal rights group involved in a long legal dispute with Kentucky Fried Chicken about the treatment of the 700 million chickens it buys each year is to release a videotape today showing slaughterhouse workers for one supplier jumping up and down on live chickens, drop-kicking them like footballs and slamming them into walls, apparently for fun.
After officials of the KFC Corporation saw the videotape yesterday, they said they would seek dismissal of the workers, inspect the slaughterhouse more often and end their relationship if the cruelty was repeated. The company that owns the slaughterhouse, the Pilgrim's Pride Corporation, the country's second-largest poultry processor, said it was "appalled" by the tape.
Animal rights groups have long complained that sheer malicious behavior-on top of the expected confinement and bloodletting-goes on in slaughter plants, but this is the first time such graphic proof has been produced. The tape was taken surreptitiously by an investigator for People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals who worked from October 2003 to May 2004 at a Pilgrim's Pride plant in Moorefield, W.Va., that won KFC's "Supplier of the Year" award in 1997.
KFC and its parent, Yum Brands, have repeatedly committed themselves to a promise that all suppliers would treat animals humanely. Yesterday, a spokeswoman for KFC said the company "wouldn't tolerate the type of behavior in the video."
KFC "will require that the employee or employees responsible be terminated," said Bonnie Warschauer, director of public relations, and further violations will "result in termination of our relationship."
Prominent veterinarians, including those on the company's animal welfare advisory board, called for shutting the plant and dismissing or prosecuting its managers. Dr. Ian J. H. Duncan, an animal and poultry science professor at the University of Guelph in Ontario, who is a KFC adviser, said the tape "contains some of the worst scenes of animal cruelty that I have ever witnessed."
A Pilgrim's Pride spokesman said the company had an anonymous report about poultry mistreatment at the plant in April and had made it clear to its workers that "any such behavior would result in immediate termination." In light of the tape, the company said, it will reopen its investigation.
The tape includes loud music the workers listen to, the screeching of the birds and the sound of each hitting the wall. When released, it will be on a Web site of the animal-rights group, which is known as PETA, at kentuckyfriedcruelty.com.
The undercover investigator, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he feared retaliation and still does undercover work for the group, said in a telephone interview that he saw "hundreds" of acts of cruelty, including workers tearing beaks off, ripping a bird's head off to write graffiti in blood, spitting tobacco juice into birds' mouths, plucking feathers to "make it snow," suffocating a chicken by tying a latex glove over its head, and squeezing birds like water balloons to spray feces over other birds.
He said the behavior was "to alleviate boredom or vent frustrations," especially when so many birds were coming in that they would have to work late.
On April 6, one day he filmed, workers made a game of throwing chickens against a wall; 114 were thrown in seven minutes. A supervisor walking past the pile of birds on the floor said, "Hold your fire," and, once out of the way, told the crew to "carry on."
On another day, he said, the supervisor told the crew to kill correctly because inspectors were visiting.
To document cruelty and position his tiny camera, he said, he spent eight months working in the "hang pen," where workers attach newly arrived chickens by their feet to a conveyor that carries them upside-down through an electrified "stun bath" and then into the whirling blades of the throat-cutting machine.
KFC says all its suppliers train their workers in animal welfare, but the investigator said Pilgrim's Pride had nothing on the topic in its orientation manual and the only instruction he received was after five months, and then only in how to wring a chicken's neck by hand. The Web site of Pilgrim's Pride does not note any animal welfare policy.
Last year, PETA sued Kentucky Fried Chicken and called for a boycott, demanding that it require its suppliers to give chickens more room in factory barns, stop forcing growth so rapid that it cripples birds, and to gas birds before hanging them so they feel no pain.
The group has won similar concessions from Burger King, McDonald's and Wendy's.
Yum Brands did not do as PETA requested, but its KFC Web site says the company is "committed to the humane treatment of animals." It describes steps taken to assure such treatment, including creating an advisory council and promising to "only deal with suppliers who provide an environment that is free from cruelty, abuse and neglect."
Dr. Temple Grandin, a well-known veterinary scientist who designs plants for humane slaughter, called the behavior shown on the videotape "absolutely atrocious."
Dr. Grandin is on KFC's animal welfare advisory board, but said PETA had not told her when it sent her the tape this month where it had been taken. "They need to fire the plant manager," she said.
Both Ms. Warschauer of KFC and a spokesman for Pilgrim's Pride said they would ask Dr. Grandin to visit the plant.
PETA said it planned to ask a West Virginia prosecutor to prosecute plant employees and managers under state laws that make torture or malicious killing of animals a felony. It has also written to KFC and Pilgrim's Pride, asking them to use gas to knock the animals out before they are killed and to mount video cameras to forestall employee cruelty.
The PETA investigator said he would testify, calling it "the right thing to do."
Several American and British veterinary experts to whom PETA sent the videotape expressed disgust.
"I have visited many poultry slaughterhouses but I have never seen cruelty to chickens to the extent shown in this video," said Dr. Donald M. Broom, professor of animal welfare at Cambridge University and chairman of the European Union's animal welfare scientific committee. "It would be grounds for a successful prosecution for cruelty to animals in most countries."
20 July 2004
Compartmentalized Thinking
Suppose I tell you that I don’t care about Ohioans. When I act, I disregard their interests. They are as nothing to me. You would be aghast. “Why treat Ohioans differently from others, such as Texans?” you ask. Because they’re Ohioans, I say. I don’t care about Ohioans. “But why not? They have the same interests you and I do. They can suffer every bit as much.” “I know, but I just don’t care about them,” I reply.
You would rightly accuse me of inconsistency. Unless I can point to some morally relevant difference between Ohioans and nonOhioans that would justify my differential treatment, I act wrongly in treating them differently. As Aristotle pointed out long ago, justice consists in treating like cases alike and different cases differently—and in strict proportion to the differences.
This is the situation of people who eat meat. Unless they’re stupid, they know that the meat they eat is the result of a process that inflicts a great deal of undeserved suffering. They would never think to inflict such suffering on a fellow human. “Why treat animals differently from humans?” I ask. “Because they’re animals,” you say. “I just don’t care about animals.”
One reader accused me of going emotional. Where’s the emotion in what I just wrote? It’s an argument. I’m claiming that meat-eaters are inconsistent in treating suffering differently depending on the species of the individual who suffers. If you think animals don’t matter, morally, then the burden is on you to point to a morally relevant difference. If you think blacks don’t matter, morally, then the burden is on you to point to a morally relevant difference. Can we agree that this is where the burden lies?
Racists disregard or discount the interests of other races. Sexists disregard or discount the interests of the other sex. Ethnocentrists disregard or discount the interests of other ethnicities. Nationalists disregard or discount the interests of other nationalities. Speciesists disregard or discount the interests of other species.
One reader said that not all the animals he eats have suffered. Does he know that? If you buy meat in a grocery store, the probability is near 1.0 that it came from an animal that was made to suffer. Do you know the facts about factory farming? If not, then you’re culpably ignorant. There is no excuse for not inquiring into the means by which all of the products you use were produced. Would you buy a pair of sneakers if you had reason to believe that they were made by slave labor? What if you went out of your way to remain ignorant of how your sneakers were produced? Does that exculpate you? Surely not. Personal responsibility means being responsible (accountable) for whatever went into the products one buys. If you buy sneakers made with slave labor, you enslaved someone. That you didn’t see the sneakers made is irrelevant.
Unless you know for a fact that the animal whose flesh you eat did not suffer, it is morally irresponsible for you to eat its flesh. I suspect that only a tiny fraction of meat consumed satisfies this requirement.
Another reader asked what meat-eating has to do with war, since I discussed the two issues in a single post. The obvious answer is that both involve the infliction of harm. Any reasonable person, and certainly a philosopher, should strive to develop a coherent view of the permissibility of harm-infliction (including killing). If you think that the suffering of Iraqis counts for as much as the suffering of Americans, how can you consistently discount or disregard the suffering of animals? Why do you insist that Iraqis be given full moral consideration but allow that animals be given less than full moral consideration (or none at all)?
As every psychologist knows, people compartmentalize their thinking. It’s a defense mechanism, a way of avoiding cognitive dissonance and uncomfortable feelings such as guilt and shame. For example, people have a view about abortion, about capital punishment, about war, about meat-eating, about suicide, and about self-defense. Is there an underlying principle for these views? Shouldn’t there be? Isn’t it the job of a philosopher to induce people to work out a coherent ethic of killing?
One reason people are so testy about my posts on animals is that they’ve compartmentalized their thinking. I can see it in their letters. They put animals into a separate moral category. Either animals don’t count at all or they don’t count for as much as humans. This compartmentalization allows people to eat meat with a clear conscience. Well, I’m here to dirty your conscience. Stop compartmentalizing and start being consistent. Unless you can cite a morally relevant difference between humans and animals that justifies discounting or disregarding the suffering of the latter, you are irrational and irresponsible. Why not stop eating meat until you’ve thought things through? Isn’t that what a conscientious person would do?
By the way, one person keeps saying that animals aren’t innocent. What the hell are they, guilty? For the last time, animals are innocent in the same sense as Iraqi children. All this means is that they don’t deserve to suffer. If you care about the suffering of Iraqi children, you must, to be consistent, care about the suffering of animals. Suffering is suffering, whether it’s in a black body, a white body, an Iraqi body, an American body, a human body, or an animal body. Suffering is intrinsically bad. Therefore, it is prima facie wrong to inflict it. Since there is no need or other justification for inflicting it on animals, it is wrong, all things considered, to do so. That’s my argument. If you can’t find anything wrong with it, then either stop eating meat or admit that you’re too weak to do so.
You would rightly accuse me of inconsistency. Unless I can point to some morally relevant difference between Ohioans and nonOhioans that would justify my differential treatment, I act wrongly in treating them differently. As Aristotle pointed out long ago, justice consists in treating like cases alike and different cases differently—and in strict proportion to the differences.
This is the situation of people who eat meat. Unless they’re stupid, they know that the meat they eat is the result of a process that inflicts a great deal of undeserved suffering. They would never think to inflict such suffering on a fellow human. “Why treat animals differently from humans?” I ask. “Because they’re animals,” you say. “I just don’t care about animals.”
One reader accused me of going emotional. Where’s the emotion in what I just wrote? It’s an argument. I’m claiming that meat-eaters are inconsistent in treating suffering differently depending on the species of the individual who suffers. If you think animals don’t matter, morally, then the burden is on you to point to a morally relevant difference. If you think blacks don’t matter, morally, then the burden is on you to point to a morally relevant difference. Can we agree that this is where the burden lies?
Racists disregard or discount the interests of other races. Sexists disregard or discount the interests of the other sex. Ethnocentrists disregard or discount the interests of other ethnicities. Nationalists disregard or discount the interests of other nationalities. Speciesists disregard or discount the interests of other species.
One reader said that not all the animals he eats have suffered. Does he know that? If you buy meat in a grocery store, the probability is near 1.0 that it came from an animal that was made to suffer. Do you know the facts about factory farming? If not, then you’re culpably ignorant. There is no excuse for not inquiring into the means by which all of the products you use were produced. Would you buy a pair of sneakers if you had reason to believe that they were made by slave labor? What if you went out of your way to remain ignorant of how your sneakers were produced? Does that exculpate you? Surely not. Personal responsibility means being responsible (accountable) for whatever went into the products one buys. If you buy sneakers made with slave labor, you enslaved someone. That you didn’t see the sneakers made is irrelevant.
Unless you know for a fact that the animal whose flesh you eat did not suffer, it is morally irresponsible for you to eat its flesh. I suspect that only a tiny fraction of meat consumed satisfies this requirement.
Another reader asked what meat-eating has to do with war, since I discussed the two issues in a single post. The obvious answer is that both involve the infliction of harm. Any reasonable person, and certainly a philosopher, should strive to develop a coherent view of the permissibility of harm-infliction (including killing). If you think that the suffering of Iraqis counts for as much as the suffering of Americans, how can you consistently discount or disregard the suffering of animals? Why do you insist that Iraqis be given full moral consideration but allow that animals be given less than full moral consideration (or none at all)?
As every psychologist knows, people compartmentalize their thinking. It’s a defense mechanism, a way of avoiding cognitive dissonance and uncomfortable feelings such as guilt and shame. For example, people have a view about abortion, about capital punishment, about war, about meat-eating, about suicide, and about self-defense. Is there an underlying principle for these views? Shouldn’t there be? Isn’t it the job of a philosopher to induce people to work out a coherent ethic of killing?
One reason people are so testy about my posts on animals is that they’ve compartmentalized their thinking. I can see it in their letters. They put animals into a separate moral category. Either animals don’t count at all or they don’t count for as much as humans. This compartmentalization allows people to eat meat with a clear conscience. Well, I’m here to dirty your conscience. Stop compartmentalizing and start being consistent. Unless you can cite a morally relevant difference between humans and animals that justifies discounting or disregarding the suffering of the latter, you are irrational and irresponsible. Why not stop eating meat until you’ve thought things through? Isn’t that what a conscientious person would do?
By the way, one person keeps saying that animals aren’t innocent. What the hell are they, guilty? For the last time, animals are innocent in the same sense as Iraqi children. All this means is that they don’t deserve to suffer. If you care about the suffering of Iraqi children, you must, to be consistent, care about the suffering of animals. Suffering is suffering, whether it’s in a black body, a white body, an Iraqi body, an American body, a human body, or an animal body. Suffering is intrinsically bad. Therefore, it is prima facie wrong to inflict it. Since there is no need or other justification for inflicting it on animals, it is wrong, all things considered, to do so. That’s my argument. If you can’t find anything wrong with it, then either stop eating meat or admit that you’re too weak to do so.
19 July 2004
From Today's New York Times
To the Editor:
It is possible to lower cholesterol levels significantly if substantial dietary and lifestyle changes are made.
No one would deny the role that cholesterol-lowering drugs have to play in the battle against heart disease, but many people's lives and billions of dollars in money spent on medicine and related health care costs could be saved if people were aware of the important results in the battle against high cholesterol and heart disease that have been made as the result of a diet that eliminates or almost totally eliminates animal products and consists primarily of unrefined grains, legumes, fruits and vegetables, coupled with moderate exercise.
MICHAEL PITKOWSKY
Bronx, July 13, 2004
It is possible to lower cholesterol levels significantly if substantial dietary and lifestyle changes are made.
No one would deny the role that cholesterol-lowering drugs have to play in the battle against heart disease, but many people's lives and billions of dollars in money spent on medicine and related health care costs could be saved if people were aware of the important results in the battle against high cholesterol and heart disease that have been made as the result of a diet that eliminates or almost totally eliminates animal products and consists primarily of unrefined grains, legumes, fruits and vegetables, coupled with moderate exercise.
MICHAEL PITKOWSKY
Bronx, July 13, 2004
Selective Concern
I’ve made a decision. Henceforth, when someone tells me that he or she opposed the war in Iraq, I’ll ask why. If the answer includes concern for innocent Iraqis who were killed during the war, I’ll ask whether the speaker eats meat. If the answer is yes, I’ll end the discussion.
How can I take seriously someone who professes concern for innocent human beings but willingly inflicts terrible suffering on innocent nonhuman animals? This is as flagrant an inconsistency as can be imagined. That people don’t notice it testifies to an almost infinite human capacity for denial, delusion, rationalization, and self-servingness.
Someone might say that there are morally relevant differences between humans and animals. Of course there are. But to say that there are morally relevant differences between X and Y is not to say that there are no morally relevant similarities between X and Y. Two beings can be alike in some respects but different in others. Suppose one of my children has been bad and another good. There’s a morally relevant difference between them that would justify differential treatment; but this doesn’t mean the bad child loses all moral status.
Follow along with me. Sentient beings, i.e., beings who have the capacity to suffer, have an interest in not suffering. Suffering is intrinsically bad. Therefore, it’s prima facie wrong to inflict suffering. This means that, unless there is a good reason to inflict suffering, it is wrong to do so. But what is the good reason for making animals suffer? That you like the taste of their cooked flesh? If that’s a moral reason at all, it’s extremely weak. Certainly it’s not strong enough to justify the infliction of pain! How would you like it if someone put his or her trivial interests ahead of your significant interests? You would be outraged. Morally outraged.
Meat-eaters are walking contradictions. They violate their own moral principles. How can I take seriously someone whose heart bleeds for innocent Iraqis but who happily kills and eats innocent animals? I can’t. Until meat-eating opponents of the war in Iraq change their diets, they forfeit their right to be taken seriously.
How can I take seriously someone who professes concern for innocent human beings but willingly inflicts terrible suffering on innocent nonhuman animals? This is as flagrant an inconsistency as can be imagined. That people don’t notice it testifies to an almost infinite human capacity for denial, delusion, rationalization, and self-servingness.
Someone might say that there are morally relevant differences between humans and animals. Of course there are. But to say that there are morally relevant differences between X and Y is not to say that there are no morally relevant similarities between X and Y. Two beings can be alike in some respects but different in others. Suppose one of my children has been bad and another good. There’s a morally relevant difference between them that would justify differential treatment; but this doesn’t mean the bad child loses all moral status.
Follow along with me. Sentient beings, i.e., beings who have the capacity to suffer, have an interest in not suffering. Suffering is intrinsically bad. Therefore, it’s prima facie wrong to inflict suffering. This means that, unless there is a good reason to inflict suffering, it is wrong to do so. But what is the good reason for making animals suffer? That you like the taste of their cooked flesh? If that’s a moral reason at all, it’s extremely weak. Certainly it’s not strong enough to justify the infliction of pain! How would you like it if someone put his or her trivial interests ahead of your significant interests? You would be outraged. Morally outraged.
Meat-eaters are walking contradictions. They violate their own moral principles. How can I take seriously someone whose heart bleeds for innocent Iraqis but who happily kills and eats innocent animals? I can’t. Until meat-eating opponents of the war in Iraq change their diets, they forfeit their right to be taken seriously.
Confusions and Fallacies About Animals, Part 15
I’m always stunned to hear intelligent people defend meat-eating on the ground that animals kill and eat each other. (See here.) To quote Ronald Dworkin from another context, this is an “album of confusions.”
First, not all animals kill and eat each other. Some animals are herbivores. Perhaps we should emulate them rather than omnivores or carnivores.
Second, what’s the underlying principle? Is it that we may (morally) do anything any animal does? But surely that’s not acceptable, for it implies, inter alia, that we may dominate other humans. Do we really want to look to animals for moral guidance? Any less-inclusive principle runs the risk of being self-serving. People who want to eat meat will justify it by citing the fact that some animals eat meat; but they won’t cite animal behavior as justification for behaviors they dislike, such as incest and conquest.
Third, even if it’s in our nature as human beings to eat meat, it doesn’t follow that we may. It’s in our nature as human beings to do many things that are wrong, such as inseminate women against their will, aggress on others, disregard the interests of those of other races and religions, and deceive others. That something is natural for humans goes no way toward showing that it’s morally permissible. This violates Hume’s law, which prohibits inferences from “is” to “ought.”
Fourth, there’s a relevant difference between humans and animals. Only humans are moral agents. (Animals are moral patients.) Only humans have the capacity to reflect on their desires and act against them. Only humans can act on the basis of principle. Only humans are responsible for their conduct. To blame an animal for harming another animal would be as absurd and pointless as blaming lightning for causing a fire. Since humans can decide how to act, we must decide, using reason, how to act. This difference between humans and animals imposes a special responsibility on humans. With moral agency comes responsibility. To say that we ought to act as animals do is to shirk this responsibility and become mere animals. It is a rationalization of something one wants to do but can’t justify doing.
By the way, I wrote about this confusion on 26 April (see here), but I keep getting letters from people that suggest that they haven’t read or understood it. Some things bear repeating.
First, not all animals kill and eat each other. Some animals are herbivores. Perhaps we should emulate them rather than omnivores or carnivores.
Second, what’s the underlying principle? Is it that we may (morally) do anything any animal does? But surely that’s not acceptable, for it implies, inter alia, that we may dominate other humans. Do we really want to look to animals for moral guidance? Any less-inclusive principle runs the risk of being self-serving. People who want to eat meat will justify it by citing the fact that some animals eat meat; but they won’t cite animal behavior as justification for behaviors they dislike, such as incest and conquest.
Third, even if it’s in our nature as human beings to eat meat, it doesn’t follow that we may. It’s in our nature as human beings to do many things that are wrong, such as inseminate women against their will, aggress on others, disregard the interests of those of other races and religions, and deceive others. That something is natural for humans goes no way toward showing that it’s morally permissible. This violates Hume’s law, which prohibits inferences from “is” to “ought.”
Fourth, there’s a relevant difference between humans and animals. Only humans are moral agents. (Animals are moral patients.) Only humans have the capacity to reflect on their desires and act against them. Only humans can act on the basis of principle. Only humans are responsible for their conduct. To blame an animal for harming another animal would be as absurd and pointless as blaming lightning for causing a fire. Since humans can decide how to act, we must decide, using reason, how to act. This difference between humans and animals imposes a special responsibility on humans. With moral agency comes responsibility. To say that we ought to act as animals do is to shirk this responsibility and become mere animals. It is a rationalization of something one wants to do but can’t justify doing.
By the way, I wrote about this confusion on 26 April (see here), but I keep getting letters from people that suggest that they haven’t read or understood it. Some things bear repeating.
18 July 2004
PETA's Unsavoriness
I don't understand how anyone with any intelligence could have anything to do with PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals). If you care about animals, work in their behalf. You don't need to belong to an organization to do this. Be independent. Avoid entanglements. Think for yourself. See here for the latest instance of PETA's unsavoriness.
It's outrageous that many people on both sides of the animal-rights issue identify the animal-rights movement with PETA. PETA is no more the animal-rights movement than the Republican party is conservatism or the Soviet Union Marxism. It is a corruption of the movement. It sets back the movement. PETA is the worst thing to happen to animals. If you care about animals, stop supporting PETA.
It's outrageous that many people on both sides of the animal-rights issue identify the animal-rights movement with PETA. PETA is no more the animal-rights movement than the Republican party is conservatism or the Soviet Union Marxism. It is a corruption of the movement. It sets back the movement. PETA is the worst thing to happen to animals. If you care about animals, stop supporting PETA.
Richard Sorabji on Western Attitudes Toward Animals
Unfortunately, the Stoic view of animals, with its stress on their irrationality, became embedded in Western, Latin-speaking Christianity above all through Augustine. Western Christianity concentrated on one half, the anti-animal half, of the much more evenly balanced ancient debate. Although there were other strands in Western Christianity, I think this accounts for the relative complacency of our Western Christian tradition about the killing of animals. The ancient philosophers were less complacent. In the eighteenth century the tide began to turn, and in the last fifteen years it has accelerated, with a widespread rethinking of our treatment of animals. But I do not believe that the right defence of animals has yet been found. The modern philosophical defences seem to me to be too one-dimensional. What is clear, however, is that we should treat animals very much better than we do. My own diet has changed as a result of reflecting on the ancient texts, at least when I am choosing for myself, although I still enjoy whatever food I am served by others. I do not mention that as a particularly compelling position, and I have no wish to tell anyone else what to do. I explain in the concluding chapter why I think decisions must be complex, and suggest an alternative approach.
(Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, vol. 54 [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993], 2-3)
(Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, vol. 54 [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993], 2-3)
17 July 2004
Shelbie
One of the worst things to happen to me in my forty-seven years of existence was the loss of my beloved canine companion Ginger on Thanksgiving day 2000. I was a zombie for weeks. I was deep into marathon training when she died, but I knew I had to keep going. Near the end of the marathon, seventeen days after her death, I started thinking about Ginger and began to cry. That affected my breathing, so I had to think about other things. Ginger was the sweetest, smartest, most beautiful dog in the world, with the exception of Sophie, with whom she was tied. I still talk to Ginger on every walk, as silly as that may sound.
Sophie and I got on for nearly three years by ourselves. I knew we needed a puppy, but I was afraid it would disrupt our lives and remind me of Ginger. Okay, I felt guilty about trying to “replace” Ginger. Finally, a year ago today, I drove to the North Texas Humane Society in Fort Worth. I made the rounds of dogs and was about to go home empty-handed. I wanted a particular age, sex, and breed, and no dog in the shelter filled the bill. Before leaving, I decided to make one more pass through the small-dog area. This time I saw Shelbie, a three-and-a-half-month-old stinker. She had just been put in a cage, probably because she had just gotten her shots. She walked toward me, nuzzled my hand, and stole my heart. Within two hours, she was home with Sophie and me.
The first couple of days were hard. As expected, I felt guilty, as if I were dishonoring Ginger’s memory. But mercifully it passed. Each day brought more joy into our lives, replacing the awful sadness. The past year has been one of the happiest of my life, and I’ve had many happy years. Shelbie is every bit as sweet, smart, and beautiful as Ginger. I love her dearly. She learns from and plays with Sophie, who, at eleven and a half years of age, is kept young by the upstart’s energy and playfulness. How did I get lucky again? I am thrice-blessed. Here is Shelbie the day I brought her home (eleven pounds) and here she is today (45.5 pounds) with Sophie.
Sophie and I got on for nearly three years by ourselves. I knew we needed a puppy, but I was afraid it would disrupt our lives and remind me of Ginger. Okay, I felt guilty about trying to “replace” Ginger. Finally, a year ago today, I drove to the North Texas Humane Society in Fort Worth. I made the rounds of dogs and was about to go home empty-handed. I wanted a particular age, sex, and breed, and no dog in the shelter filled the bill. Before leaving, I decided to make one more pass through the small-dog area. This time I saw Shelbie, a three-and-a-half-month-old stinker. She had just been put in a cage, probably because she had just gotten her shots. She walked toward me, nuzzled my hand, and stole my heart. Within two hours, she was home with Sophie and me.
The first couple of days were hard. As expected, I felt guilty, as if I were dishonoring Ginger’s memory. But mercifully it passed. Each day brought more joy into our lives, replacing the awful sadness. The past year has been one of the happiest of my life, and I’ve had many happy years. Shelbie is every bit as sweet, smart, and beautiful as Ginger. I love her dearly. She learns from and plays with Sophie, who, at eleven and a half years of age, is kept young by the upstart’s energy and playfulness. How did I get lucky again? I am thrice-blessed. Here is Shelbie the day I brought her home (eleven pounds) and here she is today (45.5 pounds) with Sophie.
Who Moved My Truth?
Ally Eskin has a thoughtful post about meat-eating. See here. To answer Ally's question about what to do about the cows, pigs, and chickens we stop eating, what happened to the horse-drawn carriages and Edsels people stopped buying? Did their manufacturers continue to produce them? No; they stopped making them. We'll stop making cows, pigs, and chickens.
16 July 2004
Tugboat
Tyler Hamilton is one of the best bicyclists in the world. He's currently competing in the Tour de France. Sadly, his longtime canine companion, Tugboat, died the other day. Not surprisingly, Tyler did poorly today in one of the Tour's most important stages. Here is the blurb that appeared at cyclingnews.com:
Not just a dogI send my condolences to Tyler and Haven.
Tyler Hamilton is in mourning for his friend Tugboat. For if the old adage that a dog is man's best friend [is true], Hamilton's big, friendly golden Labrador retriever was quite a buddy. Cyclingnews had the fortune to meet Tugboat a few years ago in Paris at the end of the Tour de France when Ty's wife Haven brought their beloved pet to the end of the Tour. Today we spoke to Hamilton before Stage 11 where the usually stoic New Englander told us about his emotional roller-coaster surrounding the loss of his best friend.
"Tugboat was like a family member to me," he said. "A lot of people don't know me or know the situation; they might think 'oh he's just a dog' but for me, it's hard, it's hard . . . just as hard as losing a family member. But life goes on and certainly (the loss of Tugboat) is a hundred times harder than what I went through last year." [Hamilton rode most of the 2003 Tour with a fractured collarbone.]
When we asked Hamilton if he thought the spirit of Tugboat might be with him during the rest of the Tour, Ty smiled and said "Yeah, I've got his tag right here," showing us Tug's red ID tag held around his neck on a white ribbon.
15 July 2004
From the Mailbag
Dear Keith,
I have enjoyed your columns on Tech Central Station from day one. I often find my self rereading some of them, and your columns are one of the reasons I am hooked on TCS. I am glad I found your blog. However, I will probably skip over anything on your blog about animal rights just as I skip over anything about same-sex unions on Andrew Sullivan's blog.
Now exchanging views with a doctor of philosophy could be akin to wrestling against Randy Savage but, I will stick my toe, perhaps my foot into the ring (and not into my mouth) concerning animal rights with this question-slash-statement:
Christopher Pugh
Austin, TX
I have enjoyed your columns on Tech Central Station from day one. I often find my self rereading some of them, and your columns are one of the reasons I am hooked on TCS. I am glad I found your blog. However, I will probably skip over anything on your blog about animal rights just as I skip over anything about same-sex unions on Andrew Sullivan's blog.
Now exchanging views with a doctor of philosophy could be akin to wrestling against Randy Savage but, I will stick my toe, perhaps my foot into the ring (and not into my mouth) concerning animal rights with this question-slash-statement:
Don't other animals eat other animals? Aren't there more animals being consumed by non-human animals (including bugs, fish, etc; a non-human is a non-human) than by humans? Don't they do it as a function of biology and evolution? While they haven't evolved with a moral sense as deep as ours don't they have some moral sense? Isn't it possible that some animals know the difference between life and death and some even show signs of grieving (such as the elephant)? Don't we have some kind of duty to stop their immoral behavior too since that is where most of the "killing" occurs?Respectfully,
Christopher Pugh
Austin, TX
14 July 2004
Animals
I’ve received several letters from people who don’t like my posts on animals. Some of them are nasty. One reader said I was on the verge of becoming Andrew Sullivan, who is obsessed with homosexuality. I replied that, just as I stopped reading Sullivan’s blog, he should stop reading mine.
But I’ve been thinking. My decision to stop reading Sullivan’s blog was based on more than the fact that he writes a lot about homosexuality. That doesn’t bother me. What bothers me is that he won’t listen to reason. He tars opponents of homosexual “marriage” as “the religious right,” implying that the only basis for objecting to homosexual “marriage” is religious. He knows better. Many of us oppose it on secular grounds. I also think Sullivan is disingenuous in calling himself a federalist (he’s not) and in not taking seriously the possibility—indeed, the high probability, according to many constitutional scholars—that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution will be used to force homosexual “marriage” on all states. When I made this argument to him, he retorted, “It’s never been applied to marriage.” I guess that means it can’t be or never will be.
In short, I object to Sullivan’s irrationality, not to his interest in homosexuality.
Am I as irrational about animals as Sullivan is about homosexuality? I don’t think so. I’m perfectly happy to argue about the moral status of animals, which I’ve been doing for more than two decades. I teach the subject. I’ve published essays on it. I don’t resort to name-calling or manipulative rhetoric, as Sullivan does. I take pains to make relevant distinctions, to get my facts right, and correctly to characterize my opponents’ arguments before criticizing them. I’m committed to rational persuasion as a means of social change.
I believe that meat-eaters have inconsistent beliefs. They believe (1) that suffering is intrinsically bad; (2) that, as such, it must be justified; and (3) that the animals whose flesh they consume were made to suffer in its production. It follows logically from these beliefs that meat-eating is morally questionable. In philosophical terms, there is a strong prima facie case against consuming animal products. And yet, when I point this out, I get everything from denial to evasion to ridicule to abuse.
In my judgment, the most important moral issue in the world today is the status of nonhuman animals. Nothing else, even war, comes close. Why, believing this, would I forbear to discuss it? That readers of my blog prefer not to hear me discuss it may signify discomfort on their part. They grew up eating meat and enjoy it. They don’t like feeling guilty as they consume animal flesh. I make them feel guilty, for I remind them that they’re not living up to their own moral principles about not harming others. Please note: I’m not imposing my values on you. I’m imposing your values on you. Don’t react defensively or angrily. I’m trying to help you. I want you to have a coherent set of beliefs. I want you to live up to your moral principles. I want you to be a good person. Ask yourself whether your values commit you to changing your behavior. Follow my reasoning. If there’s something wrong with it, say so.
Some people say that animals don’t count for as much as humans or that they don’t have the same rights as humans. That’s irrelevant. If animals have any moral status at all—if they’re anything more than objects—then it’s wrong to eat them, because eating them is unnecessary. But surely, as sentient beings, they have at least some moral status. Any being that can suffer has an interest in not suffering. Isn’t it a requirement of rationality, and therefore of morality, that one take all relevant interests into account before acting? Is your interest in satisfying your taste sensations more important than an animal’s interest in not suffering? That, ultimately, is the question you must confront. Don’t evade it. Confront it. The unexamined life is not worth living.
But I’ve been thinking. My decision to stop reading Sullivan’s blog was based on more than the fact that he writes a lot about homosexuality. That doesn’t bother me. What bothers me is that he won’t listen to reason. He tars opponents of homosexual “marriage” as “the religious right,” implying that the only basis for objecting to homosexual “marriage” is religious. He knows better. Many of us oppose it on secular grounds. I also think Sullivan is disingenuous in calling himself a federalist (he’s not) and in not taking seriously the possibility—indeed, the high probability, according to many constitutional scholars—that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution will be used to force homosexual “marriage” on all states. When I made this argument to him, he retorted, “It’s never been applied to marriage.” I guess that means it can’t be or never will be.
In short, I object to Sullivan’s irrationality, not to his interest in homosexuality.
Am I as irrational about animals as Sullivan is about homosexuality? I don’t think so. I’m perfectly happy to argue about the moral status of animals, which I’ve been doing for more than two decades. I teach the subject. I’ve published essays on it. I don’t resort to name-calling or manipulative rhetoric, as Sullivan does. I take pains to make relevant distinctions, to get my facts right, and correctly to characterize my opponents’ arguments before criticizing them. I’m committed to rational persuasion as a means of social change.
I believe that meat-eaters have inconsistent beliefs. They believe (1) that suffering is intrinsically bad; (2) that, as such, it must be justified; and (3) that the animals whose flesh they consume were made to suffer in its production. It follows logically from these beliefs that meat-eating is morally questionable. In philosophical terms, there is a strong prima facie case against consuming animal products. And yet, when I point this out, I get everything from denial to evasion to ridicule to abuse.
In my judgment, the most important moral issue in the world today is the status of nonhuman animals. Nothing else, even war, comes close. Why, believing this, would I forbear to discuss it? That readers of my blog prefer not to hear me discuss it may signify discomfort on their part. They grew up eating meat and enjoy it. They don’t like feeling guilty as they consume animal flesh. I make them feel guilty, for I remind them that they’re not living up to their own moral principles about not harming others. Please note: I’m not imposing my values on you. I’m imposing your values on you. Don’t react defensively or angrily. I’m trying to help you. I want you to have a coherent set of beliefs. I want you to live up to your moral principles. I want you to be a good person. Ask yourself whether your values commit you to changing your behavior. Follow my reasoning. If there’s something wrong with it, say so.
Some people say that animals don’t count for as much as humans or that they don’t have the same rights as humans. That’s irrelevant. If animals have any moral status at all—if they’re anything more than objects—then it’s wrong to eat them, because eating them is unnecessary. But surely, as sentient beings, they have at least some moral status. Any being that can suffer has an interest in not suffering. Isn’t it a requirement of rationality, and therefore of morality, that one take all relevant interests into account before acting? Is your interest in satisfying your taste sensations more important than an animal’s interest in not suffering? That, ultimately, is the question you must confront. Don’t evade it. Confront it. The unexamined life is not worth living.
13 July 2004
Len's Inconsistency
Len Carrier is my co-blogger on The Ethics of War. He opposed the war in Iraq. What would Len say if, during our discussion of the war, I said that Iraqis don’t count for as much, morally speaking, as Americans? He would deny it. He would say that Iraqis can suffer just as much as Americans, that their lives are just as valuable, and so forth. If I persisted, he would say that I’m racist, ethnocentric, or unacceptably nationalistic. He would say that I draw a moral line in an arbitrary place.
But that’s exactly what he’s doing with respect to animals. Len says he eats meat. But this inflicts terrible suffering on the animals whose flesh he consumes. If Len believes that suffering has moral significance, then its infliction must be justified. What is his justification for inflicting it on animals? Do his tastes for animal flesh justify it? Would my taste for Iraqi flesh justify killing and eating them? Would my interest in sport shooting justify my picking off random Iraqis?
People who discount or disregard the interests of other races are racists. People who discount or disregard the interests of the other sex are sexists. People who discount or disregard the interests of other nationalities are nationalists. People who discount or disregard the interests of other species are speciesists. If Len says that animals don’t matter, then I say that Iraqis don’t matter. If the former is rational, then so is the latter.
Len’s professed concern for innocent Iraqis rings hollow when he blithely inflicts terrible pain and suffering on innocent animals for his gustatory pleasure. And please, Len, don’t say that animals aren’t innocent. What are they, guilty? Animals are innocent in the same sense in which Iraqi children are innocent. If the interests of the latter must be taken into account in our deliberations, then so must the interests of animals be taken into account. Your eating meat shows that you do not take them into account. You are a walking contradiction who cannot be taken seriously. Before you respond to this post, read—and think about!—this essay by Mylan Engel.
But that’s exactly what he’s doing with respect to animals. Len says he eats meat. But this inflicts terrible suffering on the animals whose flesh he consumes. If Len believes that suffering has moral significance, then its infliction must be justified. What is his justification for inflicting it on animals? Do his tastes for animal flesh justify it? Would my taste for Iraqi flesh justify killing and eating them? Would my interest in sport shooting justify my picking off random Iraqis?
People who discount or disregard the interests of other races are racists. People who discount or disregard the interests of the other sex are sexists. People who discount or disregard the interests of other nationalities are nationalists. People who discount or disregard the interests of other species are speciesists. If Len says that animals don’t matter, then I say that Iraqis don’t matter. If the former is rational, then so is the latter.
Len’s professed concern for innocent Iraqis rings hollow when he blithely inflicts terrible pain and suffering on innocent animals for his gustatory pleasure. And please, Len, don’t say that animals aren’t innocent. What are they, guilty? Animals are innocent in the same sense in which Iraqi children are innocent. If the interests of the latter must be taken into account in our deliberations, then so must the interests of animals be taken into account. Your eating meat shows that you do not take them into account. You are a walking contradiction who cannot be taken seriously. Before you respond to this post, read—and think about!—this essay by Mylan Engel.
12 July 2004
Confusions and Fallacies About Animals, Part 14
Every social movement has both moderates and extremists. The difference is what they are willing to do—or, more precisely, not willing to do—in pursuit of their objective(s). They share ends, but not means. Some extremists are willing to harm others to achieve their goals, thinking, perhaps, that nothing will ever change if one works within the system. This was the agonizing choice Dr Martin Luther King Jr faced. Given his goal of a colorblind society, which means were best calculated to bring it about? He could have worked within the system, but he believed that that would never change anything, since the system was rigged against people of color. So he decided to disobey the law. But this disobedience, he insisted, had to be nonviolent. It was a form of communication, an initiation of dialogue with those who stood in the way of a just society.
Moderates face a dilemma. Either they repudiate their extreme colleagues or they do not. If they repudiate them, they risk alienating them and losing their energy and resources. If they do not repudiate them, they risk alienating their audience. Many people favor social change but are not willing to endorse or accept just any means to that change. They are, in philosophical terms, deontologists. They believe that evil may not be done that good may come. They believe that the end does not justify the means.
Many people, such as my Ethics of War co-blogger Len Carrier, sincerely believe that the war in Iraq was a mistake. They may believe that some good has come from the war, but not enough to justify the costs. Others take it to absurd extremes, propounding conspiracy theories about why the United States went to war, making personal attacks on those who waged it, and doing everything possible to undermine the war effort. When presidential candidate Wesley Clark was asked to repudiate some of the wild assertions made by one of his supporters, Michael Moore, he refused to do so. This was unfortunate (and telling), for it made it seem as though he were just as irrational as Moore, and nobody wants an irrational president. I know I don’t.
You’re probably wondering why I’m talking about war in Iraq in a post ostensibly about animals. It’s because there’s a parallel. Many people believe that factory farming and other horrific practices must be abolished. But by what means? Some people advocate working within the system, trying to muster support for enactment, amendment, or repeal of laws. Others are impatient with this, thinking, as King did, that nothing will ever change by working within the system. Some of the impatient ones take extreme measures, such as destroying property or injuring or killing persons. This is a serious problem for the animal-liberation movement. If the aim is to change minds, resorting to violence may be counterproductive.
I’m a moderate when it comes to animal liberation. I believe that in the long run, the most effective means to social change is rational persuasion. Not force, not coercion, not manipulation. The people I persuade will manifest their changed attitudes and beliefs both in their personal lives (by changing their diets, for example) and in their political behavior. We live in a democracy. Each of us is entitled to vote our consciences. My goal is to work on consciences. I believe this is also the goal of Peter Singer. Perhaps we philosophers are naïve, but we are committed to reason. We would rather not persuade at all than persuade by nonrational means.
Some people are frustrated by the slowness of this process. But look how much progress has been made in the past hundred years. The moral and legal status of nonhuman animals has improved considerably. No, it hasn’t changed nearly enough. There is a great deal of work yet to be done. It breaks my heart to see how animals are abused and neglected day in and day out. But I’m convinced that resorting to violence against person or property in the name of animals is not the way to go. It may be personally satisfying, but it doesn’t ultimately help the animals we profess to care about.
I hereby repudiate organizations such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Earth First! to the extent that they advocate, endorse, tolerate, or engage in violent actions. Everyone who cares about animals should do the same. This is not a betrayal of the cause. It is fidelity to the cause. The betrayers are those who, looking only at the short run or their own satisfaction, undermine public support for the goal of protecting animals.
Moderates face a dilemma. Either they repudiate their extreme colleagues or they do not. If they repudiate them, they risk alienating them and losing their energy and resources. If they do not repudiate them, they risk alienating their audience. Many people favor social change but are not willing to endorse or accept just any means to that change. They are, in philosophical terms, deontologists. They believe that evil may not be done that good may come. They believe that the end does not justify the means.
Many people, such as my Ethics of War co-blogger Len Carrier, sincerely believe that the war in Iraq was a mistake. They may believe that some good has come from the war, but not enough to justify the costs. Others take it to absurd extremes, propounding conspiracy theories about why the United States went to war, making personal attacks on those who waged it, and doing everything possible to undermine the war effort. When presidential candidate Wesley Clark was asked to repudiate some of the wild assertions made by one of his supporters, Michael Moore, he refused to do so. This was unfortunate (and telling), for it made it seem as though he were just as irrational as Moore, and nobody wants an irrational president. I know I don’t.
You’re probably wondering why I’m talking about war in Iraq in a post ostensibly about animals. It’s because there’s a parallel. Many people believe that factory farming and other horrific practices must be abolished. But by what means? Some people advocate working within the system, trying to muster support for enactment, amendment, or repeal of laws. Others are impatient with this, thinking, as King did, that nothing will ever change by working within the system. Some of the impatient ones take extreme measures, such as destroying property or injuring or killing persons. This is a serious problem for the animal-liberation movement. If the aim is to change minds, resorting to violence may be counterproductive.
I’m a moderate when it comes to animal liberation. I believe that in the long run, the most effective means to social change is rational persuasion. Not force, not coercion, not manipulation. The people I persuade will manifest their changed attitudes and beliefs both in their personal lives (by changing their diets, for example) and in their political behavior. We live in a democracy. Each of us is entitled to vote our consciences. My goal is to work on consciences. I believe this is also the goal of Peter Singer. Perhaps we philosophers are naïve, but we are committed to reason. We would rather not persuade at all than persuade by nonrational means.
Some people are frustrated by the slowness of this process. But look how much progress has been made in the past hundred years. The moral and legal status of nonhuman animals has improved considerably. No, it hasn’t changed nearly enough. There is a great deal of work yet to be done. It breaks my heart to see how animals are abused and neglected day in and day out. But I’m convinced that resorting to violence against person or property in the name of animals is not the way to go. It may be personally satisfying, but it doesn’t ultimately help the animals we profess to care about.
I hereby repudiate organizations such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Earth First! to the extent that they advocate, endorse, tolerate, or engage in violent actions. Everyone who cares about animals should do the same. This is not a betrayal of the cause. It is fidelity to the cause. The betrayers are those who, looking only at the short run or their own satisfaction, undermine public support for the goal of protecting animals.
11 July 2004
David Hume (1711-1776) on the Impotence of Reason
Since morals . . . have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.
(David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects, Book III ["Of Morals"], Part I ["Of Virtue and Vice in General"], Section I ["Moral Distinctions Not Deriv'd from Reason"], Paragraph 6 [1740])
(David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects, Book III ["Of Morals"], Part I ["Of Virtue and Vice in General"], Section I ["Moral Distinctions Not Deriv'd from Reason"], Paragraph 6 [1740])
Conservatism and Animals
See here for my lengthy post on whether conservatism is compatible with concern for animals.
From Yesterday's Dallas Morning News
Bans on cattle feed debated
Officials say new limits not needed; critics say consumers are at risk
By KATIE FAIRBANK
Six months after promising to remove chicken waste, food scraps and blood from cattle feed systems, federal officials said Friday they aren't sure whether the bans are needed.
The restrictions were announced in January soon after mad cow disease was found in a Holstein in Washington state.
But the rules were not instituted and are now up for public comment along with other possible feed restrictions, including bans on animals that die on farms or can't stand up when they're taken to a slaughterhouse.
The earliest any of the rules under consideration could be instituted would be the end of the year.
Federal regulators say that if cows with suspicious symptoms are kept out of the system, there should be no worries about specific products.
"Based on all of the measures that have been offered, if we did some of these, would we need to do all of them?" asked Dr. Steven Sundlof. The director of the Center for Veterinary Medicine with the Food and Drug Administration spoke during a news conference in Washington, D.C.
Critics of the feed practices say the government has caved in to the meat industry and the exceptions put consumers at risk of mad cow disease, also known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy.
"This is something that could have a health impact," said Tom McGarity, a professor of food safety law at the University of Texas Law School and president of the Center for Progressive Regulation. "American consumers will remain unprotected as ranchers and feedlots continue to feed cow blood to calves and potentially contaminated chicken litter to cattle for the foreseeable future."
Calves are fed blood because the milk that is produced is sold to human consumers.
Chicken litter is a cheap, readily available feed, and plate waste is food left over at restaurants that is sent to rendering plants and added to feed.
Carol Tucker Foreman, food policy director of the Consumer Federation of America, said she didn't understand why the government didn't ban poultry litter and cows' blood as cattle food now and make adjustments later if more stringent rules are put in place.
"Instead they choose to do nothing," she said.
Richard Wortham, executive vice president of the Texas Beef Council, said the meat industry is just "trying to protect the food supply. If there are any additional safeguards that need to take place, they need to be based on science."
The FDA did enact one ban Friday: Brains and other cattle parts that could carry mad cow will no longer be used in cosmetics and dietary supplements.
Those cattle parts are not in the food supply because of an Agriculture Department ban.
The ban affects products made from animals 30 months of age and older, which the government says are more at risk.
A loophole for tallow remains. Tallow is a processed fat made from cattle that is used in cosmetics, but the FDA said that the high heat and pressure used to make it minimize the risk.
Consumer groups applauded the cosmetic and supplement decision.
"I think taking the steps to keep specified risk materials out of FDA-regulated food and dietary supplements and cosmetics is a worthwhile thing to do," said Ms. Tucker Foreman.
"But if you're talking about reducing risk, it would reduce risk a lot more by dealing with the feed issues."
Officials say new limits not needed; critics say consumers are at risk
By KATIE FAIRBANK
Six months after promising to remove chicken waste, food scraps and blood from cattle feed systems, federal officials said Friday they aren't sure whether the bans are needed.
The restrictions were announced in January soon after mad cow disease was found in a Holstein in Washington state.
But the rules were not instituted and are now up for public comment along with other possible feed restrictions, including bans on animals that die on farms or can't stand up when they're taken to a slaughterhouse.
The earliest any of the rules under consideration could be instituted would be the end of the year.
Federal regulators say that if cows with suspicious symptoms are kept out of the system, there should be no worries about specific products.
"Based on all of the measures that have been offered, if we did some of these, would we need to do all of them?" asked Dr. Steven Sundlof. The director of the Center for Veterinary Medicine with the Food and Drug Administration spoke during a news conference in Washington, D.C.
Critics of the feed practices say the government has caved in to the meat industry and the exceptions put consumers at risk of mad cow disease, also known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy.
"This is something that could have a health impact," said Tom McGarity, a professor of food safety law at the University of Texas Law School and president of the Center for Progressive Regulation. "American consumers will remain unprotected as ranchers and feedlots continue to feed cow blood to calves and potentially contaminated chicken litter to cattle for the foreseeable future."
Calves are fed blood because the milk that is produced is sold to human consumers.
Chicken litter is a cheap, readily available feed, and plate waste is food left over at restaurants that is sent to rendering plants and added to feed.
Carol Tucker Foreman, food policy director of the Consumer Federation of America, said she didn't understand why the government didn't ban poultry litter and cows' blood as cattle food now and make adjustments later if more stringent rules are put in place.
"Instead they choose to do nothing," she said.
Richard Wortham, executive vice president of the Texas Beef Council, said the meat industry is just "trying to protect the food supply. If there are any additional safeguards that need to take place, they need to be based on science."
The FDA did enact one ban Friday: Brains and other cattle parts that could carry mad cow will no longer be used in cosmetics and dietary supplements.
Those cattle parts are not in the food supply because of an Agriculture Department ban.
The ban affects products made from animals 30 months of age and older, which the government says are more at risk.
A loophole for tallow remains. Tallow is a processed fat made from cattle that is used in cosmetics, but the FDA said that the high heat and pressure used to make it minimize the risk.
Consumer groups applauded the cosmetic and supplement decision.
"I think taking the steps to keep specified risk materials out of FDA-regulated food and dietary supplements and cosmetics is a worthwhile thing to do," said Ms. Tucker Foreman.
"But if you're talking about reducing risk, it would reduce risk a lot more by dealing with the feed issues."
10 July 2004
Animal Rights
Some time back, Khursh Mian Acevedo sent a list of essays on the moral status of animals. I've been linking to the essays one at a time. Here is an essay on animal rights.
08 July 2004
Reading Material
Here is an essay that may be of interest.
07 July 2004
Justice
My friend Butch had to euthanize his ten-year old canine companion, Justice, who developed a prostate problem that affected other organs. Having lost my Ginger nearly four years ago, I know how Butch feels. If it's any consolation, Butch, you gave Justice a great life. You were loyal to him to the end, as he was to you throughout his life. He is no longer in pain. Don't reflect on what you lost or on what might have been. Reflect on what you and Justice had—the quiet times you spent together, the things you did, the joy and comfort each of you gave the other. Rest in peace, Justice.
06 July 2004
A Puzzle
Anyone who cares about the amount of suffering in the world and wants to do something about it should be concerned about nonhuman animals. Nothing humans do to one another comes close to matching the enormity of what they do to animals. If you eat beef, for example, you are contributing quite directly to a practice that treats sentient beings as little more than flesh-making machines. If you don’t believe me, read this story from The Washington Post. (Here is the same story on a different site.) If you’re not crying by the end of it, you’re not functioning properly.
I’m puzzled by people who care a great deal about the feelings and social status of homosexuals but not at all about animals. Even if you think animals count for less than humans, this is irrational. No homosexual is confined, castrated, and chopped to pieces while alive, the way the cow whose flesh you eat was. All you have to do, if you’re a feeling, thinking person, is stop contributing to the horror. Stop rationalizing your behavior. Stop pretending that the animals whose flesh you eat lived happy lives and died painless deaths, for it’s almost certain that they did not.
I’m puzzled by people who care a great deal about the feelings and social status of homosexuals but not at all about animals. Even if you think animals count for less than humans, this is irrational. No homosexual is confined, castrated, and chopped to pieces while alive, the way the cow whose flesh you eat was. All you have to do, if you’re a feeling, thinking person, is stop contributing to the horror. Stop rationalizing your behavior. Stop pretending that the animals whose flesh you eat lived happy lives and died painless deaths, for it’s almost certain that they did not.
05 July 2004
Confusions and Fallacies About Animals, Part 13
There’s a difference between having a right and being able to assert it. I sometimes hear it suggested that, since animals can’t assert rights, they don’t have any. But this is a non sequitur. Babies can’t assert rights, but surely they have them. The senile can’t assert rights, but surely they have them.
Rightholders can be represented by others. This is done every day when people hire attorneys (or when guardians are appointed for the incompetent). An attorney, literally, is someone who works at the turn of—i.e., in behalf of—another. Actually, attorneys both work in behalf of their clients and speak on behalf of their clients. There are plenty of people who are able and willing to work in behalf of and speak on behalf of animals. Thus, animals’ not being able to assert their rights has nothing to do with whether they have rights to be asserted. Don’t confuse the two.
Sometimes I think animals get shafted because they can’t stand up for themselves. It’s a case of might makes right. When humans are abused, they cry “injustice,” “exploitation,” “oppression,” and “unfairness.” This rallies others to their cause. Animals don’t speak this language. But they have interests, like humans; and their interests can be wrongfully set back. The law is changing, albeit gradually. A hundred years from now, the legal status of animals will be very different from what it is today. Wrongs that now go unrecognized and unremedied will be seen for what they are and dealt with accordingly.
If you’re skeptical that this will happen, look at slavery. It took a long time for people to see the evil in human chattel slavery, evil that seems as obvious to us as that there are people. It required a paradigm shift. It’s only a matter of time before people see the evil in treating animals as property.
Rightholders can be represented by others. This is done every day when people hire attorneys (or when guardians are appointed for the incompetent). An attorney, literally, is someone who works at the turn of—i.e., in behalf of—another. Actually, attorneys both work in behalf of their clients and speak on behalf of their clients. There are plenty of people who are able and willing to work in behalf of and speak on behalf of animals. Thus, animals’ not being able to assert their rights has nothing to do with whether they have rights to be asserted. Don’t confuse the two.
Sometimes I think animals get shafted because they can’t stand up for themselves. It’s a case of might makes right. When humans are abused, they cry “injustice,” “exploitation,” “oppression,” and “unfairness.” This rallies others to their cause. Animals don’t speak this language. But they have interests, like humans; and their interests can be wrongfully set back. The law is changing, albeit gradually. A hundred years from now, the legal status of animals will be very different from what it is today. Wrongs that now go unrecognized and unremedied will be seen for what they are and dealt with accordingly.
If you’re skeptical that this will happen, look at slavery. It took a long time for people to see the evil in human chattel slavery, evil that seems as obvious to us as that there are people. It required a paradigm shift. It’s only a matter of time before people see the evil in treating animals as property.
03 July 2004
Peter Singer
Pablo Stafforini, creator of Peter Singer Links, has posted some new material. Here is a newspaper column from a year or so ago entitled "Some Are More Equal."
02 July 2004
Texana
I lived the first twenty-six years of my life in Michigan, followed by five in Arizona and now sixteen in Texas. Some things were the same in these three states, but many—including climate, geography, flora, and fauna—were different. I’m blessed to have lived in such different environments. If I never live anywhere else, and I probably won’t, I can say that I experienced three distinct regions of the United States: the Great Lakes, the desert Southwest, and the Southern Great Plains.
One of the animals I never saw until I came to Texas in 1988, and which seems to be identified with Texas in people’s minds, is the nine-banded armadillo (Dasypus novemcinctus). According to my Audubon Society Field Guide to North American Mammals (1980), this is “the only North American mammal armored with heavy, bony plates.” The armadillo is a little tank. When threatened, it curls into a ball, too large to be eaten and too hard to be bitten into. Who says evolution isn’t ingenious?
The field guide contains this bit of lore: “The Spanish conquistadors first encountered this strange creature and named it the ‘little man in armor.’ It spends most waking hours digging for food and building burrows, grunting almost constantly.” The map shows a range from West Texas northward into Nebraska and Missouri and eastward to the Atlantic coast, with all but the southernmost tip of Florida covered. While I’ve never touched an armadillo or been close to a living one, I see them flattened on highways quite often. The other day, while returning home from an errand, I narrowly missed either an armadillo or an opossum.
The field guide says that, “For such a clumsy-looking animal it is surprisingly swift. It can swim short distances, gulping air to inflate its intestines for increased buoyancy, and can cross small streams by walking underwater on the stream bed.” And then, disappointingly, there is this: “Its meat tastes somewhat like pork, and its decorative shell is used to make bowls or baskets.” Who would eat such a cute little critter?
One of the animals I never saw until I came to Texas in 1988, and which seems to be identified with Texas in people’s minds, is the nine-banded armadillo (Dasypus novemcinctus). According to my Audubon Society Field Guide to North American Mammals (1980), this is “the only North American mammal armored with heavy, bony plates.” The armadillo is a little tank. When threatened, it curls into a ball, too large to be eaten and too hard to be bitten into. Who says evolution isn’t ingenious?
The field guide contains this bit of lore: “The Spanish conquistadors first encountered this strange creature and named it the ‘little man in armor.’ It spends most waking hours digging for food and building burrows, grunting almost constantly.” The map shows a range from West Texas northward into Nebraska and Missouri and eastward to the Atlantic coast, with all but the southernmost tip of Florida covered. While I’ve never touched an armadillo or been close to a living one, I see them flattened on highways quite often. The other day, while returning home from an errand, I narrowly missed either an armadillo or an opossum.
The field guide says that, “For such a clumsy-looking animal it is surprisingly swift. It can swim short distances, gulping air to inflate its intestines for increased buoyancy, and can cross small streams by walking underwater on the stream bed.” And then, disappointingly, there is this: “Its meat tastes somewhat like pork, and its decorative shell is used to make bowls or baskets.” Who would eat such a cute little critter?
01 July 2004
The Rest of the Story
Keith, below is the story that should have accompanied the catfish images I sent yesterday (see here). I accidentally deleted the text while trying to import it into the flash document. My friend kindly resent it to me this morning, so here it is. Sorry about that . . . Joanna
FISH STORY FROM WICHITA EAGLE NEWSPAPER
This story was published in the Sunday Wichita Eagle newspaper a couple of weeks ago. It happened in a housing development around 119th Street South and Maple. A resident in the area saw a ball bouncing around in the development's pond and, when he went to investigate, he saw a flathead catfish who had obviously tried to swallow a child's basketball which had became stuck in its mouth. The fish was totally exhausted from trying to dive but unable to because the ball would always bring him back up to the surface. The resident tried numerous times to get the ball out but was unsuccessful. He finally asked his wife to cut the ball in order to deflate it and was then able to release the catfish.
FISH STORY FROM WICHITA EAGLE NEWSPAPER
This story was published in the Sunday Wichita Eagle newspaper a couple of weeks ago. It happened in a housing development around 119th Street South and Maple. A resident in the area saw a ball bouncing around in the development's pond and, when he went to investigate, he saw a flathead catfish who had obviously tried to swallow a child's basketball which had became stuck in its mouth. The fish was totally exhausted from trying to dive but unable to because the ball would always bring him back up to the surface. The resident tried numerous times to get the ball out but was unsuccessful. He finally asked his wife to cut the ball in order to deflate it and was then able to release the catfish.
30 June 2004
Catfish at Play?
Joanna Lucas sent this. You'll have to provide the context. It looks like a catfish at play to me, but then, I live with dogs, the most playful critters on earth.
29 June 2004
Hunting
Here is an essay about hunting that may be of interest.
28 June 2004
Confusions and Fallacies About Animals, Part 12
Suppose you’re inclined to eat meat but wonder about the moral permissibility of doing so. You think it might be wrong, since it requires the confinement and killing of sentient beings, but then it occurs to you that your forbearance won’t make a difference. Why deprive yourself of a simple pleasure when it’s not clear that doing so will save an animal’s life? It seems pointless, fruitless, wasteful, abnegating.
If you look at it this way, you’ll probably continue to eat meat. But there’s another way to look at it. I’ve always thought of morality in terms of personal integrity—of having high standards and striving mightily to live up to them. Morality, in this view, is more a matter of what one rules out as unthinkable than of what one decides or does. Do I want to participate in an institution that uses animals as resources—that confines them, deprives them of social lives, frustrates their urges, alters their diets and bodies, and eventually kills them in the prime of their lives? It’s a matter of not getting one’s hands dirty, of not collaborating with evil. Perhaps other people can do these things, I say, but I can’t. I want no part of such a cruel institution. There will be no blood on my hands.
One view of morality sees it as a mechanism of change, with each person being a lever of the mechanism. The other sees it in terms of what sort of person one is. When you hear that billions of animals are killed every year for food, you might think, “My becoming a vegetarian won’t make a difference, so I may as well indulge my tastes.” That’s to take the first view. But why not say that what other people do is not up to you? You control your actions. Your actions reflect your moral values and what sort of person you are. Stand up for something. Say “These things go on, but they do not go on through me!” You’ll feel good about yourself; I guarantee it.
If you look at it this way, you’ll probably continue to eat meat. But there’s another way to look at it. I’ve always thought of morality in terms of personal integrity—of having high standards and striving mightily to live up to them. Morality, in this view, is more a matter of what one rules out as unthinkable than of what one decides or does. Do I want to participate in an institution that uses animals as resources—that confines them, deprives them of social lives, frustrates their urges, alters their diets and bodies, and eventually kills them in the prime of their lives? It’s a matter of not getting one’s hands dirty, of not collaborating with evil. Perhaps other people can do these things, I say, but I can’t. I want no part of such a cruel institution. There will be no blood on my hands.
One view of morality sees it as a mechanism of change, with each person being a lever of the mechanism. The other sees it in terms of what sort of person one is. When you hear that billions of animals are killed every year for food, you might think, “My becoming a vegetarian won’t make a difference, so I may as well indulge my tastes.” That’s to take the first view. But why not say that what other people do is not up to you? You control your actions. Your actions reflect your moral values and what sort of person you are. Stand up for something. Say “These things go on, but they do not go on through me!” You’ll feel good about yourself; I guarantee it.
From NewScientist.com
Dogs can predict epileptic seizures
Some dogs can predict when a child will have an epileptic seizure, a new study has revealed. These dogs not only protect their charges from injuries, such as falling, but also seem to help kids deal with the daily struggle of epilepsy.
Nine of the 60 dogs in the study (15 per cent) were able to predict a seizure by licking, whimpering, or standing next to the child. These dogs were remarkably accurate—they predicted 80 per cent of seizures, with no false reports.
However, those interested in owning a dog with these skills cannot yet just order one. The dogs were not trained, but instead began predicting seizures spontaneously within a month of moving in with their owners.
"No one is reliably training such dogs yet," says Adam Kirton, a neurologist at Alberta Children's Hospital in Canada and lead author of the study. His group is looking into setting up a training program. However, some epilepsy patients do already have dogs that have been trained to protect them during a seizure.
Children with epilepsy are at risk of falling or choking during a seizure. The injury rate is highly variable, but can be about 20 per cent for some types of childhood epilepsy.
"But the worst part of the disease isn't a seizure, it's fear of the next seizure," says Kirton. "By knowing when a seizure might happen, it could liberate them and free them to do what they want to do."
Minutes to hours
Before the new study, reports of dogs predicting seizures had only been anecdotal. So Kirton and colleagues attempted to systematically assess dog behaviour by sending questionnaires to families in their clinic.
Forty-two percent of the families with both an epileptic child and a dog said their dogs responded to seizures. And nine of these dogs actually anticipated the seizure, alerting families minutes to hours before the seizure occurred. Also, dog-owning families reported a higher quality of life than those without, with the owners of seizure-alerting dogs reporting the highest values.
One possible weakness of the study is that the behaviour was reported by the dog-owners themselves, who may overestimated their dog's abilities. Kirton therefore plans to do another study in a more clinical setting, which will also try to determine how these dogs predict seizures.
At present, the mechanism is unknown. But some researchers speculate that the dog could be using subtle visual or olfactory cues that occur before a seizure.
Gregory Holmes, a neurologist at Dartmouth Medical School in New Hampshire, says the dogs could be detecting a change in smell. "People have autonomic changes, such as increased sweating, which a dog could pick up on."
According to Douglas Nordli, director of the children's epilepsy center at Children's Memorial Hospital in Chicago, such external changes could result from a small electrical discharge that occurs in the brain before the full blown electrical seizure.
Journal reference: Neurology (vol 62, p 2303)
Emily Singer
Some dogs can predict when a child will have an epileptic seizure, a new study has revealed. These dogs not only protect their charges from injuries, such as falling, but also seem to help kids deal with the daily struggle of epilepsy.
Nine of the 60 dogs in the study (15 per cent) were able to predict a seizure by licking, whimpering, or standing next to the child. These dogs were remarkably accurate—they predicted 80 per cent of seizures, with no false reports.
However, those interested in owning a dog with these skills cannot yet just order one. The dogs were not trained, but instead began predicting seizures spontaneously within a month of moving in with their owners.
"No one is reliably training such dogs yet," says Adam Kirton, a neurologist at Alberta Children's Hospital in Canada and lead author of the study. His group is looking into setting up a training program. However, some epilepsy patients do already have dogs that have been trained to protect them during a seizure.
Children with epilepsy are at risk of falling or choking during a seizure. The injury rate is highly variable, but can be about 20 per cent for some types of childhood epilepsy.
"But the worst part of the disease isn't a seizure, it's fear of the next seizure," says Kirton. "By knowing when a seizure might happen, it could liberate them and free them to do what they want to do."
Minutes to hours
Before the new study, reports of dogs predicting seizures had only been anecdotal. So Kirton and colleagues attempted to systematically assess dog behaviour by sending questionnaires to families in their clinic.
Forty-two percent of the families with both an epileptic child and a dog said their dogs responded to seizures. And nine of these dogs actually anticipated the seizure, alerting families minutes to hours before the seizure occurred. Also, dog-owning families reported a higher quality of life than those without, with the owners of seizure-alerting dogs reporting the highest values.
One possible weakness of the study is that the behaviour was reported by the dog-owners themselves, who may overestimated their dog's abilities. Kirton therefore plans to do another study in a more clinical setting, which will also try to determine how these dogs predict seizures.
At present, the mechanism is unknown. But some researchers speculate that the dog could be using subtle visual or olfactory cues that occur before a seizure.
Gregory Holmes, a neurologist at Dartmouth Medical School in New Hampshire, says the dogs could be detecting a change in smell. "People have autonomic changes, such as increased sweating, which a dog could pick up on."
According to Douglas Nordli, director of the children's epilepsy center at Children's Memorial Hospital in Chicago, such external changes could result from a small electrical discharge that occurs in the brain before the full blown electrical seizure.
Journal reference: Neurology (vol 62, p 2303)
Emily Singer
27 June 2004
Everydog
You'll enjoy this. First, click here for a reproduction of Vittore Carpaccio's 1503 painting The Apparition of Saint Jerome to Saint Augustine. Study it. Second, click here (PDF) for a wonderful poem about the painting (or rather, what's represented by the painting). Finally, click here for a discussion of the painting by a commencement speaker. Don't you love the little dog?
26 June 2004
Bullfighting
Sometimes the bull strikes a blow.
25 June 2004
The Animal Rights Library
Khursh Mian Acevedo sent this wonderful resource to me the other day, so I thought I'd pass it on. It looks like more fine work by Pablo Stafforini. Thanks, Khursh! Thanks, Pablo! You work in behalf of animals and speak on behalf of animals.
24 June 2004
Homes for the Abandoned
Joanna Lucas sent a link to this heartwarming story from yesterday's Christian Science Monitor.
22 June 2004
The Hidden Victims of War
When we tally up the costs and benefits of war, we must neither disregard not discount the interests of nonhuman animals. Khursh Mian Acevedo sent a link to this illustrated document. It's in PDF format, so please give it a minute or so to load. You won't regret waiting.
21 June 2004
Confusions and Fallacies About Animals, Part 11
The other day, a reader asked whether it is morally objectionable to eat the flesh of animals who died natural or accidental deaths. For example, suppose I strike a deer with my car. If I’m inclined to eat it, may I? Or suppose some animal companion of mine—a cow, a horse, a pig, a chicken, a goat—dies a natural death. May I eat it?
I don’t see why not. There are two reasons, in general, to refrain from eating animal flesh. The first—the utilitarian reason—is that the animals whose flesh you eat were made to suffer. By eating an animal’s flesh, you become a party to its suffering and contribute to further suffering. The second—the deontological reason—is that you deprive animals of their lives. Why is it wrong to kill normal adult human beings like you and me? It’s because we are deprived of our futures, which contain enjoyments, satisfactions, experiences, activities, and projects. Animals are deprived of the same things (with the possible exception of projects) by being killed, even if they were not made to suffer during life.
If an animal is not made to suffer and is not deprived of its future by having its life cut short, I don’t see any reason not to consume its flesh. I’m not saying that anyone must or should eat it, or even that many people would want to, only that one who is so inclined may. I welcome feedback from anyone who has a different take on this. Perhaps I’m missing some morally relevant consideration.
By the way, if it’s permissible to eat the flesh of animals who died natural or accidental deaths, it’s permissible (for the same reasons) to eat the flesh of humans who died natural or accidental deaths. The only difference I can see is that in the case of humans, others, such as relatives and friends, may be distressed by the knowledge that the corpse of their loved one is being consumed. This is a case where the greater intellectual capacity of humans makes a moral difference.
I don’t see why not. There are two reasons, in general, to refrain from eating animal flesh. The first—the utilitarian reason—is that the animals whose flesh you eat were made to suffer. By eating an animal’s flesh, you become a party to its suffering and contribute to further suffering. The second—the deontological reason—is that you deprive animals of their lives. Why is it wrong to kill normal adult human beings like you and me? It’s because we are deprived of our futures, which contain enjoyments, satisfactions, experiences, activities, and projects. Animals are deprived of the same things (with the possible exception of projects) by being killed, even if they were not made to suffer during life.
If an animal is not made to suffer and is not deprived of its future by having its life cut short, I don’t see any reason not to consume its flesh. I’m not saying that anyone must or should eat it, or even that many people would want to, only that one who is so inclined may. I welcome feedback from anyone who has a different take on this. Perhaps I’m missing some morally relevant consideration.
By the way, if it’s permissible to eat the flesh of animals who died natural or accidental deaths, it’s permissible (for the same reasons) to eat the flesh of humans who died natural or accidental deaths. The only difference I can see is that in the case of humans, others, such as relatives and friends, may be distressed by the knowledge that the corpse of their loved one is being consumed. This is a case where the greater intellectual capacity of humans makes a moral difference.
20 June 2004
Laboratory Experiments
The following news item, which I have had tacked to my bulletin board, appeared in The Dallas Morning News on 19 January 2000:
Champaign, Ill.—The University of Illinois has suspended first-year veterinary school lab experiments that can kill dogs, rabbits and pigs. The decision to stop such experiments through the spring semester followed complaints from veterinary students and members of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals. Twenty-six students, or a quarter of the first-year veterinary class, signed a petition last fall saying they would not participate in animal labs during the spring semester. The veterinary school has used about 100 dogs and pigs annually to teach animal physiology, including a course in which students inject drugs into dogs to change their heartbeat or their rate of breathing.I find it hard to believe that PETA had any influence on the university’s decision. What obviously troubled the university was the fact that its students refused to participate. Now, maybe the students themselves were influenced by PETA, in which case I salute PETA. I haven’t seen a follow-up about this decision. I hope the suspension of experiments became permanent. If anyone has information, let me know.
19 June 2004
18 June 2004
Ad Hominem Arguments and Ad Hominem Fallacies
Just as not all slippery-slope arguments are slippery-slope fallacies (see the post of 19 November 2003 in the AnalPhilosopher archive), not all ad hominem arguments are ad hominem fallacies. If you want to learn the difference between the ad hominem argument (i.e., the argumentum ad hominem, or argument to the person) and the ad hominem fallacy (attack on the person), read my essay “How to Argue,” a permanent link to which appears on the left side of this blog.
Here’s the difference in a nutshell. The ad hominem fallacy consists in dismissing a person’s argument on the basis of some negative characteristic of the person (rather than because of some defect in the argument). That you are a jerk does not make your arguments bad (any more than your being a saint makes your arguments good).
Note that this fallacy requires dismissal of an argument. It has the form:
One does not commit the ad hominem fallacy merely by attacking or disparaging a person. That may be disrespectful, but disrespectfulness is not a fallacy. It’s a vice, a character defect. A fallacy is a psychologically attractive but logically defective argument. It is a mistake in reasoning, not a way of treating someone.
The ad hominem argument, which is perfectly legitimate, indeed essential to effective persuasion, consists in holding people to their beliefs, values, or principles. If you’re a Christian and I point out to you that you’re not living up to your Christian principles, I commit no fallacy. I’m simply helping you be a better Christian, for which you should be grateful, not resentful. I do not need to be a Christian myself for this to work.
All of which is to say that I did not commit an ad hominem fallacy in my post (see here) about Michael Moore. I couldn’t have, since I didn’t dismiss any argument he made. (Does he make arguments?) Perhaps I was disrespectful to Moore, in which case I was bad. Then again, perhaps he doesn’t deserve respect, in which case I wasn’t bad. Respect must be earned.
Here’s the difference in a nutshell. The ad hominem fallacy consists in dismissing a person’s argument on the basis of some negative characteristic of the person (rather than because of some defect in the argument). That you are a jerk does not make your arguments bad (any more than your being a saint makes your arguments good).
Note that this fallacy requires dismissal of an argument. It has the form:
1. S is a bad person (in some respect).Compare:Therefore,2. S is a bad arguer (i.e., S's argument is bad).
1. M is a small animal.That this is invalid is easily seen, for the premise can be true while the conclusion is false (if M is a large mouse). The invalidity consists in transferring a relative term (“bad” or “small”) from one class to another. That this cannot be done is clear; the criteria for smallness in animals differ from (or rather, are not necessarily the same as) the criteria for smallness in mice. The criteria for badness in persons are not necessarily the same as the criteria for badness in arguers. Good people can be bad (or merely nongood) arguers. Bad people can be good (or merely nonbad) arguers. (For further discussion, see my textbook Informal Logic, 3d ed.)Therefore,2. M is a small mouse.
One does not commit the ad hominem fallacy merely by attacking or disparaging a person. That may be disrespectful, but disrespectfulness is not a fallacy. It’s a vice, a character defect. A fallacy is a psychologically attractive but logically defective argument. It is a mistake in reasoning, not a way of treating someone.
The ad hominem argument, which is perfectly legitimate, indeed essential to effective persuasion, consists in holding people to their beliefs, values, or principles. If you’re a Christian and I point out to you that you’re not living up to your Christian principles, I commit no fallacy. I’m simply helping you be a better Christian, for which you should be grateful, not resentful. I do not need to be a Christian myself for this to work.
All of which is to say that I did not commit an ad hominem fallacy in my post (see here) about Michael Moore. I couldn’t have, since I didn’t dismiss any argument he made. (Does he make arguments?) Perhaps I was disrespectful to Moore, in which case I was bad. Then again, perhaps he doesn’t deserve respect, in which case I wasn’t bad. Respect must be earned.
From the Mailbag
Dear Keith Burgess-Jackson:
I'm a former philosophy grad student and freelance writer who enjoys your site. I saw your call for someone to forward Michael Moore's references to animals. As it happens, I had a copy of Herbivore magazine, issue #3, which includes "An Open Letter to Michael Moore," from Bruce Friedrich of PETA. The letter comes with a sidebar quoting two Moore passages concerning animals, which I've included below. Friedrich's letter is quite critical of Moore regarding animals. (For your amusement, if you Google PETA and Moore, you'll see they're also running a campaign making an issue of his weight.)
Unfortunately, the Herbivore article is not available online (and the actual issue of the magazine is sold out). But more information about Herbivore is available here.
Interestingly, Herbivore is a bit like Animal Ethics: both puncture stereotypes about vegetarians. You do it by writing as a conservative for animal ethics, while they do it using humour. I think both kinds of diversity are a terrific development for the animal ethics movement.
As one of your more liberal-minded admirers, I wondered if your item on Moore didn't stray a bit into the ad hominem zone. But I'm happy to see anyone get involved with animal issues, whatever their politics (I quite admired Matthew Scully's book, which I'm sure you're familiar with). Overall I think your site is terrific. I often follow up on the links to philosophical papers. I found especially valuable the recent links to Essays in Philosophy and the paper rebutting Steven Davis. I've interviewed Davis myself, and while he is very pro-animal, I've always thought someone should write a response.
For your interest, here are a couple of links to other conservatives (if libertarians count as conservatives) who are pro-animal rights:
Keep up the great work.
Best,
[name withheld by request]
Ottawa, Ontario
P.S. I see you sometimes post emails on the blog. You're welcome to do so with all or part of this one, but I'd prefer you don't include my name if so.
From Dude, Where's My Country?
By Michael Moore
Page 190: "Vegetarianism is unhealthy. Humans need protein, and lots of it. Put down those sprouts and pick up a T-bone."
Pages 192-3: "Animals don't have rights."
"'Freeing' chickens from their factory farms is idiotic. They don't know how to survive in the wild and they're just going to get hit by a truck."
"You just look like a dumbass if you go on national TV, like PETA does, to argue that beer is better for the body than milk. This shit just makes me wanna go kick my dog."
I'm a former philosophy grad student and freelance writer who enjoys your site. I saw your call for someone to forward Michael Moore's references to animals. As it happens, I had a copy of Herbivore magazine, issue #3, which includes "An Open Letter to Michael Moore," from Bruce Friedrich of PETA. The letter comes with a sidebar quoting two Moore passages concerning animals, which I've included below. Friedrich's letter is quite critical of Moore regarding animals. (For your amusement, if you Google PETA and Moore, you'll see they're also running a campaign making an issue of his weight.)
Unfortunately, the Herbivore article is not available online (and the actual issue of the magazine is sold out). But more information about Herbivore is available here.
Interestingly, Herbivore is a bit like Animal Ethics: both puncture stereotypes about vegetarians. You do it by writing as a conservative for animal ethics, while they do it using humour. I think both kinds of diversity are a terrific development for the animal ethics movement.
As one of your more liberal-minded admirers, I wondered if your item on Moore didn't stray a bit into the ad hominem zone. But I'm happy to see anyone get involved with animal issues, whatever their politics (I quite admired Matthew Scully's book, which I'm sure you're familiar with). Overall I think your site is terrific. I often follow up on the links to philosophical papers. I found especially valuable the recent links to Essays in Philosophy and the paper rebutting Steven Davis. I've interviewed Davis myself, and while he is very pro-animal, I've always thought someone should write a response.
For your interest, here are a couple of links to other conservatives (if libertarians count as conservatives) who are pro-animal rights:
This is a libertarian site.Interestingly (as you may already know), libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick also endorsed ethical vegetarianism in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. I hope it is a trend that is growing.
And this is the blog of a writer for Reason magazine who writes about animals from time to time.
Keep up the great work.
Best,
[name withheld by request]
Ottawa, Ontario
P.S. I see you sometimes post emails on the blog. You're welcome to do so with all or part of this one, but I'd prefer you don't include my name if so.
From Dude, Where's My Country?
By Michael Moore
Page 190: "Vegetarianism is unhealthy. Humans need protein, and lots of it. Put down those sprouts and pick up a T-bone."
Pages 192-3: "Animals don't have rights."
"'Freeing' chickens from their factory farms is idiotic. They don't know how to survive in the wild and they're just going to get hit by a truck."
"You just look like a dumbass if you go on national TV, like PETA does, to argue that beer is better for the body than milk. This shit just makes me wanna go kick my dog."
17 June 2004
From the Mailbag
Keith, I am forwarding this information I found very valuable.
There's a virtual consensus among "food economists" that eating healthfully at the bottom of the food chain (i.e. veganism or near vegetarianism) is the most sustainable way for the human population to eat, animal welfare issues aside. Here is a column on the subject by George Monbiot that makes the basic case. Seemingly the lone dissident, an agricultural academic named Steven Davis, favors a pastured ruminant omnivorous diet for the planet [see here]. He has been rebutted in this paper.Joanna
Michael Moore's View of Animals and Those Who Defend Them
The other day, someone sent some quotations from Michael Moore’s books or essays. I unfortunately deleted them. The quotations were awful. Moore not only expressed indifference to the fate of animals; he poked fun at those who care about them and ridiculed the idea of animal rights. It was vile stuff, which shows the true character of this “man of the people.” I have a friend who cares deeply about animals but also admires and respects Moore. I wonder how he feels about Moore’s mockery of what he holds dear.
This raises a larger question. Leftists profess to be concerned with the disadvantaged, the oppressed, the downtrodden, the exploited. Don’t these terms apply, quite literally, to nonhuman animals? Michael Moore doesn’t see the contradiction between defending working people from greedy capitalists (an instance of exploitation) and dining on the flesh of cows, pigs, and chickens, who were made to suffer horribly (and eventually die) for his trivial pleasure. I don’t think Moore really cares about human beings, if you want to know the truth. I think he cares about himself, and only himself.
If someone has quotations about animals from Moore’s books or essays, please send them to me with full citations, including page numbers. I don’t own any of his writings and never will. He’s a despicable and hypocritical human being, one of the very worst I’ve seen. That he is celebrated in certain quarters—e.g., Hollywood, France, academia—is a symptom of an insidious social disease.
This raises a larger question. Leftists profess to be concerned with the disadvantaged, the oppressed, the downtrodden, the exploited. Don’t these terms apply, quite literally, to nonhuman animals? Michael Moore doesn’t see the contradiction between defending working people from greedy capitalists (an instance of exploitation) and dining on the flesh of cows, pigs, and chickens, who were made to suffer horribly (and eventually die) for his trivial pleasure. I don’t think Moore really cares about human beings, if you want to know the truth. I think he cares about himself, and only himself.
If someone has quotations about animals from Moore’s books or essays, please send them to me with full citations, including page numbers. I don’t own any of his writings and never will. He’s a despicable and hypocritical human being, one of the very worst I’ve seen. That he is celebrated in certain quarters—e.g., Hollywood, France, academia—is a symptom of an insidious social disease.
16 June 2004
From the Mailbag
"But animals are harmed (egregiously, profoundly, irreversibly) by meat-eating, so the presumption in favor of tradition is rebutted in this case, as is the corresponding commonsense belief that meat-eating is morally acceptable." [See here.]
Although I understand what this sentence was about, I think the wording is incorrect, and thinking about alternate meanings led me to some questions.
I think you really meant to say animals are harmed by being killed (for their meat)—the physical act of eating their flesh does not harm their interests, since they are already dead. Even if the meat were not eaten, their interests would be harmed irreversibly, so I don't see how the act of meat-eating would add anything to that.
I don't think it's a minor terminological issue, either, since it raises the question—do you think it's moral to eat meat from animals that died a natural death?
I don't recall this being addressed on your website, but I could have missed it. I believe that lower-caste Indians do actually eat the meat of cows that die of natural causes in India, but not sure how reliable that is.
A related question would be if it's okay to raise animals for that purpose, giving them a reasonable life, then as soon as they die-off to market.
John Crawford
Although I understand what this sentence was about, I think the wording is incorrect, and thinking about alternate meanings led me to some questions.
I think you really meant to say animals are harmed by being killed (for their meat)—the physical act of eating their flesh does not harm their interests, since they are already dead. Even if the meat were not eaten, their interests would be harmed irreversibly, so I don't see how the act of meat-eating would add anything to that.
I don't think it's a minor terminological issue, either, since it raises the question—do you think it's moral to eat meat from animals that died a natural death?
I don't recall this being addressed on your website, but I could have missed it. I believe that lower-caste Indians do actually eat the meat of cows that die of natural causes in India, but not sure how reliable that is.
A related question would be if it's okay to raise animals for that purpose, giving them a reasonable life, then as soon as they die-off to market.
John Crawford
15 June 2004
Peter Singer on the Expanding Circle
The circle of altruism has broadened from the family and tribe to the nation and race, and we are beginning to recognize that our obligations extend to all human beings. The process should not stop there. In my earlier book, Animal Liberation, I showed that it is as arbitrary to restrict the principle of equal consideration of interests to our own species as it would be to restrict it to our own race. The only justifiable stopping place for the expansion of altruism is the point at which all whose welfare can be affected by our actions are included within the circle of altruism. This means that all beings with the capacity to feel pleasure or pain should be included; we can improve their welfare by increasing their pleasures and diminishing their pains.
The expansion of the moral circle should therefore be pushed out until it includes most animals. (I say “most” rather than “all” because there comes a point as we move down the evolutionary scale—oysters, perhaps, or even more rudimentary organisms—when it becomes doubtful if the creature we are dealing with is capable of feeling anything.) From an impartial point of view, the pleasures and pains of non-human animals are no less significant because the animals are not members of the species Homo sapiens. This does not mean that a human being and a mouse must always be treated equally, or that their lives are of equal value. Humans have interests—in ideas, in education, in their future plans—that mice are not capable of having. It is only when we are comparing similar interests—of which the interest in avoiding pain is the most important example—that the principle of equal consideration of interests demands that we give equal weight to the interests of the human and the mouse.
The expansion of the moral circle to non-human animals is only just getting under way. It has still to gain verbal and intellectual acceptance, let alone be generally practiced. Yet the ecology movement has emphasized that we are not the only species on this planet, and should not value everything by its usefulness to human beings; and defenders of rights for animals are gradually replacing the old-fashioned animal welfare organizations which cared a lot for domestic pets but little for animals with less emotional appeal to us. In philosophy departments all over the English-speaking world, the moral status of animals has become a lively topic of debate, and the number of those calling for a change in our present attitude toward animals is growing. The idea of equal consideration for animals strikes many as bizarre, but perhaps no more bizarre than the idea of equal consideration for blacks seemed three hundred years ago. We are witnessing the first stirrings of a momentous new stage in our moral thinking.
(Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology [New York and Scarborough, Ontario: New American Library, 1982], 120-1 [first published in 1981])
The expansion of the moral circle should therefore be pushed out until it includes most animals. (I say “most” rather than “all” because there comes a point as we move down the evolutionary scale—oysters, perhaps, or even more rudimentary organisms—when it becomes doubtful if the creature we are dealing with is capable of feeling anything.) From an impartial point of view, the pleasures and pains of non-human animals are no less significant because the animals are not members of the species Homo sapiens. This does not mean that a human being and a mouse must always be treated equally, or that their lives are of equal value. Humans have interests—in ideas, in education, in their future plans—that mice are not capable of having. It is only when we are comparing similar interests—of which the interest in avoiding pain is the most important example—that the principle of equal consideration of interests demands that we give equal weight to the interests of the human and the mouse.
The expansion of the moral circle to non-human animals is only just getting under way. It has still to gain verbal and intellectual acceptance, let alone be generally practiced. Yet the ecology movement has emphasized that we are not the only species on this planet, and should not value everything by its usefulness to human beings; and defenders of rights for animals are gradually replacing the old-fashioned animal welfare organizations which cared a lot for domestic pets but little for animals with less emotional appeal to us. In philosophy departments all over the English-speaking world, the moral status of animals has become a lively topic of debate, and the number of those calling for a change in our present attitude toward animals is growing. The idea of equal consideration for animals strikes many as bizarre, but perhaps no more bizarre than the idea of equal consideration for blacks seemed three hundred years ago. We are witnessing the first stirrings of a momentous new stage in our moral thinking.
(Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology [New York and Scarborough, Ontario: New American Library, 1982], 120-1 [first published in 1981])
From Today's New York Times
To the Editor:
Re "Finally, an Old Dog That Can Learn New Tricks" (news article, June 11):
The only surprising thing about the news that Rico, a 9-year-old border collie, can understand human language is the attention paid to it by the news media.
On the day I read about this "Albert Einstein" of the dog world, Bailey, my 3-year-old golden retriever, came to me with my daughter Leah's stuffed toy in her mouth. After reminding Bailey that it was Leah's toy, not hers, I told her sternly, "Go ask Leah" if she could have the toy.
Bailey disappeared. Five minutes later, my daughter yelled from downstairs: "Mom! Bailey's following me around and won't leave me alone!"
Of course dogs can understand language. It shouldn't take a scientist and a controlled experiment to discover this.
KATHY FLAKE
Albuquerque, June 11, 2004
To the Editor:
Rico, the 9-year-old border collie from Germany who learns by fast mapping, is impressive, as is Jack, my 8-year-old Australian shepherd. Jack knows, in advance, when a dog will appear on TV.
He will be in an adjacent room where he can hear, but not see, the TV. He'll hear the music of a familiar commercial and run into the living room to the TV. Why? Because he knows that a few seconds after the music starts, a dog will appear that he can bark at.
It's happened dozens of times, with different music, ads and dogs, so it can't be a coincidence. He's learned to identify certain music with the imminent arrival on the screen of another dog in his territory. If there's no animal in the ads, Jack ignores the TV.
DAVID FEHR
Williamstown, Mass., June 12, 2004
To the Editor:
The ability of Rico, a border collie, to learn by inference is seemingly impressive, but I suspect that it's so only because of the assumptions we make about the members of other species.
My cat talks from time to time, yet I have no idea what he's saying, so he compensates for my poor learning skills by using body language that he somehow deduces I'll understand.
There are thousands of stories showing an innate ability of animals to reason. Perhaps we ought to rethink our own reasoning ability when we use it to denigrate the integrity and dignity of members of other species by confining them, exploiting them and knowingly causing them pain and stress in order to dine on their flesh, wear their fur, probe their bodies and force them to perform.
JACQUELINE RAVEN
New York, June 11, 2004
Re "Finally, an Old Dog That Can Learn New Tricks" (news article, June 11):
The only surprising thing about the news that Rico, a 9-year-old border collie, can understand human language is the attention paid to it by the news media.
On the day I read about this "Albert Einstein" of the dog world, Bailey, my 3-year-old golden retriever, came to me with my daughter Leah's stuffed toy in her mouth. After reminding Bailey that it was Leah's toy, not hers, I told her sternly, "Go ask Leah" if she could have the toy.
Bailey disappeared. Five minutes later, my daughter yelled from downstairs: "Mom! Bailey's following me around and won't leave me alone!"
Of course dogs can understand language. It shouldn't take a scientist and a controlled experiment to discover this.
KATHY FLAKE
Albuquerque, June 11, 2004
To the Editor:
Rico, the 9-year-old border collie from Germany who learns by fast mapping, is impressive, as is Jack, my 8-year-old Australian shepherd. Jack knows, in advance, when a dog will appear on TV.
He will be in an adjacent room where he can hear, but not see, the TV. He'll hear the music of a familiar commercial and run into the living room to the TV. Why? Because he knows that a few seconds after the music starts, a dog will appear that he can bark at.
It's happened dozens of times, with different music, ads and dogs, so it can't be a coincidence. He's learned to identify certain music with the imminent arrival on the screen of another dog in his territory. If there's no animal in the ads, Jack ignores the TV.
DAVID FEHR
Williamstown, Mass., June 12, 2004
To the Editor:
The ability of Rico, a border collie, to learn by inference is seemingly impressive, but I suspect that it's so only because of the assumptions we make about the members of other species.
My cat talks from time to time, yet I have no idea what he's saying, so he compensates for my poor learning skills by using body language that he somehow deduces I'll understand.
There are thousands of stories showing an innate ability of animals to reason. Perhaps we ought to rethink our own reasoning ability when we use it to denigrate the integrity and dignity of members of other species by confining them, exploiting them and knowingly causing them pain and stress in order to dine on their flesh, wear their fur, probe their bodies and force them to perform.
JACQUELINE RAVEN
New York, June 11, 2004
From the Mailbag
I was very intrigued by your blog [post] re: eating meat. If I understand your blog, you are saying that because there is a risk (albeit remote) of hurting another, one must consider whether the harm to eating flesh is morally justifiable. Implicit in this argument is the idea that there may, perhaps, be an act of immorality involved in the eating of flesh, and that to be moral, an agent must consider the possibility. (Although I don’t understand how the act of cogitation renders another act moral or not; either it is moral to eat flesh or it is not. If you cogitate and reach an incorrect conclusion, you are behaving both immorally and in error.)
I argue that you have turned it around. Your idea would be valid if there were any reason to assume that animals are anything other than fodder. There can be a risk of immorally harming an animal only if an animal is somehow imbued with sentience, or a soul, or some element of morality. Since animals have none of these elements there is no reason to give thought to eating one any more than there is a need to give thought to eating an ear of corn.
This begs the question: Is there a need to consider the morality of eating corn or animals? I can’t see how there can possibly be. Whether you accept (as I do) the Word of God as it pertains to man’s use of the earth, or if you believe that man is a product solely of the flesh, you have to accept that man is, if nothing else, a product of the natural order. Man’s actions are no more unnatural than any other animal’s, and therefore man’s morality in eating other creatures is no less an issue than any other creature’s consumption of another. Is a wolf immoral for eating a lamb? It seems to me that if I have to consider the morality of consuming a wolf, then the element of sentience that a wolf may possess that would make eating him immoral also places the wolf in the position of behaving immorally when it consumes flesh, which is absurd.
Warmest regards,
Mark T. Gibson
Rockvale, TN
I argue that you have turned it around. Your idea would be valid if there were any reason to assume that animals are anything other than fodder. There can be a risk of immorally harming an animal only if an animal is somehow imbued with sentience, or a soul, or some element of morality. Since animals have none of these elements there is no reason to give thought to eating one any more than there is a need to give thought to eating an ear of corn.
This begs the question: Is there a need to consider the morality of eating corn or animals? I can’t see how there can possibly be. Whether you accept (as I do) the Word of God as it pertains to man’s use of the earth, or if you believe that man is a product solely of the flesh, you have to accept that man is, if nothing else, a product of the natural order. Man’s actions are no more unnatural than any other animal’s, and therefore man’s morality in eating other creatures is no less an issue than any other creature’s consumption of another. Is a wolf immoral for eating a lamb? It seems to me that if I have to consider the morality of consuming a wolf, then the element of sentience that a wolf may possess that would make eating him immoral also places the wolf in the position of behaving immorally when it consumes flesh, which is absurd.
Warmest regards,
Mark T. Gibson
Rockvale, TN
14 June 2004
Confusions and Fallacies About Animals, Part 10
I’ve written a great deal (some would say too much) about liberalism and conservatism as political moralities. Did you know that there are analogues in epistemology? (Epistemology is the science, study, or theory [logos] of knowledge [episteme].) Epistemological liberals accord no presumption to commonsense or ordinary belief. In their view, beliefs are guilty until proved innocent, i.e., unjustified until justified. Epistemological conservatives, by contrast, accord a presumption to commonsense or ordinary belief. In their view, beliefs are innocent (justified) until proved guilty (unjustified).
It will not surprise you to learn that I’m an epistemological conservative as well as a political conservative. I see no reason why anyone’s commonsense beliefs need justification. If someone points out to me that two of my beliefs are contradictory, it will of course concern me (for I find cognitive dissonance uncomfortable), and I will take steps to resolve the inconsistency. How I do so, however, is up to me. A conservative will change as little as possible. If the choice is between giving up a belief that lies at the center of my noetic web and giving up a belief that lies at its periphery, rationality dictates that I give up the peripheral belief. I won’t argue the point here, but I believe rationality entails epistemological conservatism. Isn’t it irrational to give up (pay) more than one has to? Isn’t this the case in other realms, such as the economic?
Many people, probably most people, believe that there is nothing morally wrong with eating animal flesh, either because animals don’t matter at all, morally, or because animal interests count for less than human interests. It would seem that an epistemological conservative would presume this belief innocent until proved guilty. But that’s not so. Conservatives don’t accord infinite value to tradition or to commonsense belief. They accord a presumption to them. Presumptions are by their nature rebuttable (overridable). I have argued in various places that, just as the liberal presumption in favor of individual liberty can be (and sometimes is) rebutted (overridden), so the conservative presumption in favor of tradition can be (and sometimes is) rebutted (overridden). Neither liberals nor conservatives, in other words, are absolutists.
In both cases, what does the rebutting is harm to others. My liberty stops at the tip of your nose. I’m free to do as I please provided I don’t harm anyone. By the same token, traditions are morally benign provided they don’t harm anyone. But animals are harmed (egregiously, profoundly, irreversibly) by meat-eating, so the presumption in favor of tradition is rebutted in this case, as is the corresponding commonsense belief that meat-eating is morally acceptable.
The practical upshot of these reflections is that meat-eaters should institute a moratorium on meat-eating until they have thought things through. Don’t just continue with the diet your parents had or that you find tastiest. Take responsibility for your diet. Until you have justified your belief that meat-eating is morally acceptable, it’s morally risky to continue eating meat. Suppose there’s a one-in-ten chance that a human being is on the other side of the target you’re shooting at. Wouldn’t it be irresponsible—reckless—to shoot? You could easily kill someone! Why does this reasoning not apply to meat-eating? Unless you have thought things through and justified your belief, you are taking a moral chance (i.e., playing with moral fire).
Stop. Think. If, after thinking it through in good faith, in light of the facts of meat production, taking all counterarguments into consideration and finding them wanting, you are convinced that meat-eating is morally acceptable, you will be acting responsibly. This is the least we can expect of moral agents. You are a moral agent, aren’t you?
It will not surprise you to learn that I’m an epistemological conservative as well as a political conservative. I see no reason why anyone’s commonsense beliefs need justification. If someone points out to me that two of my beliefs are contradictory, it will of course concern me (for I find cognitive dissonance uncomfortable), and I will take steps to resolve the inconsistency. How I do so, however, is up to me. A conservative will change as little as possible. If the choice is between giving up a belief that lies at the center of my noetic web and giving up a belief that lies at its periphery, rationality dictates that I give up the peripheral belief. I won’t argue the point here, but I believe rationality entails epistemological conservatism. Isn’t it irrational to give up (pay) more than one has to? Isn’t this the case in other realms, such as the economic?
Many people, probably most people, believe that there is nothing morally wrong with eating animal flesh, either because animals don’t matter at all, morally, or because animal interests count for less than human interests. It would seem that an epistemological conservative would presume this belief innocent until proved guilty. But that’s not so. Conservatives don’t accord infinite value to tradition or to commonsense belief. They accord a presumption to them. Presumptions are by their nature rebuttable (overridable). I have argued in various places that, just as the liberal presumption in favor of individual liberty can be (and sometimes is) rebutted (overridden), so the conservative presumption in favor of tradition can be (and sometimes is) rebutted (overridden). Neither liberals nor conservatives, in other words, are absolutists.
In both cases, what does the rebutting is harm to others. My liberty stops at the tip of your nose. I’m free to do as I please provided I don’t harm anyone. By the same token, traditions are morally benign provided they don’t harm anyone. But animals are harmed (egregiously, profoundly, irreversibly) by meat-eating, so the presumption in favor of tradition is rebutted in this case, as is the corresponding commonsense belief that meat-eating is morally acceptable.
The practical upshot of these reflections is that meat-eaters should institute a moratorium on meat-eating until they have thought things through. Don’t just continue with the diet your parents had or that you find tastiest. Take responsibility for your diet. Until you have justified your belief that meat-eating is morally acceptable, it’s morally risky to continue eating meat. Suppose there’s a one-in-ten chance that a human being is on the other side of the target you’re shooting at. Wouldn’t it be irresponsible—reckless—to shoot? You could easily kill someone! Why does this reasoning not apply to meat-eating? Unless you have thought things through and justified your belief, you are taking a moral chance (i.e., playing with moral fire).
Stop. Think. If, after thinking it through in good faith, in light of the facts of meat production, taking all counterarguments into consideration and finding them wanting, you are convinced that meat-eating is morally acceptable, you will be acting responsibly. This is the least we can expect of moral agents. You are a moral agent, aren’t you?
13 June 2004
Animals and War
The links Khursh Mian Acevedo sent to me could be posted on any of my blogs. Here is one that I posted on my Ethics of War blog.
Roger Scruton on Animal Rights
Khursh Mian Acevedo sent a link to this essay by Roger Scruton, who is one of my philosophical heroes. I'll comment on it soon. Thanks, Khursh.
12 June 2004
An Interesting Site
A reader, Khursh Mian Acevedo, sent several links the other day about the effect of war on nonhuman animals. (Thanks, Khursh!) I'll post some of the links here and on The Ethics of War in days to come. While browsing on one of the sites, I came across this.
11 June 2004
Them Wacky Scientists
Anyone who lives with a dog (or watched Lassie) will wonder about the point of doing a scientific study of whether dogs can learn the meanings (or at least the referents) of words. See here. When I say "squirrel," both Sophie and Shelbie go on high alert. I've played around with it. I'll be scratching Shelbie's belly while talking to her in a monotone. I'll slip in the word "squirrel," as in "You're a good girl, Shelbie. We had fun this morning down by the school, didn't we? This evening we'll go around the block. Squirrel." Up she bolts, ears raised, eyes fixed. It's funny. I have to resist yanking her around by doing it all the time.
One thing the scientists might study, given that they're studying what we already know, is how dogs pick up on the tone of one's voice. I think they read their human companions' emotions and moods by focusing on their voices. Dogs are far more intelligent than they're given credit for. Sometimes I think Sophie and Shelbie know me better than I know myself. They read me like a book. They know what I'm doing, what I'm about to do, and even, by sniffing me, what I've done.
One thing the scientists might study, given that they're studying what we already know, is how dogs pick up on the tone of one's voice. I think they read their human companions' emotions and moods by focusing on their voices. Dogs are far more intelligent than they're given credit for. Sometimes I think Sophie and Shelbie know me better than I know myself. They read me like a book. They know what I'm doing, what I'm about to do, and even, by sniffing me, what I've done.
10 June 2004
Blood Sport
Here is a story about seal hunting in Norway. Killing defenseless animals has become a mark of status, a kind of conspicuous consumption. (Thanks to Dan Gifford for the link.)
09 June 2004
Gary L. Francione
Here is an interview with law professor Gary L. Francione, author of, among other things, Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996). I admire Francione very much. If I were an animal, I would love him and hate PETA.
08 June 2004
Letting Me Have It
Smallholder gives me hell here. Ouch!
From the Mailbag
I must disagree with the conclusion of this post that even People Who Think Animals Count For No More Than Rocks (hereafter referred to as PWTACFNMTR) should logically adopt a veggie diet because 1) meat-based agriculture is wasteful, 2) some people are starving, and 3) meat is bad for you. I will attempt to reason from the point of view of PWTACFNMTR.
No matter how wasteful it appears to Dr. [Peter] Singer, agriculture in a highly developed Western country is so efficient that it constitutes only one to two percent of GDP. In fact, most of these countries are net exporters of food. The cost of food is so low that it has exactly little or no bearing on whatever level of domestic starvation their populations experience. That is a political and sociological issue which would remain even if their agricultural systems were entirely crop-based. I conclude that changing to veggie diets in the Western world would not affect starvation there.
In the less developed parts of the world, in which the bulk of humanity lives, agriculture is a much higher component of GDP and in many cases is the dominant component. About half of these folks live where there are decent soils, reliable water supplies, and access to transportation, markets, and supplies. They have instituted modern agricultural techniques (the Green Revolution), and livestock agriculture is an important source of income for them they would be foolish to forgo without some very good reason. The rest of the people in the third world live in intermittently rain-fed, hilly areas far from civilization and its markets. They use a form of agriculture that is an incremental refinement of the way people have grown food and livestock for almost 10,000 years. Livestock can live on locally grown or grazed feed, their "outputs" can enrich the soil, and their very movements can till the soil. Growing livestock is a proven way out of poverty for them. They start with a few chickens, then work up to goats, and then eventually the largest animals (cow/buffalo/camel). At each stage their livestock represent capital stock in an economy which places high value on the animals because of their many uses. Again, it is foolish to expect the PWTACFNMTR among them to conclude in large numbers that becoming veggie will be best for all. It is reasonable to conclude that a large-scale adoption of the veggie lifestyle, which would devastate the market value of the capital stock of the poorest third-world people, would definitely NOT improve the quality of life in the third world.
Lastly, we have the "meat is bad for you" issue. I think you failed to demonstrate why a PWTACFNMTR would conclude that there is something fundamentally unsound with a diet consisting of, say, fruits, vegetables, nuts, grains, and lean meats in moderation. You said the PWTACFNMTR should "look it up." I don't think a PWTACFNMTR would find that this type of diet is considered a health menace.
I think the justification for the veggie lifestyle can only be found in granting moral status to animals, which a PWTACFNMTR does not.
Ben
Duluth, GA
No matter how wasteful it appears to Dr. [Peter] Singer, agriculture in a highly developed Western country is so efficient that it constitutes only one to two percent of GDP. In fact, most of these countries are net exporters of food. The cost of food is so low that it has exactly little or no bearing on whatever level of domestic starvation their populations experience. That is a political and sociological issue which would remain even if their agricultural systems were entirely crop-based. I conclude that changing to veggie diets in the Western world would not affect starvation there.
In the less developed parts of the world, in which the bulk of humanity lives, agriculture is a much higher component of GDP and in many cases is the dominant component. About half of these folks live where there are decent soils, reliable water supplies, and access to transportation, markets, and supplies. They have instituted modern agricultural techniques (the Green Revolution), and livestock agriculture is an important source of income for them they would be foolish to forgo without some very good reason. The rest of the people in the third world live in intermittently rain-fed, hilly areas far from civilization and its markets. They use a form of agriculture that is an incremental refinement of the way people have grown food and livestock for almost 10,000 years. Livestock can live on locally grown or grazed feed, their "outputs" can enrich the soil, and their very movements can till the soil. Growing livestock is a proven way out of poverty for them. They start with a few chickens, then work up to goats, and then eventually the largest animals (cow/buffalo/camel). At each stage their livestock represent capital stock in an economy which places high value on the animals because of their many uses. Again, it is foolish to expect the PWTACFNMTR among them to conclude in large numbers that becoming veggie will be best for all. It is reasonable to conclude that a large-scale adoption of the veggie lifestyle, which would devastate the market value of the capital stock of the poorest third-world people, would definitely NOT improve the quality of life in the third world.
Lastly, we have the "meat is bad for you" issue. I think you failed to demonstrate why a PWTACFNMTR would conclude that there is something fundamentally unsound with a diet consisting of, say, fruits, vegetables, nuts, grains, and lean meats in moderation. You said the PWTACFNMTR should "look it up." I don't think a PWTACFNMTR would find that this type of diet is considered a health menace.
I think the justification for the veggie lifestyle can only be found in granting moral status to animals, which a PWTACFNMTR does not.
Ben
Duluth, GA
07 June 2004
Confusions and Fallacies About Animals, Part 9
It’s a sad fact of life that some people don’t care about animals. It’s tempting to think that no argument for vegetarianism could appeal to these people. But let’s think about it. Suppose you care only about humans. That is to say, suppose that when you deliberate, about diet or anything else, you take only the interests of human beings into consideration. As far as you’re concerned, animals count for no more than rocks. On the moral scale, they have no weight.
You should still be a vegetarian. Sounds crazy, doesn’t it? But keep two facts in mind.
Animal agriculture has many other harmful effects on humans, from pollution of the air they breathe and the water they drink to erosion of the soil they depend on (see here) to the spread of diseases (think of Mad Cow). And meat-based diets are themselves unhealthy, even deadly. They’re linked to heart disease, colon cancer, and stroke, among other maladies. Don’t take my word for it. Check into it! Take responsibility for your choices.
I hope you care about animals, because that in itself will, if you’re rational, dictate your diet; but even if you don’t—even if you care only about humans—you have ample reason to become a vegetarian. All roads lead to vegetarianism.
You should still be a vegetarian. Sounds crazy, doesn’t it? But keep two facts in mind.
1. Meat-based agriculture is wasteful. “If we are to analyze the real efficiency of animals as food machines, . . . we must add in all grain and other food energy spent in rearing and maintaining breeding animals and all losses resulting from infertility and deaths. When these are figured in, only about 17 percent of the usable grain or food energy fed to a dairy herd is recovered in milk, and only about 6 percent of that fed to a beef herd is recovered in edible meat” (Jim Mason and Peter Singer, Animal Factories, rev. and updated ed. [New York: Harmony Books, 1990], 110 [endnote omitted]).By doing what you can to end animal agriculture, such as refraining from eating animal flesh, you improve the world for human beings. What’s good for animals turns out to be good for human beings. This gives the lie to the idea that we must choose between humans and animals. There is no conflict. There is no competition. There is no dilemma.
2. There are human beings throughout the world, including in the United States, who are starving to death or otherwise malnourished. I hope I don’t need to support this factual claim. If you doubt it, do some research.
Animal agriculture has many other harmful effects on humans, from pollution of the air they breathe and the water they drink to erosion of the soil they depend on (see here) to the spread of diseases (think of Mad Cow). And meat-based diets are themselves unhealthy, even deadly. They’re linked to heart disease, colon cancer, and stroke, among other maladies. Don’t take my word for it. Check into it! Take responsibility for your choices.
I hope you care about animals, because that in itself will, if you’re rational, dictate your diet; but even if you don’t—even if you care only about humans—you have ample reason to become a vegetarian. All roads lead to vegetarianism.
06 June 2004
The Vegetarian Site
This website has several good links. Try the one entitled "Philosophy of Animal Rights."
05 June 2004
ALF
Here is the website of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). Please note that providing a link does not constitute an endorsement on my part of any organization, doctrine, or set of tactics.
04 June 2004
"Almost Totally Useable"
Here is a site devoted to emu farming. Note the absence of any indication that emus are sentient, social beings, with interests of their own. To the people involved in the "emu business," emus are resources for human use and consumption. Only efficiency—not morality—dictates how they are treated. Here is information about emus.
03 June 2004
Essays in Philosophy
The Internet is transforming scholarship. Here is an online, edited, refereed philosophical publication. This particular issue is devoted to animal ethics. I hope you enjoy it.
From Today's Dallas Morning News
Poultry trouble grows
Pilgrim's Pride flock is 2nd to be destroyed in recent infections
By KATIE FAIRBANK
A second flock of 24,000 chickens raised for Pilgrim's Pride Corp. has been killed after testing positive for avian influenza, the third incident in the state this year.
The flock of breeding birds was destroyed Saturday after state and federal workers found more evidence of the disease. The officials had been testing to learn whether the virus could be contained after an outbreak in the area last week also resulted in the destruction of 24,000 birds.
The tests of the second flock showed "the same strain of avian influenza as in the first flock (H7N3)," Dr. Bob Hillman, executive director of the Texas Animal Health Commission, said in a statement released Wednesday.
The birds were on farms near Sulphur Springs in Hopkins County. Officials have been testing surrounding commercial flocks, as well as privately owned chickens and waterfowl, to determine how far the disease had spread.
Nearly all of that testing is now complete, although test results are not yet known.
According to Dr. Hillman, the same people owned both sets of diseased flocks. Their names have not been released.
Pilgrim's Pride, based in Pittsburg, Texas, said that the chickens were used to lay eggs for hatching and that none of the products had left the farms.
Texas agriculture officials have tried to reassure consumers, saying the disease does not compromise the safety of cooked poultry or eggs.
The disease is usually transmitted from bird to bird through respiratory discharge.
It can also be passed in bird manure.
Pilgrim's Pride spokeswoman Sondra Fowler said the company decided to destroy the flock "as a prudent, pre-emptive action."
"One preliminary test showed a positive. Normally, they're tested a lot more than that. We went ahead and depopulated because we thought it was the prudent thing to do," she said.
The company expects no significant impact from this outbreak, unlike in 2002, when avian influenza cost the company millions and resulted in the destruction of 27.4 million birds.
This time around, the number of infected birds is "still a very small percentage, a fraction of 1 percent of our whole flock," said Ms. Fowler.
In February, more than 9,000 chickens were destroyed in South Texas, and big importers such as Mexico, Russia and Hong Kong banned Texas poultry as a result.
Most countries have relaxed the bans, but some have kept them because the February flu strain (H5N2) was highly capable of causing disease.
Pilgrim's Pride said the company is the second-largest poultry producer in Mexico, so that will help offset any trade issues that arise from bans there.
"That will somewhat mitigate the impact on us. We don't have to export, we're already there," said Ms. Fowler.
The company's stock was up 15 cents to close at $26.96 on the New York Stock Exchange.
Pilgrim's Pride flock is 2nd to be destroyed in recent infections
By KATIE FAIRBANK
A second flock of 24,000 chickens raised for Pilgrim's Pride Corp. has been killed after testing positive for avian influenza, the third incident in the state this year.
The flock of breeding birds was destroyed Saturday after state and federal workers found more evidence of the disease. The officials had been testing to learn whether the virus could be contained after an outbreak in the area last week also resulted in the destruction of 24,000 birds.
The tests of the second flock showed "the same strain of avian influenza as in the first flock (H7N3)," Dr. Bob Hillman, executive director of the Texas Animal Health Commission, said in a statement released Wednesday.
The birds were on farms near Sulphur Springs in Hopkins County. Officials have been testing surrounding commercial flocks, as well as privately owned chickens and waterfowl, to determine how far the disease had spread.
Nearly all of that testing is now complete, although test results are not yet known.
According to Dr. Hillman, the same people owned both sets of diseased flocks. Their names have not been released.
Pilgrim's Pride, based in Pittsburg, Texas, said that the chickens were used to lay eggs for hatching and that none of the products had left the farms.
Texas agriculture officials have tried to reassure consumers, saying the disease does not compromise the safety of cooked poultry or eggs.
The disease is usually transmitted from bird to bird through respiratory discharge.
It can also be passed in bird manure.
Pilgrim's Pride spokeswoman Sondra Fowler said the company decided to destroy the flock "as a prudent, pre-emptive action."
"One preliminary test showed a positive. Normally, they're tested a lot more than that. We went ahead and depopulated because we thought it was the prudent thing to do," she said.
The company expects no significant impact from this outbreak, unlike in 2002, when avian influenza cost the company millions and resulted in the destruction of 27.4 million birds.
This time around, the number of infected birds is "still a very small percentage, a fraction of 1 percent of our whole flock," said Ms. Fowler.
In February, more than 9,000 chickens were destroyed in South Texas, and big importers such as Mexico, Russia and Hong Kong banned Texas poultry as a result.
Most countries have relaxed the bans, but some have kept them because the February flu strain (H5N2) was highly capable of causing disease.
Pilgrim's Pride said the company is the second-largest poultry producer in Mexico, so that will help offset any trade issues that arise from bans there.
"That will somewhat mitigate the impact on us. We don't have to export, we're already there," said Ms. Fowler.
The company's stock was up 15 cents to close at $26.96 on the New York Stock Exchange.
02 June 2004
From the Mailbag
keith—
was reading your post about dogs & cats—and got to the part about other animals.
would have to beg to differ with you about this section:
while mr mollo enjoys looking at the birdies outside his window—i think he honestly seems himself more like ed and me than he does those "outside" birdies!
for him, his natural habitat is INSIDE the house, eating his regular food, with daily treats of eggs, lettuce, nuts and popcorn!
peg
was reading your post about dogs & cats—and got to the part about other animals.
would have to beg to differ with you about this section:
Wild animals such as lizards, snakes, monkeys, rodents (hamsters, gerbils, guinea pigs), and birds did not evolve with humans. They are out of place living in houses. This is highly unnatural for them and must be a source of frustration and distress (although not, given their natures, resentment). We should treat animals according to their nature. It’s in the nature of domesticated animals to need care; it’s in the nature of wild animals to be left alone in their habitats.all of my birds have been bred in the US—with most of them being hand fed. thus—these birds virtually are domesticated from coming out of the egg . . . and probably couldn't even survive out in the wild. they love people and depend upon them to feed them and play with them.
while mr mollo enjoys looking at the birdies outside his window—i think he honestly seems himself more like ed and me than he does those "outside" birdies!
for him, his natural habitat is INSIDE the house, eating his regular food, with daily treats of eggs, lettuce, nuts and popcorn!
peg
Confusions and Fallacies About Animals, Part 8
How, philosophically speaking, should we think about dogs and cats? I’ve heard it said by people in the animal-liberation movement that dogs, cats, and other companion animals are slaves. If so, then they are being wronged and must be liberated forthwith, at whatever cost to our other interests. Just as the institution of human chattel slavery was an abomination, so too is the institution of pet ownership. Both are unjust. Both, accordingly, must be abolished. If you live with a dog or a cat, you are no better, morally, than a plantation owner in the ante-bellum South.
I’m ashamed to admit that I used to think this way, but now I consider it confused. Dogs and cats are domesticated animals. They are not wild. Dogs are not wolves; cats are not wildcats; and you and I are not apes. We evolved from apes, just as dogs evolved from wolves, but being evolved from X doesn’t make one an X. Humans and dogs have lived together for thousands of years. To think that a dog, bred to live with or near humans and to depend on them for food and shelter, could fend for itself in the wild is absurd. Could you fend for yourself in the wild? You might last for a while, but your existence (to quote Hobbes) would be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
The best way to think of dogs and cats is as children. They depend on us. They’re vulnerable. By bringing them into our lives, we assume responsibility for them. They need protection from things they don’t understand, such as automobiles, toxic substances, and malicious people. I’m tempted to say that the proper model for our relationships with dogs and cats is friendship, but while there are aspects of our relationships that are equal (as friendship requires), there are other aspects that are unequal. Parents aren’t their children’s friends, although one day, if they are lucky, they will be. So perhaps that’s the difference. Children can become friends of their parents. Dogs and cats cannot.
There’s a loose sense of “friend” in which I can befriend a dog. We do say, after all, that a dog is “man’s best friend.” But that’s metaphorical. A friend, as Aristotle pointed out, is an alter ego (other self). Friendship is a relation between equals. Some philosophers have thought (and some people still think) that even a man and a woman cannot be friends. Not because they’re different, which of course they are, but because they’re intellectually and morally unequal. As much as I love Sophie and Shelbie, my canine companions, they are not my friends. They are more like my children, looking to me for guidance and protection. I’m a moral agent; they’re moral patients.
To return to the charge that all companion animals are slaves, perhaps the person making it has in mind other animals besides dogs and cats. Wild animals such as lizards, snakes, monkeys, rodents (hamsters, gerbils, guinea pigs), and birds did not evolve with humans. They are out of place living in houses. This is highly unnatural for them and must be a source of frustration and distress (although not, given their natures, resentment). We should treat animals according to their nature. It’s in the nature of domesticated animals to need care; it’s in the nature of wild animals to be left alone in their habitats.
If you want to read more along these lines, see my 1998 essay “Doing Right by Our Animal Companions,” which appeared in The Journal of Ethics.
I’m ashamed to admit that I used to think this way, but now I consider it confused. Dogs and cats are domesticated animals. They are not wild. Dogs are not wolves; cats are not wildcats; and you and I are not apes. We evolved from apes, just as dogs evolved from wolves, but being evolved from X doesn’t make one an X. Humans and dogs have lived together for thousands of years. To think that a dog, bred to live with or near humans and to depend on them for food and shelter, could fend for itself in the wild is absurd. Could you fend for yourself in the wild? You might last for a while, but your existence (to quote Hobbes) would be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
The best way to think of dogs and cats is as children. They depend on us. They’re vulnerable. By bringing them into our lives, we assume responsibility for them. They need protection from things they don’t understand, such as automobiles, toxic substances, and malicious people. I’m tempted to say that the proper model for our relationships with dogs and cats is friendship, but while there are aspects of our relationships that are equal (as friendship requires), there are other aspects that are unequal. Parents aren’t their children’s friends, although one day, if they are lucky, they will be. So perhaps that’s the difference. Children can become friends of their parents. Dogs and cats cannot.
There’s a loose sense of “friend” in which I can befriend a dog. We do say, after all, that a dog is “man’s best friend.” But that’s metaphorical. A friend, as Aristotle pointed out, is an alter ego (other self). Friendship is a relation between equals. Some philosophers have thought (and some people still think) that even a man and a woman cannot be friends. Not because they’re different, which of course they are, but because they’re intellectually and morally unequal. As much as I love Sophie and Shelbie, my canine companions, they are not my friends. They are more like my children, looking to me for guidance and protection. I’m a moral agent; they’re moral patients.
To return to the charge that all companion animals are slaves, perhaps the person making it has in mind other animals besides dogs and cats. Wild animals such as lizards, snakes, monkeys, rodents (hamsters, gerbils, guinea pigs), and birds did not evolve with humans. They are out of place living in houses. This is highly unnatural for them and must be a source of frustration and distress (although not, given their natures, resentment). We should treat animals according to their nature. It’s in the nature of domesticated animals to need care; it’s in the nature of wild animals to be left alone in their habitats.
If you want to read more along these lines, see my 1998 essay “Doing Right by Our Animal Companions,” which appeared in The Journal of Ethics.
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